Does California law require every member of a municipal utility district's security force to be a sworn peace officer with POST training?

Plain-English summary

Public Utilities Code section 12820 lets a municipal utility district employ a "suitable security force" and gives the district's general manager the option to designate certain employees as "security officers." Designated security officers get peace-officer authority under Penal Code section 830.34(a) (powers of arrest, ability to carry firearms if the district authorizes it) and must conform to Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) standards.

Senator Brian Dahle asked: does that mean every member of a utility district's security force has to be a peace officer with POST training? Or can the district staff its security force with a mix of peace officers and non-sworn personnel like guards, monitors, dispatchers, and access-control staff?

The AG said the statute uses different terms ("security force" versus "security officers") for a reason. The first sentence of section 12820 is permissive ("may employ a suitable security force"). The peace-officer requirements attach only to those whom the general manager specifically designates as "security officers" whose primary duty is protecting district property and persons on it. The statute is also silent on what happens to a security force member who is not designated as a security officer or who loses POST certification, which signals that the security force can include non-peace-officer roles.

The legislative history backs this reading. The provision was enacted in 1974 at East Bay Municipal Utility District's request because the District was opening 50,000 acres and 95 miles of trails to the public and wanted armed peace officers for felony arrests. Nothing in the record suggests the Legislature intended to strip the District of its existing authority to also employ ordinary, non-sworn security personnel. The opinion explicitly relies on consultation letters from East Bay MUD and Sacramento MUD confirming a layered staffing model.

What this means for you

If you are the general manager of a municipal utility district

You have flexibility. You can stand up a layered security operation: a small core of POST-certified security officers (designated by you, with peace-officer powers and arrest authority) plus a larger team of non-sworn personnel handling routine monitoring, alarm response, access control, and dispatching. The non-sworn personnel can be district employees, contractors, or a mix. POST training, certification, and ongoing-compliance costs only apply to the designated officers.

Document the designation. Section 12820(a) says the general manager makes the designation, and the peace-officer authority flows from that designation. Keep a written list, update it on hire and separation, and tie firearm authorization to the same documentation. If a designated officer fails POST standards, the statute says they "shall not continue to have the powers of a security officer," but the AG opinion confirms they can remain on the force in a non-sworn role if you choose.

If you direct security at a municipal utility district

This opinion validates a hybrid staffing model. You can hire trained but non-sworn guards for facility patrols, gate posts, and emergency response, and reserve POST-certified personnel for armed posts and arrest situations. Pay scales and benefit costs typically differ substantially between the two categories.

If your district has been treating every security position as a sworn peace officer post, this opinion is your basis to restructure. You may be carrying POST training costs and raised liability exposure that you could shed by reclassifying positions that don't actually need arrest authority.

If you are general counsel to a special district considering similar staffing

The reasoning here is not unique to municipal utility districts. The "may" / "shall" pattern (permissive authorization to employ a force, mandatory peace-officer requirements only on a designated subset) appears in other special-district enabling statutes. If your district's enabling act distinguishes between a "force" and "officers" within that force, this opinion is persuasive authority for the same layered reading.

If you are a current or prospective security employee at a municipal utility district

If you're hired without a peace-officer designation, you don't carry arrest authority, you don't carry firearms (unless the district has separately authorized you under different authority), and you're not subject to POST standards. Your scope of duties is whatever the district assigns within the bounds of state law on private security and use of force. If you're designated as a security officer, your role expands to include arrest authority, you may be authorized to carry firearms, and you must meet and maintain POST standards on an ongoing basis.

If you are a POST oversight or labor auditor

This opinion provides a clean line for distinguishing utility-district personnel who must appear in POST training records and ongoing certification reports from those who must not. The trigger is the general manager's designation under section 12820, not the underlying job title.

Background and statutory framework

The Municipal Utility District Act sits at Public Utilities Code section 11501 et seq., enacted in 1951. Section 12820 was added in 1974 (originally as section 12819, renumbered in 1975). At the time, East Bay Municipal Utility District was opening over 50,000 acres of property to public recreation, including a 95-mile trail. The District wanted armed peace officers with felony-arrest authority because it could already appoint officers for misdemeanor arrests under Penal Code section 836.5 but not for felonies.

Section 12820 reads in full:

(a) A district may employ a suitable security force. The employees of the district that are designated by the general manager as security officers shall have the authority and powers conferred by subdivision (a) of Section 830.34 of the Penal Code upon peace officers. The district shall adhere to the standards for recruitment and training of peace officers established by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training pursuant to Title 4 (commencing with Section 13500) of Part 4 of the Penal Code.

(b) Every security officer employed by a district shall conform to the standards for peace officers of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. Any officer who fails to conform to these standards shall not continue to have the powers of a security officer.

Penal Code section 830.34(a) makes "[p]ersons designated as a security officer by a municipal utility district pursuant to Section 12820 of the Public Utilities Code, if the primary duty of the officer is the protection of the properties of the utility district and the protection of the persons thereon" peace officers with statewide arrest authority for offenses involving immediate danger.

The opinion turns on three textual moves: (1) section 12820 uses "may" for the security force and "shall" for the peace-officer obligations on designated security officers; under Public Utilities Code sections 5 and 14, those words are construed as permissive and mandatory respectively; (2) "security force" and "security officer" are different terms and presumed to mean different things; (3) the cross-reference to Penal Code section 830.34 limits peace-officer status to designated officers whose "primary duty" is protection of district property and persons on it, implying other security personnel exist whose primary duty is something else.

The broader statutory scheme also gives the district board broad management authority under Public Utilities Code sections 11883 (board as legislative body), 11884 (general administrative authority), 11886 (creation of necessary positions), 12721 (contracting and labor), and 12801 (general powers).

Common questions

Can a non-designated security force member carry a firearm at work? Not under section 12820 alone. Penal Code section 830.34 firearm authority flows from the security-officer designation. A non-designated guard would have to satisfy California's general private-security and firearm-permit rules (Bureau of Security and Investigative Services licensing, exposed-firearm permits, etc.). The district as employer also has its own use-of-force policy to manage.

Can the same person work part-time as a designated security officer and part-time as non-sworn security? The opinion doesn't address that directly, but the structure of the statute would not prohibit it. The peace-officer powers attach when the designated officer is performing duties whose "primary duty" is protection of property and persons. Outside that scope, the person is acting in a different role.

What happens if a designated security officer fails POST standards? Section 12820(b) says they "shall not continue to have the powers of a security officer." The AG opinion clarifies that doesn't necessarily remove them from the security force; the district can keep them in a non-sworn role.

Does this opinion change anything for districts that have always operated with all-sworn security forces? It validates that as a permissible choice. The district can still require all security personnel to be POST-certified peace officers if it wants. The opinion just confirms that the district isn't required to.

What about other special districts with similar enabling statutes? This opinion interprets only Public Utilities Code section 12820, which applies to municipal utility districts. Other special districts have their own enabling statutes with their own security-personnel provisions. The reasoning is portable, but the statutory text differs across districts.

Could the Legislature change this?
Yes. The Legislature could amend section 12820 to require every member of the security force to be POST-certified, or to require firearm-bearing personnel to be POST-certified regardless of designation. The AG noted there's "nothing in the legislative record" suggesting the Legislature intended that, so any change would be a new policy choice.

Citations

• Public Utilities Code section 12820 (security force / security officers)
• Public Utilities Code section 11501 et seq. (Municipal Utility District Act)
• Public Utilities Code section 12801 (general powers)
• Public Utilities Code sections 5, 14 (may/shall construction rules)
• Penal Code section 830.34, subdivision (a) (peace officer status for designated district security officers)
• Penal Code sections 13500, 13503, 13510 (POST standards)
• Penal Code section 836 (peace officer arrests)
• Penal Code section 836.5 (misdemeanor arrests by public officers)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/24-401.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
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OPINION
of
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
CATHERINE BIDART
Deputy Attorney General

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No. 24-401
October 9, 2024

The HONORABLE BRIAN DAHLE, MEMBER OF THE STATE SENATE, has requested an opinion on a question relating to municipal utility districts. QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION Does Public Utilities Code section 12820 require all members of a municipal utility district's "suitable security force" to have the peace officer authority and powers specified in that statute, including its related requirement to comply with the applicable standards of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)? No. The peace officer authority and powers and POST-standards compliance specified in Public Utilities Code section 12820 are required only as to security force members whom the utility district's general manager designates as "security officers," and whose primary duty is to protect district property and the persons on it. Not every member of a district's security force must be designated as a security officer or possess peace officer powers and authority.

BACKGROUND
Cities, counties, and certain other entities may form a municipal utility district. The Public Utilities Code authorizes a municipal utility district to provide district inhabitants with a panoply of services including water, power, garbage, sewer, and transportation.

Public Utilities Code section 12820 is part of the Municipal Utility District Act, enacted in 1951. Section 12820 was added in 1974 at the request of the East Bay Municipal Utility District. At the time, the District was opening over 50,000 acres of its property to public recreation, including a 95-mile trail, and anticipated greater security needs. To ensure the safety of the public, the District would need, among other things, armed peace officers to make felony arrests. Section 12820 provides that a "[municipal utility] district may employ a suitable security force," and that district employees whom the district manager designates as "security officers" "shall have" specified peace officer "authority and powers." It further provides that such designated "security officers" and the district "shall" comply with rules of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

ANALYSIS
We are asked to clarify whether section 12820 requires all members of a municipal utility district's "suitable security force" to possess peace office powers and conform to POST training requirements, or whether a district may employ a "suitable security force" that contains personnel who are not designated as "security officers" and who have not attained peace officer status or the concomitant responsibilities for POST compliance. At first glance, "security force" may sound like a synonym or a plural form of "security officers." If that were so, the security force would have security officers only. But as discussed in greater detail below, a careful review of the statutory language, as well as its purpose and context, reveals that a "suitable security force" may include personnel other than those designated as "security officers." And unlike "security officers," these other personnel need not have peace officer authority and powers.

In construing Public Utilities Code section 12820, we employ established rules of statutory interpretation to determine the Legislature's intent. The starting point is to consider the statute's words because they are generally the most reliable indicator of its intended purpose. We consider the "ordinary meaning" of the relevant words, as well as "related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme." If the relevant words are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we then consider extrinsic sources including the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.

Section 12820 begins by stating that a municipal utility district "may employ a suitable security force." The next sentence provides that district employees designated as "security officers" "shall have" the peace officer powers described in Penal Code section 830.34(a), which empowers certain "security officers", those whose primary duty is protecting property and people, to make arrests and (if the district has so authorized) to use firearms. Lastly, the statute provides that "[e]very security officer" "shall conform" to POST standards. Does section 12820 allow a district to employ a "suitable security force" that includes personnel who are not designated as "security officers," and who are therefore not required to have peace officer powers and conform to POST standards?

The first sentence of section 12820 uses "may," and each successive sentence uses "shall." The Public Utilities Code directs that the word "may" is interpreted as permissive and the word "shall" is interpreted as mandatory, unless the context requires otherwise. Applicable case law also generally assigns those same meanings to these words when they are in close proximity to each other, as here. Seeing nothing in the statutory context or otherwise to indicate a contrary meaning, we therefore apply a permissive meaning to "may" and a mandatory meaning to "shall."

Applying a permissive meaning to "may," section 12820's opening sentence means that a district has authorization, but no obligation, to employ a "suitable security force." Applying a mandatory meaning to "shall," the statute provides that any employees who are designated by the district's general manager as "security officers" are required to have peace officer powers, as specified, and POST compliance is required for such officers.

In other words, a district is authorized to hire a "suitable security force"; and peace officer powers and POST compliance are required for those employees of the security force who have the "security officer" designation. But is a district authorized to hire, as part of its "suitable security force," other personnel who are not designated as "security officers"? Put another way, does the statute require that the entirety of the "suitable security force" be comprised solely of designated "security officers" with associated peace officer powers? Or does the statute allow the security force to include personnel without such powers?

First, we observe that the terms "security force" and "security officers" are similar, but not exactly the same. And when the Legislature uses different terms, as it has here, they are presumed to have different meanings.

Second, section 12820 is revealing by what it does not state. It does not state that all members of a district's "suitable security force" shall have peace officer powers with POST compliance. Instead, it provides that those security force members who are designated as "security officers" shall have such powers. This strongly suggests that the statute's authorization of a "suitable security force" means that a district may determine for itself which level of security personnel would be best-suited to its needs, and that its security force may, but is not required to, have designated "security officers" with peace officer powers.

The rest of the statute and the broader statutory scheme similarly support this reading. Section 12820 removes peace officer powers from security officers if they fail to conform to POST standards. But the statute does not state that such an "officer," who had been designated as a "security officer," can no longer be part of the "security force." This all suggests authority to maintain a security force that includes both "security officers" with concomitant POST qualifications and responsibilities, and personnel who are not POST-qualified peace officers.

Having considered the words of the statute itself, we now turn to the statute it cross-references, Penal Code section 830.34. That statute provides that persons designated as "a security officer" under section 12820 qualify as peace officers if their "primary duty" is protecting utility district property and people on it. So even where security force members are designated as "security officers" by a district's general manager, such officers only have peace officer powers and authority to the extent that their primary duty is protecting utility district property and people on it. This further qualification also supports the inference that some members of a district's suitable security force, i.e., those members whose primary duty is not protecting district property and the persons on it, need not satisfy the peace officer requirements imposed on a "security officer."

To resolve any doubt that may remain on the meaning of section 12820, we turn to its purpose as evidenced by the legislative history. The East Bay Municipal Utility District requested enactment of the statute because the District was opening large areas of its property to public recreational use, and sought security powers beyond those it already had, namely the power to make felony arrests. The legislative record does not reflect an intent to remove the District's authority to employ other modes of security (namely, non-peace-officer personnel) as part of its suitable security force. After all, a district might wish to maintain a security force to monitor activities and contact law enforcement as needed. Nothing in the legislative record advocates for, or analyzes the consequences of, removal of a district's then-existing authority to hire security personnel who do not have the requested peace officer powers, as might be expected if the statute had intended to do so. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts cannot read into a law a provision that does not exist and is not shown to be the intent of the lawmakers." For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a municipal utility district is authorized to include personnel on its security force who do not have peace officer powers with related POST responsibilities.