If California declares a shelter crisis or state of emergency, does that automatically make the affected area a 'scene of an emergency' so volunteer medical providers get Good Samaritan immunity?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Thomas Umberg asked the AG a practical question driven by California's homelessness crisis: medical professionals are sometimes willing to volunteer care for unhoused people but worry about civil liability. Could a shelter-crisis declaration under Government Code section 8698 (which lets cities, counties, or the state declare a shelter crisis) or a state-of-emergency declaration under Government Code section 8625 (which lets the Governor declare a state of emergency) create a "scene of an emergency" for Good Samaritan immunity, and thereby cover volunteer medical care for unhoused people across the entire declared area?

Attorney General Rob Bonta said no. The Good Samaritan statute in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 protects people who provide care "at the scene of an emergency," and the Emergency Medical Services framework defines "emergency" as "a condition or situation in which an individual has a need for immediate medical attention." That requires an actual immediate medical need at a specific place, not a declared status across a whole area. A shelter crisis is by definition a "threat" to health and safety, not yet an immediate medical need. A state of emergency may include things (medfly infestation, drought, cyberterrorism) that have nothing to do with medical care.

The opinion does not say volunteer medical providers cannot get Good Samaritan immunity in shelter-crisis or emergency areas. It says immunity attaches at scenes within those areas where people actually need immediate medical attention, not on the basis of the declaration itself. The AG also pointed out that other immunity provisions, such as Government Code section 8659(a) for medical professionals serving at the request of a government official during an emergency, may cover non-emergency volunteer care that section 1799.102 does not.

What this means for you

Verify these statutes have not been amended since 2022 before relying on the specific framework.

If you are a physician or other licensed clinician thinking about volunteering at a homeless services site

Section 1799.102 immunity is not a blanket waiver for any volunteer care provided in a city that has declared a shelter crisis. It applies when you are responding to someone's immediate medical need. For routine volunteer care (chronic disease management, preventive care, basic primary care visits) that is not "immediate" in the emergency-medicine sense, look to other liability vehicles: malpractice coverage through the host organization, federal Volunteer Protection Act protections, charitable immunity statutes, or Government Code section 8659(a) if you are operating at the request of a government official during a declared state of emergency.

If you run a free clinic or homeless services nonprofit

Do not assume Good Samaritan immunity covers your volunteer clinicians categorically. Talk to a healthcare attorney about layering protections: malpractice insurance, formal credentialing of volunteers, contractual agreements with a county or city that bring section 8659(a) into play, and clear scope-of-practice protocols. Document who your patients are, what their medical needs are, and whether the care provided is emergency or routine, since the legal framework treats them very differently.

If you are a city attorney or county counsel advising on a shelter crisis declaration

The shelter crisis declaration carries its own immunity package: section 8698.1(a) limits the city or county's liability for ordinary negligence in providing emergency housing in public facilities, and section 8698.1(b) suspends conflicting state and local housing, health, and safety standards to the extent strict compliance would prevent or delay shelter crisis mitigation. None of that automatically extends to private medical volunteers serving unhoused people, and this opinion explains why.

If you are a state legislator considering legislation on this question

The AG's opinion effectively invites legislative clarification. If the goal is to give volunteer clinicians broader liability protection when caring for unhoused people in declared shelter-crisis areas, that probably requires a statutory amendment. The current framework gives liability protection only at scenes where immediate medical attention is required, which is narrower than the use case Senator Umberg's question described.

Common questions

Q: What counts as "immediate medical attention" under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102?
A: The AG used dictionary definitions: "immediate" means "occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss or interval of time: instant." So the scene of an emergency is a place where someone has a need for instant medical care, or where emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency perceive a potential need for instant care. A chronic condition or routine medical need does not fit.

Q: Is a Good Samaritan immune from suit only for emergency care or also for non-emergency care at the scene?
A: After the 2009 amendment that responded to Van Horn v. Watson, the immunity covers both medical and non-medical care at the scene of an emergency. The expansion was about the type of care, not about extending the geographic concept of the "scene." For lay persons (not medical/law enforcement/emergency personnel), immunity does not apply to acts constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Q: Are there other immunity provisions that might help volunteer medical care in declared emergencies?
A: Yes, several. Government Code section 8659(a) provides immunity to physicians, dentists, nurses, hospitals, pharmacists, and respiratory care practitioners who provide services during a state of emergency at the request of a government official, except for willful acts or omissions. Business and Professions Code sections 2395, 2396, and 2397 provide separate immunities for medical licensees in various emergency contexts. Section 1627.5 governs dentists in state-of-emergency contexts. The federal Volunteer Protection Act may also apply.

Q: Could a city or county declare a shelter crisis specifically to attract volunteer medical care?
A: This opinion does not prevent that, and the shelter crisis framework has its own value (limiting local liability for opening public facilities as shelters and suspending some standards). But the declaration itself does not create Good Samaritan immunity for medical volunteers operating across the declared area.

Q: Does this opinion change anything for everyday Good Samaritans helping at car accidents or other emergencies?
A: No. The classic case (someone collapses in a public place, a passerby provides CPR or first aid) is exactly what section 1799.102 was designed to cover, and this opinion does not narrow that immunity. The opinion just declines to extend the immunity to areas where there is no actual immediate medical need.

Background and statutory framework

California's Good Samaritan statute, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, was originally enacted in 1980 as part of the Emergency Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act. The statute had two interpretive surprises:

• The original text covered "emergency care at the scene of an emergency." In Van Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 Cal.4th 322, the California Supreme Court read "emergency care" as limited to medical care, so a Good Samaritan who pulled a paralyzed plaintiff from a car (fearing fire) without providing medical care was not covered.
• The Legislature responded in 2009 by amending the statute to extend immunity to non-medical care at the scene, while leaving the "scene of an emergency" geographic concept intact and the underlying definition of "emergency" (a need for immediate medical attention) unchanged.

The shelter crisis statute, Government Code section 8698, lets the State, cities, counties, and certain public agencies declare a shelter crisis when "a significant number of persons are without the ability to obtain shelter, resulting in a threat to their health and safety." A declaration carries:

• Section 8698.1(a): liability protection for the political entity for ordinary negligence in opening public facilities for housing.
• Section 8698.1(b): suspension of housing, health, and safety standards to the extent strict compliance would prevent or delay mitigation.

The state-of-emergency statute, Government Code section 8625, lets the Governor declare a state of emergency under the Emergency Services Act when conditions of disaster or extreme peril exist (natural disasters, riots, drought, cyberterrorism, infestations, etc.). The declaration vests the Governor with broad authority over state agencies and police powers.

The AG's textual analysis stayed close to the dictionary: "scene" plus "of an emergency" plus the Act's definition of "emergency" (immediate medical need) yields a place-based concept tied to actual medical urgency. The AG explicitly noted that scenes of emergency may exist within shelter-crisis or state-of-emergency areas, just not throughout them by virtue of the declaration alone.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- California Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 (Good Samaritan immunity)
- California Health and Safety Code section 1797.70 (definition of "emergency")
- California Government Code section 8625 (state of emergency)
- California Government Code section 8659(a) (medical professional immunity during state of emergency)
- California Government Code section 8698 (shelter crisis declaration)
- California Government Code section 8698.1 (shelter crisis liability and standards)
- California Business and Professions Code sections 2395-2397 (medical licensee emergency immunities)

Cases:
- Van Horn v. Watson, 45 Cal.4th 322 (2008) (Good Samaritan statute interpretation, prompting 2009 amendment)
- Verdugo v. Target Corp., 59 Cal.4th 312 (2014) (Good Samaritan amendment context)
- Skidgel v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., 12 Cal.5th 1 (2021) (statutory interpretation framework)
- People v. Murphy, 25 Cal.4th 136 (2001) (statutory interpretation)
- Martin v. Municipal Court, 148 Cal.App.3d 693 (1983) (medfly state of emergency)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/20-301_0.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General

OPINION
of
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
ANYA M. BINSACCA
Deputy Attorney General

No. 20-301
February 3, 2022

The HONORABLE THOMAS J. UMBERG, STATE SENATOR, has requested an opinion on a question relating to Good Samaritan immunity.

QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION

Does the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698 or a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625 create or define a "scene of an emergency" for purposes of the Good Samaritan law in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102?

No. Although a scene of an emergency within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 may sometimes exist within an area where a shelter crisis or state of emergency has been declared, such declarations do not, in and of themselves, categorically create or define a scene of an emergency under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.

BACKGROUND

California has a substantial population of people without homes. Concern for the healthcare needs of this unhoused population prompted the question here. We are informed that medical professionals otherwise willing to volunteer medical services to unhoused individuals sometimes decline to do so based on concerns relating to insurance coverage and liability issues. Senator Umberg asks whether these professionals could be exempted from liability by the Good Samaritan provision in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.

Common law principles provide that a person generally has no duty to come to the aid of another, but if a person elects to provide aid, that gives rise to a duty to exercise due care in doing so. Good Samaritan laws are a legislative response to this due care requirement, limiting or eliminating liability for those who offer aid with no expectation of payment.

The Good Samaritan law at issue here, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, generally shields from liability a person who provides emergency care, not for compensation, at the "scene of an emergency." We are asked whether the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698, or the declaration of a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625, creates or defines a scene of an emergency within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.

Government Code section 8698 allows political entities, including the State, cities, counties, and certain public agencies, to declare a "shelter crisis." A shelter crisis is "a situation in which a significant number of persons are without the ability to obtain shelter, resulting in a threat to their health and safety." A shelter crisis declaration limits the political entity's liability for allowing the use of public facilities for housing, and relaxes standards regarding housing, health, and safety in favor of mitigating the shelter crisis.

Government Code section 8625 empowers the Governor to declare a "state of emergency" when conditions of disaster or extreme peril to the safety of people or property exist because of specified conditions, including natural disasters, riots, and cyberterrorism, and the conditions are beyond the ability of one locality to handle independently. The Governor may declare a state of emergency at the request of a local official (a city mayor or authorized county official), or if the Governor finds that a local government authority is inadequate to cope with the emergency. The declaration of a state of emergency gives the Governor "complete authority" over all state agencies; the right to exercise all of the State's police powers within the affected area; and the ability to deploy state employees, facilities, and equipment to prevent or alleviate actual or threatened damage due to the emergency.

ANALYSIS

Does either the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698, or the declaration of a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625, create or define a "scene of an emergency" within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102? Not categorically. As we explain below, the scene of an emergency within Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 is a place where immediate medical attention is required. Although such scenes of emergency may exist within areas where a shelter crisis or state of emergency has been declared, declarations under Government Code sections 8625 or 8698 do not have the legal effect of classifying all areas covered by those declarations as a scene of an emergency for purposes of section 1799.102.

The fundamental task when interpreting a statute is "to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose." That begins by examining the statutory language and applying a plain, commonsense meaning, while placing the examined language in the context of the statute as a whole, as well as in the context of its larger statutory framework. Where the statutory language is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls. If the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, we may look to other sources, "including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history."

To determine whether the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698, or the declaration of a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625, creates or defines a "scene of an emergency" within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, we must examine the meaning of "scene of an emergency." Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 is part of the Emergency Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act. The Act provides that its definitions control "[u]nless the context otherwise requires." Although the Act does not define "scene of an emergency" or "scene," it does define "emergency."

Under the Act, an "emergency" is "a condition or situation in which an individual has a need for immediate medical attention, or where the potential for such need is perceived by emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency." "Immediate" is not defined in the Act, so we refer to dictionary definitions to ascertain its ordinary, usual meaning. The relevant definition of "immediate" is "occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss or interval of time: instant." Turning to the meaning of "scene," the relevant dictionary definition is "the place of an occurrence or action." Putting all of the above definitions together, the "scene of an emergency" described in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 is a place where an individual has a need for instant medical attention, or where emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency perceive a potential need for instant medical attention.

This definition is not equivalent to a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698 or a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625. As explained below, neither of those provisions contains the requirement of immediate medical care that is in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.

Government Code section 8698 defines a shelter crisis as "a situation in which a significant number of persons are without the ability to obtain shelter, resulting in a threat to their health and safety." This "threat" to health and safety is by definition different from the immediate need for medical attention contemplated by Health and Safety Code section 1799.102. A "threat" is "an indication of something impending," and thus inherently distinguished from an immediate need. Of course, individuals within a declared shelter crisis area may sometimes require immediate medical attention, and the need for immediate medical care may arise more frequently in a shelter crisis area than in areas where no shelter crisis has been declared. But a declared shelter crisis does not categorically create or describe the scene of an emergency within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 because the needs in a shelter-crisis area, however great, are not all needs for immediate medical treatment.

The same is true for states of emergency declared under Government Code section 8625. The Governor may declare a state of emergency in "[c]onditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property caused by conditions such as air pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, cyberterrorism, sudden and severe energy shortage, plant or animal infestation or disease, the Governor's warning of an earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or other conditions." Although some of these conditions may result in a need for immediate medical attention, they do not all do so. For instance, states of emergency may relate to agricultural problems, like the medfly infestation of the 1980's, that have little or nothing to do with medical emergencies. Thus, an area that is subject to a state of emergency declaration under Government Code section 8625 is not equivalent to an area that constitutes a scene of an emergency under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.

The California Supreme Court's examination of the prior version of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, and the Legislature's subsequent amendment of section 1799.102, further support the conclusion that section 1799.102 is appropriately read as limited to scenes where immediate medical treatment is needed. In a 2008 case, Van Horn v. Watson, the Supreme Court considered whether Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 could apply where the defendant pulled the plaintiff from a car following an accident, fearing the car was going to catch fire. The plaintiff suffered paralysis and claimed that the defendant, who was not a medical professional, was negligent in unnecessarily moving plaintiff from the car. The defendant asserted immunity under section 1799.102, and the plaintiff argued that the statute did not apply to a Good Samaritan who rendered nonmedical care at the scene of an emergency. At the time, the statute read in its entirety:

No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to immunity because section 1799.102 applied only to people who rendered emergency medical care. The Court reasoned that because section 1799.102 is part of the Emergency Medical Services division of the Health and Safety Code, and was enacted as part of the Emergency Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act, the Legislature intended the statute to apply to the provision of medical care at the scene of a medical emergency. The Court further noted that legislative statements in the Act, definitions in the Act, and legislative history all supported the conclusion that section 1799.102 immunity was limited to the provision of medical care. Finally, the Court observed that reading the statute broadly to immunize "any person who provides any emergency care at the scene of any emergency" could render superfluous other Good Samaritan statutes, and would undermine the well-established common law principle that although people have no duty to act, when they do act they must do so with due care.

After the Van Horn decision, the Legislature acted promptly to amend section 1799.102 to expand its coverage to Good Samaritans who provide non-medical care at the scene of an emergency. The legislative history of this 2009 amendment confirms that the Legislature was responding to the Supreme Court's ruling in Van Horn, and intended the statute's coverage to remain limited to scenes of emergency, where a need for immediate medical attention exists. A representative statement from a committee report provides:

The measure responds to a recent ruling by the California Supreme Court that, if left unaddressed, could inadvertently discourage people from being courageous "Good Samaritans" by coming to the aid of accident victims facing great peril. In essence, the measure provides immunity from suit to all Good Samaritans who render emergency care at the scene of an emergency regardless of whether the care they provide is found to be of a medical (e.g., CPR) or non-medical nature (e.g., carrying someone out of a burning building). However, the bill appropriately makes clear that such broad protection from suit is appropriately not available to rescuers who engage in grossly negligent or even reckless behavior.

After discussing the Van Horn decision, the committee report states that the bill responds to the issue raised in the case "by clarifying that this Good Samaritan statute provides immunity to all rescuers who render emergency care at the scene of an emergency, regardless of whether the care they provide is later found to be of a medical or non-medical nature." The Legislature left intact, however, the definition of "emergency" as limited to situations where "an individual has a need for immediate medical attention."

Thus, all relevant information bearing on statutory meaning supports the conclusion that section 1799.102 covers only scenes of emergency where immediate medical attention is required. The Legislature has chosen to design Good Samaritan laws with specificity, and has remained consistent in limiting section 1799.102's coverage to this type of emergency. It is this need for immediate medical attention that distinguishes a "scene of emergency" under section 1799.102 from areas where a declaration of a shelter crisis or state of emergency is in place.

Because the questions here were prompted by issues surrounding medical professionals, we offer an additional observation that cautions against extending section 1799.102's coverage beyond scenes where individuals are in need of immediate medical attention. The practice of medicine is highly regulated, including through specific liability limitations, some of which relate to declared states of emergency and scenes of accidents. For instance, the Emergency Services Act contains Government Code section 8625, empowering the Governor to declare states of emergency. That act also exempts from liability medical professionals who provide services during a state of emergency (or other specified emergency conditions) at the request of a government official or agency, except for willful acts or omissions. This immunity differs from that in Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 by covering actions taken at the request of a government official or agency, and by excluding willful acts and omissions. Thus, these two immunity provisions may apply to different circumstances within one area where the Governor has declared a state of emergency. For example, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102(a) would cover a scenario where a medical professional provides care to someone in need of immediate medical attention, and Government Code section 8659(a) would cover a medical professional providing care, including non-emergency care, at the request of government officials.

Additionally, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 itself states that it is not meant "to alter existing protections from liability for licensed medical or other personnel specified in subdivision (a) or any other law." The specificity with which the Legislature has treated both the regulation of medical licensees and Good Samaritan statutes further weighs against imposing a broader reading of "scene of an emergency" in section 1799.102.

We reiterate that there may well be scenes within an area that has been declared a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698 or a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625 that qualify as scenes of emergency under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, because individuals are in need of immediate medical attention. But areas subject to a declaration under Government Code section 8625 or 8698 are not in and of themselves equivalent to scenes of emergency under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102.