Can a California city council majority attend a paid Chamber of Commerce 'State of the City' breakfast where the mayor speaks, without violating the Brown Act?

Subject

Whether a council majority's attendance at a Ventura Chamber of Commerce breakfast (where the mayor delivered a "State of the City" address, paid admission only, no real-time public alternative) constitutes a "meeting" under the Brown Act, and whether either the conference exception (§ 54952.2(c)(2)) or the community-meeting exception (§ 54952.2(c)(3)) applies.

Plain-English summary

The Ventura Chamber of Commerce hosted a breakfast at the Crowne Plaza Ventura Beach where the mayor delivered the city's "State of the City" address. Tickets were $80 ($60 for chamber members), and there was no other way for the public to watch in real time. The Ventura City Attorney asked the District Attorney whether council members could attend; the DA verbally advised that less than a quorum should go. The mayor delivered the speech, and less than a quorum attended. After the fact, the city attorney and DA disagreed on whether a full council attendance would have violated the Brown Act, and the DA asked the AG.

The AG's three answers:

Q1: Would a council-majority attendance be a "meeting"? Yes. The Brown Act defines a "meeting" as a "congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location … to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body." All three elements are met. A majority is gathered. The members are there to "hear" an item (a State of the City address). And the city's State of the City is plainly an item within the council's subject-matter jurisdiction. The Constitution requires the AG to construe the Brown Act broadly to favor public access, so doubts get resolved against the council.

Q2: Does the conference exception (§ 54952.2(c)(2)) apply? No. That exception applies to "a conference or similar gathering open to the public that involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body." The chamber breakfast was a single speech by a single official about a single city, which doesn't fit the dictionary meaning of "conference" (multiple presentations, interchange of views). And the issues addressed are of interest within Ventura, but not of "general interest to the public" (the public as a whole) or to other city councils on a categorical basis. The legislative history confirms this narrow reading.

Q3: Does the community-meeting exception (§ 54952.2(c)(3)) apply? No. The community-meeting exception requires the event to be "open" to the public. A paid-admission ticket is not "open." The conference exception (c)(2) explicitly allows charging admission ("Nothing in this paragraph is intended to allow members of the public free admission"); the community-meeting exception (c)(3) deliberately omits that language. Under the standard expressio-unius canon, the omission means paid-admission events fall outside (c)(3). The AG noted that watching a recording later doesn't fix the openness problem at the time of the event.

The AG also addressed (uninvited) the "purely social or ceremonial occasion" exception in § 54952.2(c)(5). It doesn't apply either. A State of the City address typically sets policy priorities, project goals, and the legislative agenda. The League of California Cities, the California Chamber of Commerce, and the National League of Cities all publish guidance describing State of the City addresses as substantive policy events. So the address isn't "purely" ceremonial, and the exception requires that purity.

What this means for you

City council members and mayors

If a chamber of commerce, business group, or other private organization invites your full council to attend an event where the mayor (or any other council member) is going to speak about the city, you have three real options:

1. Less than a quorum attends. The simplest fix. The Brown Act doesn't trigger if the event isn't a "congregation of a majority." Your city attorney can tell you who can go. (This is what Ventura did once the DA's verbal advice came in.)
2. Make it a public meeting. If the council wants the entire body to attend, treat the event as a special or regular council meeting: agendize it, post the notice, allow free public access. The chamber can co-host, but the meeting is the council's, governed by Brown Act mechanics.
3. Move to a free, openly-publicized venue. A community meeting at a free-admission town hall could plausibly fit the (c)(3) exception, especially if the chamber organizes the event but allows the public free entry. Caveat: the event still has to be a "meeting organized to address a topic of local community concern," and a single State of the City speech may not be that.

What you can't do: have the city help promote a paid-admission event with a council majority attending and call it a "ceremonial occasion." That's the exact fact pattern the AG rejected.

City attorneys

This opinion is the controlling Brown Act guidance on State of the City addresses. Memo your council and mayor's office now if you haven't already, before next year's address. The risk: a Brown Act violation can be challenged by injunction, civil action, or DA criminal referral (§ 54959; willful violation by member is a misdemeanor). The Ventura DA pursued this question seriously enough to ask the AG; other DAs may follow.

Practical drafting points for your memo:
- The "less than a quorum" rule still works, but it requires you to actually count. Do the math each time and document it.
- The "available later online" workaround does not satisfy the openness requirement at the time of the event.
- The "ceremonial" exception requires purity. If your mayor uses the speech to outline the year's policy agenda (typical), it's not purely ceremonial.

Chambers of commerce and event organizers

You can still host paid-admission speaker events with city officials. What you can't do is have a council majority attend if the speaker is delivering an address on the city's business. The fix on your end:

1. Either make ticket access free (donations OK; admission charge not) so the (c)(3) community-meeting exception works, or
2. Coordinate with the city to bifurcate the event: a public, free-admission council session (a special Brown Act meeting) plus a separate paid networking breakfast. Council members attend the public portion; non-council attendees stay for the breakfast.

Note the AG's footnote that solicitations for donations or sponsorships during a free-admission event are different from required admission fees, and the AG suggests "good practice" of stating that the public may attend free of charge.

District attorneys handling Brown Act enforcement

The opinion is a clean enforcement template. The relevant facts (paid-admission, no real-time public alternative, council majority, item within subject-matter jurisdiction) check every box. Your discretion still controls whether to bring an action, but the legal framework is settled.

Public records and open-meeting advocates

The AG's invocation of the constitutional access rule (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)) is meaningful. It directs broad construction of any Brown Act provision furthering access and narrow construction of any provision limiting access. Any close case under the Brown Act now leans toward openness, including ambiguities in exceptions like (c)(2) and (c)(3).

Common questions

Q: What if a council member attends as a "private citizen" and pays their own ticket?

Doesn't matter. The Brown Act definition of "meeting" turns on the congregation of a majority of members, not on whether they came in their official capacity. If a majority shows up, it's a meeting, regardless of how they paid for the breakfast.

Q: What about live-streaming the speech?

If the live stream is free and publicly accessible at the time of the event, that may satisfy the openness requirement of (c)(3). The AG's footnote points this direction. A delayed-recording posted "later online" does not.

Q: Can the city co-sponsor the event with the chamber, charge no admission, and have the full council attend?

Probably yes if it's organized to address a topic of local community concern, by a person or organization other than the local agency. The wrinkle: if the city itself is the organizer (not the chamber), the (c)(3) exception's "by a person or organization other than the local agency" element fails. Co-sponsorship structure matters.

Q: Does the conference exception (c)(2) work for League of California Cities annual conference attendance?

Yes. That kind of event is a multi-day, multi-presenter conference, addresses issues of general interest to other city councils, and is open to the public (with chargeable admission allowed). It fits the (c)(2) exception cleanly. The League's annual conference is the prototype.

Q: What's the criminal exposure for a Brown Act violation?

Section 54959 makes a willful violation by a member of a legislative body a misdemeanor. Civil remedies under § 54960 and § 54960.1 include injunction and invalidation of action. Cure-and-correct procedures under § 54960.1 give an opportunity to fix problems before suit.

Q: Does this rule apply to county boards of supervisors and school boards too?

Yes. The Brown Act applies to all "legislative bodies of local agencies." County boards, school district boards, special district boards, and similar bodies are all governed by the same rules. The same conclusion would apply to a "State of the County" or "State of the District" address at a paid-admission event.

Q: What about the Bagley-Keene Act for state bodies?

The AG opinion analogizes throughout to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 11120 et seq.), which has nearly identical exceptions. Same answer: the conference exception under § 11122.5(c)(2)(A) requires the event to be a true conference and to address issues of general interest, which a single-state-body-focused presentation typically isn't.

Background and statutory framework

The California Constitution (art. I, § 3, subd. (b)) guarantees public access to government meetings and directs that any provision of law furthering access be broadly construed, while any provision limiting access is narrowly construed. The Brown Act, Gov. Code § 54950 et seq., is the primary implementation of this guarantee at the local-agency level.

The Brown Act's core rule is that every meeting of a legislative body of a local agency must be open and public (§ 54953(a)). A "meeting" is defined in § 54952.2(a) as a "congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location, including teleconference location as permitted by Section 54953, to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body."

The exceptions in § 54952.2(c) carve out specific kinds of gatherings that are not "meetings" even with a majority present. The five most relevant:

• (c)(1) Individual contacts and conversations.
• (c)(2) Conferences or similar gatherings open to the public on issues of general interest.
• (c)(3) Open and publicized meetings on local community concerns by other organizations.
• (c)(4) Open and publicized meetings of another body of which the legislative body is a member.
• (c)(5) Purely social or ceremonial occasions.

Each exception has its own elements. The Constitution's narrow-construction rule for access-limiting provisions applies to each exception.

The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Gov. Code § 11120 et seq.) is the parallel statute for state bodies. Its conference exception (§ 11122.5(c)(2)(A)) tracks the Brown Act's (c)(2). Long-standing AG guidance under Bagley-Keene says a conference focused on the laws or issues of a particular body does not qualify.

The AG's "interest of general interest to the public" reading is grounded in the constitutional access rule plus the legislative history of § 54952.2(c)(2): an earlier version would have applied to "general conferences, conventions, symposia, speeches, classes, and seminars … attended by a broad spectrum of officials from a variety of government agencies." The Assembly narrowed that. The narrowing eliminated the "broad spectrum of officials" requirement, but it also limited the exception to true conferences and similar gatherings.

The "purely social or ceremonial" exception in (c)(5) is read literally: "purely" means completely, exclusively, genuinely. Mixed events fail. The AG cited Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41, which addressed informal lunch gatherings and held them subject to the Brown Act.

Citations

• Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b) (public access constitutional guarantee)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54952.2(a) (definition of meeting)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54952.2(b)(1) (anti-evasion serial communications)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54952.2(c)(2) (conference exception)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54952.2(c)(3) (community-meeting exception)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54952.2(c)(5) (purely social or ceremonial exception)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54953 (open meeting requirement)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54953.3 (no precondition to attendance)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54953.7 (local bodies may impose stricter rules)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 54961(a) (no facility requiring purchase)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 11122.5 (Bagley-Keene Act parallel)
• Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029 (statutory interpretation)
• Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41 (informal gathering as meeting)
• Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337 (different language, different intent)
• In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200 (expressio unius)
• Craven v. Crout (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 779 (omission shows different intent)
• Prior AG opinions: 103 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 42 (2020), 94 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 33 (2011), 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 839 (1975), 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 209 (1974), 43 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36 (1964), 36 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 175 (1960)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/23-102.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA, Attorney General
RYAN B. McCARROLL, Deputy Attorney General

No. 23-102
April 18, 2024

The HONORABLE ERIK A. NASARENKO, VENTURA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, has requested an opinion on three questions relating to the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.), which generally requires that legislative bodies of local government agencies conduct their meetings in a manner that is open and accessible to the public.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND CONCLUSIONS

The Ventura Chamber of Commerce hosted an annual breakfast at which the mayor, who is a member of the city council, delivered a "State of the City" address. Members of the public could attend the event in person, but only if they purchased a ticket from the chamber of commerce. There was no other way for the public to watch the address in real time. Given this context, the questions presented are:

1. If a majority of the members of the city council were to attend the event described above, would that event constitute a "meeting" of the city council within the scope of the Brown Act under Government Code section 54952.2(a)?

Yes. If a majority of the members of the city council were to attend the event described above, that event would constitute a congregation of a majority of the councilmembers at the same time and location to hear—and potentially discuss—an item within their subject matter jurisdiction. As such, the event would constitute a "meeting" of the city council within the meaning of Government Code section 54952.2(a), and the meeting would have to comply with the open-meeting requirements of the Brown Act, unless a statutory exception applies.

2. Would the Brown Act exception for conferences or similar gatherings set forth in Government Code section 54952.2(c)(2) apply to such an event?

No. The event as described consisted of a single speech by a single official regarding the state of a single city. As such, it would not satisfy the Brown Act exception for conferences and similar gatherings set forth in Government Code section 54952.2(c)(2) because that exception involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the city council.

3. Would the Brown Act's exception for "community meetings" set forth in Government Code section 54952.2(c)(3) apply to such an event?

No. The Brown Act exception for community meetings set forth in Government Code section 54952.2(c)(3) requires, among other things, that the event must be open to the public. The event in question would not satisfy that element because members of the public could only attend by purchasing a ticket from the chamber of commerce.

BACKGROUND

The City of Ventura is a charter city with a council-manager form of government. The city council consists of seven members elected by district for staggered terms of four years. After each election, the council appoints one of its members to serve as mayor for a term of two years. The mayor acts as the official head of city government on public and ceremonial occasions. The mayor also presides over sessions of the city council and determines the order of business under council rules. But the mayor has no veto power over the council.

On September 13, 2022, the city announced on social media that the mayor would deliver a "State of the City Address" on September 22 at an event "hosted by the Ventura Chamber of Commerce in the ballroom of the Crowne Plaza Ventura Beach." The Ventura Chamber of Commerce is a private, voluntary association that promotes commercial interests in and around the city. The announcement indicated that members of the public could purchase tickets to the event from the chamber. The price of a ticket was $60 for members of the chamber and $80 for everyone else. The announcement did not mention any other way for the public to watch the mayor's address.

On September 16, the city posted on social media a second announcement regarding the event. The announcement stated that the mayor's presentation would be "available later online." It also indicated that the mayor would "share this presentation with the public" at a regular meeting of the city council scheduled for October 10.

On September 20, the Ventura City Attorney asked the Ventura County District Attorney, our requestor here, whether a quorum of the city council could attend the chamber of commerce event without violating the Brown Act. The district attorney verbally advised the city attorney that "less than a quorum of the city council should attend the address," presumably so that there would not be a "meeting" of the council within the scope of the Act. The mayor ultimately delivered the address during the chamber of commerce event on September 22 as scheduled. We understand from the opinion request that "less than a quorum of the council attended the event."

The district attorney and city attorney subsequently exchanged letters with each other regarding whether there would have been a Brown Act violation if a majority of the city council had attended the chamber of commerce event. There appears to have been no dispute that, if a majority of the city council had attended, the event would have been a "meeting" of the council as the term is defined in section 54952.2(a) of the Brown Act. But the officials disagreed about whether such an event would qualify for either of two Brown Act exceptions set forth in section 54952.2(c). Specifically, the city attorney argued that "attendance by a majority of Councilmembers at a State of the City address is not a Brown Act meeting under a plain reading of the conference and community meeting exceptions."

The district attorney asked us to resolve the dispute by answering three questions.

ANALYSIS

The California Constitution guarantees "public access to the meetings of public bodies." The Brown Act promotes that guarantee by establishing minimum standards of public access at the local level. Under the Constitution, each of those standards "shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access."

As relevant here, the Brown Act states that every meeting of a city council or other legislative body of a local agency "shall be open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the legislative body of a local agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." The Act elaborates that a member of the public "shall not be required, as a condition to attendance at a meeting of a legislative body of a local agency, to register his or her name, to provide other information, to complete a questionnaire, or otherwise to fulfill any condition precedent to his or her attendance." Likewise, a legislative body cannot conduct a meeting in a facility "where members of the public may not be present without making a payment or purchase."

The foregoing rules apply whenever there is a "meeting" of the legislative body of a local agency. The Brown Act broadly defines a meeting in section 54952.2(a) as a "congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location . . . to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body." The Act guards against evasion by providing in section 54952.2(b)(1) that a majority "shall not, outside a meeting authorized by this chapter, use a series of communications of any kind, directly or through intermediaries, to discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item of business that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body."

But section 54952.2(c) tempers the broad definition of a meeting by providing that any number of the members of a legislative body may attend certain events without violating the Brown Act. Section 54952.2(c)(2) creates an exception to the Brown Act for "a conference or similar gathering open to the public that involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body." And section 54952.2(c)(3) creates an exception for "an open and publicized meeting organized to address a topic of local community concern by a person or organization other than the local agency."

Familiar principles of statutory interpretation guide our consideration of the Brown Act and its exceptions. "Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent, giving effect to the law's purpose." "In examining the language, the courts should give to the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning unless, of course, the statute itself specifically defines those words to give them a special meaning." "If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy."

As previously mentioned, however, the California Constitution contains a special rule requiring that language appearing in the Brown Act "shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access." Even before the voters adopted that special rule, we had concluded "as a matter of general policy, that 'doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of open and public meetings.'" Indeed, when interpreting open meeting laws, the Attorney General "has not acted as the protector of the bureaucrat, but rather has consistently prodded the agencies involved to be more open in their activities." Our approach here is no different.

1. If a Majority of the City Council Were to Attend the Chamber of Commerce Event, It Would Be a "Meeting" of the Council Within the Scope of the Brown Act

The first question asks whether the given set of facts would constitute a "meeting" of the city council under section 54952.2(a) if a majority of the council were to attend to the event. The definition of a meeting under the Brown Act can be parsed into three elements. The first element requires there to be a "congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location." The second element requires a collective intent "to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action." The third element requires that the object of that collective intent must be an "item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body."

As to the first element, a "congregation" can be simply a "gathering" or an "assembly of persons." Although the congregation must include a majority of the members of a legislative body, there is no requirement that the congregation consist of those members exclusively. And because the mayor is a member of the city council, we may include the mayor when calculating whether a "majority" of the council had congregated at the same time and location under section 54952.2(a). Video of the event at issue here revealed that attendees were gathered together in a single place to listen to the mayor's speech. As such, there would have been a qualifying "congregation of a majority of the members of the legislative body" if a majority of the city councilmembers had attended the event.

As to the second element of section 54952.2(a), we consider whether the city councilmembers would be congregated to "hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action" on an item. Our primary focus is on whether city councilmembers in the audience would be congregated to "hear" an item. In some situations, to hear an item might mean to consider it judicially. In other settings, to hear an item can simply mean to listen to it with attention or understanding. In this instance, we must adopt a broad interpretation of the term "hear" pursuant to our duty to construe section 54952.2(a) in favor of public access. Based on that interpretation, we have little doubt that attending the chamber of commerce event to listen to the mayor's speech would constitute "hear[ing]" an item within the meaning of the second element of section 54952.2(a). For this reason alone, we conclude the second element is satisfied.

In addition, because in this case the mayor is also a member of the city council, a mayoral address can also be likened to a "discussion" between the mayor and any councilmembers in the audience. We recognize that to "discuss" an item connotes a degree of reciprocity that is absent in a typical speech. This is particularly true in light of common definition of a "discussion" as meaning the "consideration of a question in open and usually informal debate." But common definitions of what it means to "discuss" something include simply "to talk about" it or "to present [it] in detail for examination or consideration." We believe that delivering a state of the city address reasonably fits within those common definitions, especially when the speaker and members of the audience are part of the same legislative body. As a result, the mayor's delivery of the speech to fellow councilmembers (albeit in the presence of others) supports our view that the councilmembers congregated to "hear" or "discuss" an item under the second element of section 54952.2(a).

Our overall conclusion in this regard is consistent with prior authorities. We have long described a "meeting" under the Brown Act as a gathering that involves the "collective acquisition and exchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision." For example, in 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 839 (1975), we observed that "informal luncheon meetings of a city council with members of civil organizations to discuss matters of civic concern would fall within the ambit of [t]he Brown Act even though no action is contemplated or taken." We concluded that the same would be true if a majority of a county board of supervisors gathers to receive a report from the grand jury "on matters pertaining to the operation of county government." And there is no reason why the rule would be different when members of a city council gather at a state of the city address to receive, or perhaps exchange, information on matters pertaining to the operation of city government. In each instance, members of the relevant legislative body are engaging in the collective acquisition or exchange of information that is relevant to the performance of their official duties.

Finally, as to the third element of section 54952.2(a), there appears to be no dispute that the State of the City address involved an "item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction" of the city council. The same terminology appears in the highly analogous Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, which applies to state governmental bodies. In that context, we have already concluded that "it would be inappropriate to adopt a definition of 'item' that would be limited to an item on an agenda." And we have explained that a body has "subject matter jurisdiction" over an item if the body has inherent authority to take action on the item. Here, the city council is the city's legislative body. It has broad power to "pass ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the State or the United States." As such, the state of a particular city is reasonably understood as an item within the subject matter jurisdiction of its city council.

We thus have little doubt that the event at issue here involved at least one item within the subject matter jurisdiction of the city council.

2. The Chamber of Commerce Event Would Not Satisfy the Brown Act Exception for Conferences or Similar Gatherings

Section 54952.2(c)(2) creates an exception to the Brown Act for "a conference or similar gathering open to the public that involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body." If an event satisfies those elements, then a majority of the legislative body may attend the event without following the Brown Act's requirements for "meetings," so long as they "do not discuss among themselves, other than as part of the scheduled program, business of a specified nature that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the local agency." As discussed below, we conclude that the mayor's State of the City address at issue here would not satisfy this exception.

First we address whether the event in question was "open to the public" as required under section 54952.2(c)(2). The exception for a conference or similar gathering includes unique language stating that "[n]othing in this paragraph is intended to allow members of the public free admission to a conference or similar gathering at which the organizers have required other participants or registrants to pay fees or charges as a condition of attendance." That language makes clear that members of a legislative body may attend a qualifying conference even if organizers require members of the public to purchase an admission ticket. But the exception as a whole also makes clear that ticket sales must be open to all members the public. In other words, organizers cannot restrict ticket sales to a particular group of people. Here, the city and the chamber of commerce indicated that anyone could purchase an admission ticket from the chamber, and we have received no information to the contrary. Based on these facts, it appears that the chamber of commerce event would satisfy the openness element of section 54952.2(c)(2).

We next consider the meaning of a "conference or similar gathering" under section 54952.2(c)(2). The Legislature has not defined a "conference" in this context, nor has it identified the elements that would make a gathering sufficiently "similar" to a conference. But common definitions of a "conference" suggest that there must be multiple presentations facilitating an interchange of views among multiple parties. This understanding is consistent with the statutory requirement that a qualifying conference or similar gathering must involve a "discussion" of issues. In contrast, the event as described here consisted of a single speech by a single official regarding the conditions in a single city. As such, the event would not appear to qualify as a conference or similar gathering under section 54952.2(c)(2).

Our understanding of what qualifies as a conference or similar gathering under section 54952.2(c)(2) is consistent with the use of the word "conference" elsewhere in the Brown Act. In particular, section 54954 uses the same word when providing that the governing board of a school district may meet outside of the district to "[a]ttend a conference on nonadversarial collective bargaining techniques." The Legislature appears to have been referring to training workshops like the ones formerly run by the California Foundation for Improvement of Employer-Employee Relations. Those events typically lasted for several days and included "mock bargaining session[s], team-building exercises, and other activities designed to make the participants re-examine assumptions about labor-management relations." As such, the events were readily distinguishable from the chamber of commerce event at issue here.

Our conclusion is also consistent with the legislative history of section 54952.2(c)(2) itself. An earlier version of the exception would have applied to "general conferences, conventions, symposia, speeches, classes, and seminars . . . that involve a discussion of broad issues, and that are attended by a broad spectrum of officials from a variety of government agencies." The Assembly replaced the quoted language with the current reference to a "conference or similar gathering . . . that involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body." The amendment means that a qualifying event does not need to be attended by a broad spectrum of officials from a variety of government agencies. But it also means that the exception applies only to conferences and to gatherings that are similar to conferences. That narrowed reference appears to include broadly faceted events like conventions, but not narrowly focused events like the chamber of commerce speech at issue here.

Finally, even if the chamber of commerce event qualified as a conference or similar gathering, we doubt that it involved "a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body" as required under section 54952.2(c)(2). As to the first prong of "general interest to the public," the statutory language refers to "the public" without any narrowing qualification or modification. As such, an issue "of general interest to the public" is most reasonably read as being of general interest to the public as a whole, not just to those members of the public who happen to live or work within the territorial jurisdiction of the legislative body. Indeed, as discussed further below, the Legislature created a separate exception in section 54952.2(c)(3) for meetings that address a topic of "local community concern." Because the Legislature used different language in different subdivisions of the same statute, we presume that it intended to create a distinction between an issue of "general interest to the public" under section 54952.2(c)(2) and a topic of "local community concern" under section 54952.2(c)(3).

Here, we have no doubt that the State of the City address delivered during the chamber of commerce event was of general interest within the city. But we suspect that it was of only limited interest outside of the city. As a result, our obligation to construe section 54952.2(c)(2) in favor of open access compels us to conclude that the chamber of commerce event did not involve a discussion of issues of general interest to the public as a whole.

We reach the same conclusion when considering whether the event involved issues of general interest to "public agencies of the type represented by the legislative body" under section 54952.2(c)(2). It is not enough for the issues to be of general interest to the relevant legislative body itself. Rather, the issues must be of interest to other public agencies that are of the same type as the legislative body. The type of public agency at issue here is a city council. We therefore consider whether the chamber of commerce event involved issues of general interest to other city councils on a categorical basis.

Similar to our conclusion above, we have no doubt that the State of the City address delivered during the chamber of commerce event would be of general interest to members of the Ventura city council. But we doubt whether it would also be of general interest to other city councils on a categorical basis. As such, our duty to resolve doubts in favor of open access compels us to conclude that the chamber of commerce event did not include a discussion of issues of general interest to public agencies of the type represented by the city council under section 54952.2(c)(2).

Our conclusions here are consistent with our longstanding interpretation of nearly identical language in the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act. Similar to the Brown Act, the Bagley-Keene Act includes an exception in section 11122.5(c)(2)(A) that allows a majority of the members of a state body to attend "a conference or similar gathering open to the public that involves a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the state body." We have long advised state bodies that, if a conference "only focuses on the laws or issues of a particular body it would not be exempt under the Act."

There is no apparent reason why the rule under the Brown Act would be different than it is under the Bagley-Keene Act. We recognize that, as a general rule, the subject matter jurisdiction of a city council is more diverse than the subject matter jurisdiction of a state body. But the fact that there might be many different issues confronting a particular city council does not mean that those issues are necessarily of general interest to the public as a whole or to other city councils on a categorical basis. This is especially true with regard to a state of the city address, because such an address typically discusses issues only as they relate to the relevant city.

As a result, we conclude that the chamber of commerce event would not have qualified as a conference or similar gathering, much less one that involved a discussion of issues of general interest to the public or to public agencies of the type represented by the city council under section 54952.2(c)(2).

3. The Chamber of Commerce Event Would Not Satisfy the Brown Act Exception for Community Meetings

Section 54952.2(c)(3) creates an exception to the Brown Act for "an open and publicized meeting organized to address a topic of local community concern by a person or organization other than the local agency." If an event satisfies those elements, then a majority of the legislative body may attend the event without the event being a "meeting" subject to the Brown Act's requirements for open meetings so long as they "do not discuss among themselves, other than as part of the scheduled program, business of a specific nature that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body of the local agency." As discussed below, we conclude that the chamber of commerce event would not have been sufficiently "open" to satisfy this exception because attendees had to purchase a ticket to gain access.

The word "open" generally denotes a lack of secrecy, as in a meeting that is "exposed to general view or knowledge." It can also refer to a meeting that is "not restricted to a particular group or category of participants." Here, members of the public could attend the chamber of commerce event in person only if they purchased a ticket from the chamber. And there was no other way for them to watch the mayor's address in real time. In other words, the event was necessarily restricted to a particular group or category of participants, that is, those who were financially able and otherwise willing to pay the price of admission. As a result, the event would not have been sufficiently "open" under section 54952.2(c)(3).

As discussed above, the conference exception under section 54952.2(c)(2) expressly allows the charging of admission: "[n]othing in this paragraph is intended to allow members of the public free admission to a conference or similar gathering." No such language appears in section 54952.2(c)(3) regarding community meetings. The absence of such language appears to have been intentional, because the Legislature enacted both exceptions at the same time. As a result, under the familiar maxim that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other, we presume that the allowance for charging admission in section 54952.2(c)(2) applies only to conferences and similar gatherings, and not to the events termed community meetings under section 54952.2(c)(3).

We reiterate that our conclusion as to this exception is based on the fact that there was no way for members of the public to participate in the Ventura chamber of commerce event free of charge. Although the city told the public that the mayor's address would be available on the Internet, it also indicated that the address would not be available until sometime later, after the event was over. In our view, the option of watching a recording of an event sometime "later" is not enough to satisfy the openness requirement of section 54952.2(c)(3).

4. No Other Brown Act Exceptions Apply

Before concluding our analysis, we note that we have received comments suggesting that a state of the city address might satisfy the Brown Act exception for a "purely social or ceremonial occasion" under section 54952.2(c)(5). That exception allows a majority of a legislative body to attend a purely social or ceremonial occasion so long as they "do not discuss among themselves business of a specific nature that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body." Although our requestor did not ask about that particular exception, it is at least arguably included in his request that we determine whether a Brown Act violation would have occurred here had a majority of councilmembers attended. As such, and given that the exception is the only remaining Brown Act exception that might conceivably apply to the circumstances, we briefly address it here.

We begin by considering what it means for an occasion to be "purely social or ceremonial" under section 54952.2(c)(5). An occasion is commonly understood as being "social" if it is "marked by or passed in pleasant companionship with friends or associates." No matter how pleasant an occasion might be, however, it cannot be considered "purely social" under the Brown Act if it is "arranged for pursuit of the public's business." As for the meaning of a "ceremonial" occasion, a common definition of the term involves something that has "no real power or influence." Examples of a "ceremonial role" under analogous provisions of the Political Reform Act include "throwing out the first pitch at a baseball game; cutting a ribbon at an opening; making a presentation of a certificate, proclamation, award, or other item, such as the key to the city."

It is notable that the exception in section 54952.2(c)(5) applies only if the "occasion" itself is "purely" social or ceremonial. In other words, the exception applies only if an occasion is completely, exclusively, and genuinely social or ceremonial. As such, an occasion that it partially or even predominately social or ceremonial would not qualify.

We conclude that the given facts would not qualify as a purely social or ceremonial occasion under section 54952.2(c)(5). We recognize that a typical state of the city address involves a degree of social interaction and ceremonial pomp. But that does not mean that the entire occasion is purely social or ceremonial. Indeed, we have received comments suggesting that a state of the city address can have a significant effect or influence on the local legislative process. For example, the League of California Cities tells us that a state of the city address could "outline the plans and goals for the coming year" and "highlight specific initiatives or projects." And the California Chamber of Commerce similarly takes the view that a state of the city address can include "upcoming priorities and important projects." The National League of Cities has likewise published their own guidance stating that a state of the city address may "recognize areas for improvement" and "set the policy agenda for the year ahead." As a result, we conclude that the chamber of commerce event at issue here would not satisfy section 54952.2(c)(5) or any other exception to the Brown Act.