Could a California city council member be barred from office after an obstruction conviction tied to prior council conduct?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 2015. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current California law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
The City of Commerce asked the California Attorney General for permission to bring a quo warranto lawsuit challenging Hugo Argumedo’s right to serve on the city council. Argumedo had pleaded guilty in 2010 to misdemeanor obstruction of justice after signing a declaration in litigation involving the city and its former attorney. The plea agreement required him to resign from the council and barred him from public office for three years. He was elected to the council again in 2015.
The Attorney General did not decide whether Argumedo had to leave office. The opinion granted the city leave to sue because a court could reasonably examine two substantial issues: whether the conduct underlying the obstruction conviction amounted to “malfeasance in office” under article VII, section 8 of the California Constitution, and whether Government Code section 1021 imposed a permanent disqualification rather than one limited to the term held when the conviction occurred.
The opinion’s statutory analysis favored permanent disqualification. It read “exclude” and “disqualified” as language barring future officeholding, distinguished a decision involving a sitting officeholder, and relied on Lubin v. Wilson, where a person was prevented from assuming a new term based on an earlier conviction. The final disposition remained limited to allowing a court to decide Argumedo’s eligibility.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Who the opinion addressed at the time
City councils and municipal attorneys
The opinion treated quo warranto under Code of Civil Procedure section 803 as the proper procedure for testing whether a person unlawfully held public office. It also explained that the Attorney General’s screening role was limited to deciding whether substantial legal or factual issues warranted judicial resolution and whether allowing the case would serve the public interest.
Elected officials with prior convictions
The opinion reasoned that the relevant inquiry was not confined to the label of the offense. A court could examine the facts underlying the obstruction conviction, including whether the conduct was connected to information Argumedo possessed only because he served on the city council, when deciding whether it constituted malfeasance “in office.”
Voters and residents of Commerce
The opinion found a public interest in obtaining a judicial determination of the council member’s eligibility. It did not itself remove Argumedo or conclusively decide that his conviction created a lifetime ban.
Common questions
Q: Did the Attorney General rule that Hugo Argumedo was ineligible to serve on the Commerce City Council?
A: No. The Attorney General granted the City of Commerce permission to file a quo warranto action. The opinion said the legal and factual questions were substantial enough for a court to decide.
Q: Why could a misdemeanor obstruction conviction raise a “malfeasance in office” issue?
A: The opinion focused on the conduct behind the conviction. Argumedo’s declaration concerned a closed city council session and information he had obtained through his council position. The AG concluded that a court could decide whether that conduct was sufficiently connected to his public office to qualify as malfeasance in office.
Q: Did the three-year restriction in the plea agreement settle how long Argumedo was barred from office?
A: No. The opinion stated that a plea agreement could not override constitutional or statutory restrictions on holding office. It analyzed Government Code section 1021 and related provisions separately.
Q: Did the opinion view disqualification under Government Code section 1021 as permanent?
A: Its analysis did. The opinion read the constitutional and statutory language as reaching future officeholding and found Lubin v. Wilson supportive. But because the matter came to the Attorney General as a request for leave to sue, the ultimate eligibility decision was left to the court.
Background and statutory framework
Code of Civil Procedure section 803 authorized an action in the name of the People against someone who unlawfully held or exercised a public office. When a private party sought to bring that kind of action, the Attorney General first decided whether the application presented substantial issues warranting judicial resolution and whether suit would serve the public interest.
Article VII, section 8, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution directed the Legislature to exclude from office people convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes. Government Code section 1021 provided that a person was disqualified from holding office upon conviction of the designated crimes. The opinion examined the ordinary meanings of “exclude,” “disqualified,” and “malfeasance in office,” then read section 1021 alongside the vacancy and forfeiture provisions in Government Code sections 1770 and 3000.
The AG distinguished Helena Rubenstein International v. Younger because that case addressed when a sitting officeholder’s conviction took effect, not whether disqualification lasted permanently. The opinion found Lubin v. Wilson more useful because Lubin upheld barring a person from assuming a newly elected term after a conviction involving conduct in a prior office.
Citations and references
Constitutional and statutory provisions:
- Code Civ. Proc., § 803, quo warranto against a person who unlawfully holds public office
- Cal. Const., art. VII, § 8, subd. (b), exclusion from office after conviction of specified crimes
- Gov. Code, § 1021, disqualification from holding office
- Gov. Code, §§ 1770, subd. (h), 3000, vacancy and forfeiture after conviction
- Gov. Code, § 1770.1, effect of an appeal on disqualification or forfeiture
- Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), the obstruction provision cited for Argumedo’s conviction
Cases:
- Rando v. Harris (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 868, 875, quo warranto as the procedure for testing a person’s right to public office
- Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1228-1229, the Attorney General’s gatekeeping role when a private party seeks leave to sue
- Helena Rubenstein International v. Younger (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406, timing of disqualification, vacancy, and forfeiture for a sitting officeholder
- Lubin v. Wilson (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1422, barring an elected person from assuming a new term based on an earlier conviction
Source
- Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
- Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/15-501_1.pdf
Original opinion text
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
KAMALA D. HARRIS
Attorney General
_________________________
:
OPINION : No. 15-501
:
of : October 27, 2015
:
KAMALA D. HARRIS :
Attorney General :
:
ANYA M. BINSACCA :
Deputy Attorney General :
:
Proposed relator the CITY OF COMMERCE has requested leave to sue proposed
defendant HUGO ARGUMEDO in quo warranto to oust him from the public office of city
council member on the ground that his previous conviction for obstruction of justice
constitutes “malfeasance in office,” and therefore precludes him from serving as a city
council member.
CONCLUSION
Whether proposed defendant Argumedo’s conviction for obstruction of justice
constitutes “malfeasance in office,” and therefore precludes him from serving as a city
council member, presents substantial questions of law and fact warranting judicial
resolution, and allowing the action to proceed would serve the public interest. Therefore,
leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED.
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ANALYSIS
Proposed defendant Argumedo currently sits on the city council for proposed relator
the City of Commerce, but the question of his legal eligibility to serve in that capacity
stems from Argumedo’s conduct during an earlier term on the Commerce city council.1
The parties do not dispute the basic underlying facts of the incidents at issue, which we
briefly summarize below.
While Argumedo was serving on the city council in 2005, the council terminated
the city’s contract with then-City Attorney Francisco Leal. In response, Leal sued the city,
claiming it owed him attorney’s fees. The city counter-sued, alleging legal malpractice
and violations of Government Code section 1090.2
On September 22, 2006, the city council met in a closed session to discuss
negotiations regarding the lawsuits. The confidential minutes of that meeting reflect that
the council discussed a settlement offer from Leal, under which Leal would pay the city
$20,000. On Argumedo’s motion, the city council voted to make a counter-offer requesting
Leal pay $60,000 to $70,000, based on the city’s incurred attorney’s fees and costs. The
case settled in November 2006, with Leal agreeing to pay the city $70,000. Leal failed to
pay that amount, however, contending that the settlement agreement was void because the
city council had never been advised of his previous $20,000 settlement offer.
The city filed suit in March 2007 to enforce the settlement agreement. In opposition
to the city’s motion for summary adjudication, Leal filed a declaration, signed by
Argumedo under penalty of perjury, which stated that Leal’s $20,000 settlement offer was
never presented to the city council, and that Argumedo would have voted in favor of that
offer had it been presented.3 The superior court denied the city’s motion for summary
adjudication, finding that Argumedo’s declaration created a triable issue of fact.
Ultimately, on March 3, 2008, the city’s enforcement action settled, with Leal agreeing to
1
Argumedo was first elected to the city council in 1996, and again several times
thereafter.
2
This section provides that “[m]embers of the Legislature, state, county, district,
judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially interested in any
contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are
members.”
3
In a closed-session meeting on December 4, 2007, at which Argumedo was present,
the city council reviewed the minutes of the September 22, 2006, council meeting, which
disclosed that the $20,000 settlement offer from Leal had in fact been presented and
considered. Argumedo declined to change or withdraw his declaration, however.
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pay the city $175,000.
In December 2010, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Argumedo
with felony perjury.4 The criminal complaint alleged that Argumedo had knowingly
submitted a false declaration to the superior court which stated that the $20,000 settlement
offer had not been presented to the city council. The district attorney later amended the
complaint to add a misdemeanor charge of obstruction of justice, i.e., obstructing a public
official (the judge) in the discharge of her duty.5 On December 20, 2010, Argumedo
pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor obstruction of justice charge. The plea agreement
required, among other things, that Argumedo resign from the city council and not run for
or hold any public office for three years.
Argumedo was again elected to the Commerce city council in 2015. The city
contends here, however, that Argumedo is disqualified from serving in this public office
based on his previous conviction for obstruction of justice, and now seeks leave to sue in
quo warranto to have the issue judicially determined. For the reasons discussed below, we
grant the city’s application for leave to sue.
Nature of and Criteria for Quo Warranto
Code of Civil Procedure section 803 provides, “An action may be brought by the
attorney-general, in the name of the people of this state, upon [her] own information, or
upon a complaint of a private party, against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise, or
against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state.”6 Thus, such an action—
commonly referred to as “quo warranto”—is the “appropriate remedy to test the right of a
person to hold public office.”7
Where the action is based on the complaint of a private party, the Attorney General
4
Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a).
5
Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) (“Every person who willfully resists, delays, or
obstructs any public officer, . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or
her office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not
to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment”).
6
Code Civ. Proc., § 803.
7
76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 157, 165 (1993); Rando v. Harris (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 868,
875.
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acts as a gatekeeper to the filing of a quo warranto action; a party must obtain the Attorney
General’s permission, or “leave to sue,” before filing such an action in superior court.8 In
evaluating whether to grant leave to sue, we do not endeavor to resolve the merits of the
controversy, but rather “we decide whether the application presents substantial issues of
fact or law that warrant judicial resolution, and whether granting the application will serve
the public interest.”9
There Are Substantial Issues of Law and Fact as to Whether Argumedo’s
Conviction for Obstruction of Justice Disqualifies Him from Serving as a City
Council Member
Article VII, section 8 of the California Constitution (section 8) directs that, “Laws
shall be made to exclude persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in
office, or other high crimes from office or serving on juries.”10 Section 8 contemplates
legislative action to give it effect, and the Legislature enacted several statutes accordingly.
Most relevant to our inquiry here is Government Code section 1021, which provides, “A
person is disqualified from holding any office upon conviction of designated crimes as
specified in the Constitution and laws of the State.”11
The city contends that Government Code section 1021 bars Argumedo from holding
the office of city council member12 because his conviction for obstruction of justice
amounts to malfeasance in office within the meaning of section 8. Argumedo makes two
arguments in opposition: (1) his conviction does not amount to malfeasance in office
within the meaning of section 8; and (2) section 8 and Government Code section 1021
apply only to a current term of office rather than operating as a permanent disqualification.
We address those arguments in turn.
1. Did Argumedo commit “malfeasance in office”?
Argumedo pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice under Penal Code section 148.
Based on the criminal complaint and the district attorney’s documentation, the factual basis
for this conviction was that Argumedo provided the superior court with a declaration
falsely attesting that the city council had not been presented with Leal’s $20,000 settlement
offer, which created a triable issue of fact, causing the superior court judge to deny,
8
Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1228-1229.
9
95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 50, 51 (2012).
10
Cal. Const., art. VII, § 8, subd. (b).
11
Gov. Code, § 1021.
12
A city council member is a city officer. (Gov. Code, § 56025.)
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erroneously, the city’s motion for summary adjudication. Does this conviction, and the
conduct on which it is based, amount to malfeasance in office within the meaning of section
8?
Malfeasance in office is not an offense enumerated in the Penal Code. Rather,
section 8 appears to use “malfeasance in office,” as well as “other high crimes,” as catch-
all phrases to encompass a variety of offenses. To determine the meaning of malfeasance
in office, we apply the rules of constitutional interpretation.
The principles of constitutional interpretation are similar to those
governing statutory construction. In interpreting a constitution’s provision,
our paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted it. To
determine that intent, we look first to the language of the constitutional text,
giving the words their ordinary meaning. If the language is clear, there is no
need for construction.13
The ordinary meaning of a word can be informed by dictionary definitions.14
Dictionaries consistently define malfeasance as “[a] wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act;
esp., wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official”15 or “wrongdoing or misconduct esp.
by a public official.”16 The Constitution then adds to this the requirement that the
malfeasance be committed “in office.” We believe the ordinary meaning of that phrase is
that the act of malfeasance be related to the actor’s occupation of a public office.
Given this framework, we find there to be substantial questions of law and fact
whether Argumedo’s conviction for obstruction of justice amounts to malfeasance in office
that warrant judicial determination. In the course of this determination, a court can inquire
into both the evidentiary basis supporting the facts at issue and whether the legal elements
of Argumedo’s conviction satisfy the constitutional prohibition. For example, a court
could evaluate whether the facts support findings that Argumedo disclosed the contents of
a closed-session city council meeting without the council’s authorization;17 violated the
city’s attorney-client privilege without authorization; or misled a judge so that she
13
Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 122, internal citations
and quotation marks omitted.
14
Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.
15
Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 1100, col. 2.
16
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1999) p. 704, col. 2.
17
Gov. Code, § 54963. The court could also consider whether Argumedo qualified for
an exception to this provision, such as “[e]xpressing an opinion concerning the propriety
or legality of actions taken . . . in closed session . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 54963, subd. (e)(2).)
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erroneously denied the city’s motion for summary adjudication, which in turn subjected
the city to continued and unnecessary litigation. The court could also determine the legal
questions whether Argumedo’s acts constituted malfeasance and whether those acts were
intrinsically related to Argumedo’s position as a city council member. As we previously
observed when evaluating whether certain acts constituted a violation of official duties,
“We do not have here an offense that involves purely ‘private’ conduct.”18 Argumedo
provided a declaration in litigation between the city and its former attorney, purporting to
provide information that he had access to exclusively based on his status as a city council
member. Thus, we believe the question whether Argumedo’s conviction constitutes
malfeasance in office within the meaning of article VII, section 8 of the California
Constitution presents substantial issues of law and fact that warrant judicial resolution.
2. Is Argumedo’s exclusion from holding public office permanent?
Argumedo also maintains that section 8 and its enabling legislation apply only to a
conviction suffered during a current term of office, rather than imposing a lifetime ban on
holding office. Section 8 specifies that “Laws shall be made to exclude persons convicted”
of various crimes from serving in office.19 What here is the meaning of “exclude”?
Exclude is defined as “to prevent or restrict the entrance of,” or “to bar from
participation, consideration, or inclusion.”20 The plain meaning of “exclude . . . from
office,” then, would be to prevent a person from assuming an office or to bar the person’s
consideration for office. We see no ambiguity in this constitutional language, nor any
implication that the exclusion is temporary. Additionally, the full text of section 8,
subdivision (b) is: “Laws shall be made to exclude persons convicted of bribery, perjury,
forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes from office or serving on juries.”21
Certainly the exclusion from juries is permanent, rather than limited to a jury an individual
might be sitting on when convicted. It would be a strained and unusual construction to
intend one exclusion to be permanent and the other temporary without so specifying.
18
75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 64, 69 (1992).
19
Cal. Const., art. VII, § 8, subd. (b).
20
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1999) p. 404, col. 2.
21
Cal. Const., art. VII, § 8, subd. (b), italics added.
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Argumedo fails to address this constitutional language, and focuses instead on the
statutory language, but this is of no moment as the same result obtains. Government Code
section 1021 provides, “A person is disqualified from holding any office upon conviction
of” the crimes designated in section 8. In ascertaining the meaning of “disqualified,” we
turn to well-established rules of statutory construction.
The “first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so
as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, [we] must look first to
the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and
according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.”22 If the statutory language is clear, we “follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend.”23 On the other hand, where ambiguity exists, “consideration should be given to
the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.”24
“Disqualify” means “[t]he act of making ineligible; the fact or condition of being
ineligible,”25 or “to deprive of the required qualities, properties, or conditions; make
unfit.”26 These definitions do not connote a fleeting condition, but rather a status of
ineligibility or unfitness. Additionally, a permanent disqualification from office is a
longstanding and common collateral consequence of a conviction.27 Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that a potential ambiguity exists given that in several statutes the Legislature
has used the phrase “forever disqualified” with reference to disqualifications from office,28
22
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-
1387 (Dyna-Med).
23
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 186, internal
quotation marks and citations omitted.
24
Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.
25
Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 2000) p. 383, col. 1.
26
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1999) p. 336, col. 1.
27
The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction (Oct. 1970) 23 Vand. L. Rev.
929, 987 (“[m]ost states have constitutional and statutory provisions disqualifying persons
convicted of certain crimes from holding public office”); id. at p. 993 (noting that New
Hampshire is the only state to have adopted the Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted
Persons, which provides that a felon regains the right to hold public office at discharge);
id. at p. 1000 (“[i]in the absence of a pardon, the offender, even though rehabilitated, will
be unable to hold public office in most states”).
28
See Gov. Code, § 1097 (person prohibited from making or being interested in
contracts who willfully does so “is forever disqualified from holding any office in this
state”); Pen. Code, § 88 (“Every Member of the Legislature, and every member of a
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but has not done so here.
Attempting to resolve this ambiguity in his favor, Argumedo points to two other
statutes that implement section 8. Government Code section 1770 directs that a public
office becomes vacant upon an officer’s “conviction of a felony or of any offense involving
a violation of his or her official duties.”29 And Government Code section 3000 provides
that “[a]n officer forfeits his office upon conviction of designated crimes as specified in
the Constitution and laws of the State.”30 Argumedo contends that the disqualification set
out in section 1021 refers only to the current term of office because it must be read as
operating simultaneously with the vacancy in section 1770 and the forfeiture in section
3000. In support, Argumedo cites Helena Rubenstein International v. Younger (1977) 71
Cal.App.3d 406 (Rubenstein). There, the court noted that Government Code sections 1021,
1770, and 3000 must be read together and harmonized, concluding that the three
consequences they define—disqualification, vacancy, and forfeiture—necessarily occur
simultaneously.31
We think Rubenstein inapposite. The “sole substantive issue presented” in
Rubenstein was whether a sitting Lieutenant Governor “was ‘convicted’ within the
meaning of the applicable California constitutional provision (former art. XX, § 11[32]) and
relevant implementing statutes for the purpose of exclusion from holding public office
upon the rendition of the jury verdict, . . . , or the judgment, . . . .”33 Given that the
Lieutenant Governor was in office upon his conviction, there could be no other result than
that he was disqualified from office, forfeited his office, and vacated his office
simultaneously. The only question was whether those events were triggered by the jury’s
verdict or the trial court’s judgment on sentencing, and the appellate court did not
legislative body of a city, county, city and county, school district, or other special district
convicted of any crime defined in this title [Of Crimes Against the Legislative Power], in
addition to the punishment prescribed, forfeits his or her office and is forever disqualified
from holding any office in this state or a political subdivision thereof”). But we note that
in at least one other place, the Legislature has expressly imposed only a temporary ban
based on certain convictions. (Gov. Code, § 1021.5 [imposing five-year ban on public
employment based on certain convictions].)
29
Gov. Code, § 1770, subd. (h).
30
Gov. Code, § 3000.
31
Rubenstein, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 421.
32
Cal. Const., art. XX, § 11 was the predecessor to section 8, and was identical to it in
all respects relevant to this opinion. (Rubenstein, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 412, fn. 6.)
33
Rubenstein, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 411. The court held that the “conviction”
occurs only upon the rendition of judgment. Ibid.
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consider whether the Lieutenant Governor was forever disqualified from office. Cases
cannot provide authority on issues not considered.34
More relevant, we believe, is Lubin v. Wilson (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1422 (Lubin).
There, Paul Carpenter served as a member of the State Board of Equalization beginning in
1987. In September 1990, Carpenter was convicted of federal racketeering, extortion, and
conspiracy based on events that occurred when he was a state senator, before he joined the
Board of Equalization. In November 1990, Carpenter was reelected to the Board of
Equalization. The Secretary of State did not allow Carpenter to file his oath of office in
January 1991, and Carpenter—along with several voters—sought mandate to compel his
installation on the Board of Equalization. 35
The court rejected various challenges to the statutory scheme embodied in
Government Code sections 1021, 1770, and 3000, including under the First Amendment
and the ex post facto clause. At no time did the court express concern that the conviction
involved conduct in a former office, or that the conviction occurred before Carpenter was
elected or attempted to assume his seat.36 Unlike in Rubenstein where the question
involved a currently sitting office-holder, in Lubin the court actually barred Carpenter from
assuming office based on a conviction suffered before the new term. Thus, although not
directly on point, we find Lubin supports our view that a court may find that the
disqualification codified in Government Code section 1021 is permanent.
In addition, viewing the statutory scheme as a whole,37 we see that Government
Code sections 1021 and 3000 have existed in their current forms since 1943,38 when they
were enacted as part of a bill that “assemble[d], codifie[d], and consolidate[d] the law
relating to the organization, operation and maintenance of a system of government for the
State and its local units.”39 Given that Government Code section 3000 provides that an
officer forfeits an office upon a conviction enumerated in section 8, Government Code
34
In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388.
35
Lubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1426.
36
E.g., id. at p. 1427 (rejecting contention that Government Code section 1770 is
ambiguous and noting, “The fact the charges stemmed from activities during Carpenter’s
senate term does not cloud the statute’s applicability”).
37
Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (“we consider portions of a
statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part,
giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose”).
38
Stats. 1943, ch. 134, § 1021, p. 954; Stats. 1943, ch. 134, § 3000, p. 976.
39
Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 958 (1943 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.
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section 1021 must mean something different. And we presume that the different meaning
is its plain meaning: upon conviction of a crime enumerated in section 8, not only does an
officer forfeit his or her current office, but the officer is also disqualified from future office
holding.
We are not persuaded by Argumedo’s assertion that we must read the
disqualification imposed by Government Code section 1021 as applying only to a currently
held office in order to avoid what he characterizes as an absurd result—that one who
obtains a reversal of conviction on appeal is nevertheless forever barred from public office.
First, of course, Argumedo’s own conviction has not been appealed, much less reversed.
In any event, athough the hypothetical result Argumedo posits may be harsh, it is not
absurd, but rather intended. Government Code section 1770.1 provides:
The disqualification from holding office upon conviction, as provided
in Section 1021, or the forfeiture of office upon conviction, as provided in
subdivision (h) of Section 1770 and Section 3000, is neither stayed by the
initiation of an appeal from the conviction, nor set aside by the successful
prosecuting of an appeal from the conviction by the person suffering the
conviction.40
This language expresses the Legislature’s “intent to preclude convicted individuals from
holding public office from the moment of entry of ‘trial court judgment,’ regardless of a
later successful appeal.”41 Thus, while a lifetime ban on holding office may be severe,
“[t]he statutory scheme advances the compelling interest for honesty, integrity and
confidence of the public in government, which is greater than the convicted person’s
interest in the office.”42
Allowing the Action to Proceed Would Serve the Public Interest
As our analysis reveals, there are substantial legal and factual questions regarding
Argumedo’s eligibility to serve on the Commerce city council in light of the obstruction of
justice conviction at issue here. We additionally conclude that allowing this action to
proceed “would serve the overall public interest in ensuring ‘the integrity of public office
40
Gov. Code, § 1770.1.
41
Lubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1429.
42
Ibid. We are also not swayed by Argumedo’s contention that the term of his plea
agreement, which prevented him from serving in office for only three years, entitles him
to hold office now, without regard to other laws. A plea agreement cannot supersede
constitutional and statutory prohibitions on holding office.
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and in the qualifications of their officials.’”43 Ordinarily we view the need for judicial
resolution of substantial questions of law or fact as sufficient public interest to grant leave
to proceed in quo warranto.44 There is no reason to depart from that general rule here.
Both the City of Commerce and the public have an interest in judicial determination of
Argumedo’s eligibility for continued service as a city council member. Accordingly, the
leave for application to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED.
*****
43
97 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 12, 19 (2014), quoting 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 43, 49 (2012).
44
95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 49.
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