When the Arizona statute requiring fingerprint clearance cards for housing-license applicants uses words like 'partner,' 'president,' and 'manager' without defining them, can the Department of Public Safety and the Department of Housing use the definitions of those same terms found in other parts of the Arizona Revised Statutes?

Plain-English summary

The Arizona Department of Housing licenses manufactured-home dealers and brokers. In 2022, the legislature added A.R.S. § 41-4025(E), which says certain owners and officers of those licensees have to get fingerprint clearance cards from the Department of Public Safety. The statute lists the people who need cards by their business titles: owner, partner, general partner, president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, manager, managing member.

Here is the catch: § 41-4025(E) sits in Title 41 of the statutes. Title 41 does not define any of those titles. The definitions live in Title 10 (corporations), Title 29 (partnerships and LLCs), and Title 32 (some occupational licensing). Because processing fingerprint clearance cards requires the FBI to share federal criminal-history records, the FBI reviewed the new law and balked, saying the categories were not defined precisely enough to identify who has to be fingerprinted.

The two state agencies asked AG Kris Mayes whether they could use the existing definitions from other titles. The opinion says yes. When a statute uses business-role terms in the same context those terms are defined elsewhere in the same overall statutory scheme, courts will read them with the existing definitions. The opinion then walks through each role and matches it to the controlling Arizona definition.

What this means for you

If you own or run a business that holds an Arizona Department of Housing license

The list of who has to obtain a fingerprint clearance card is now operationally clear. Match your business structure to the right Arizona definition:

• Sole proprietorship: the owner (A.R.S. § 32-701(26)-(27))
• General partnership: every partner (A.R.S. § 29-301(8))
• Limited partnership: every general partner (A.R.S. § 29-301(5))
• Corporation or association: president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer (A.R.S. § 10-140(38), (43), (48), (50))
• Limited liability company: the manager (in a manager-managed LLC) or every managing member (A.R.S. § 29-3102(13))
• Salesperson applicants: the individual

Plus the qualifying party in every case. Each of these people needs a valid fingerprint clearance card under A.R.S. § 41-1758.03 before you can hold a Department of Housing license.

If you are a manufactured-home dealer or installer applying for first-time licensure

Build the fingerprinting timeline into your application planning. Collecting cards for several officers (in a corporation) or several partners can take weeks. Start before you submit the application, not after.

If you work in compliance for a state agency that processes federal criminal-history checks

This opinion is a useful template if you run into the same problem under another statute. The FBI's stated concern was that the law did not "sufficiently identify the specific categories of licensees" because the role titles were undefined. The AG's framework, that contextually identical terms borrow definitions from other titles, may resolve similar issues for other Arizona licensing schemes.

If you are an LLC owner or manager

Pay close attention to manager-managed versus member-managed status. In a manager-managed LLC, only the designated manager needs the fingerprint card. In a member-managed LLC, every "managing member" needs one. Check your articles of organization to see which structure you have. If you reorganize from member-managed to manager-managed, fewer people need cards (but the manager still does).

Common questions

Q: What is a fingerprint clearance card and why does Arizona require one?
A: A fingerprint clearance card is issued by the Arizona Department of Public Safety after a criminal background check. The state requires them for various licensed roles where access to vulnerable people, money, or sensitive information matters. The card application process pulls both Arizona and FBI federal criminal-history data.

Q: Why did the FBI hold up Arizona's new law?
A: Federal regulations under Public Law 92-544 require the FBI to approve any state law authorizing access to federal records before sharing. The FBI's review found that A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) used business-role terms that were not defined in Title 41, so the agency could not be confident about who fell within scope. The FBI told Arizona that an AG opinion clarifying that other-title definitions apply would resolve the concern.

Q: Does this opinion apply to other Arizona statutes that use undefined business-role terms?
A: Not automatically. The opinion is specifically about A.R.S. § 41-4025(E). But the reasoning, that contextually aligned terms borrow definitions from other parts of the Revised Statutes, is general. Other agencies facing similar questions can cite this opinion as persuasive support.

Q: What is a "qualifying party"?
A: A "qualifying party" is the person on a manufactured-housing license application who satisfies the substantive licensing standards (experience, exam, etc.) for the business. The statute requires every qualifying party to obtain a fingerprint card, regardless of business structure.

Q: What if my title is something that does not appear in the list, like "CEO"?
A: A.R.S. § 10-140(38) says the "president" is whoever is so designated in the articles or bylaws "or, if not so designated, that officer authorized in the articles of incorporation, bylaws or otherwise to perform the functions of the chief executive officer, irrespective of the name by which designated." So a CEO will typically be the "president" for these purposes. The other titles work the same way: function over label.

Background and statutory framework

The Arizona Department of Housing regulates dealers, brokers, salespersons, and installers of manufactured homes, mobile homes, and factory-built buildings. License applicants under A.R.S. Title 41, Chapter 37, Article 2 must satisfy a range of qualifications including, since 2022, fingerprint clearance for owners and senior officers.

Federal law (Pub. L. 92-544 and 28 C.F.R. § 50.12) requires that any state statute authorizing access to FBI criminal-history records be specific enough to identify who is being checked. The FBI reviews proposed statutes for that purpose before allowing federal record access. When the FBI saw A.R.S. § 41-4025(E)'s list of undefined business roles, it asked for clarification.

Arizona's general approach to statutory interpretation is to use a defined term's defined meaning, but most Title-specific definitions begin "in this chapter" or "in this title." That ordinarily limits the definition's reach. Yet courts routinely cross those lines when the context is the same: the criminal-code definition of "recklessly" has been used to interpret a civil inheritance statute (Hoover); Title 28's definition of "motor vehicle" has been used to interpret a criminal theft statute (In re Adam P.); and so on. The AG applies that body of law here, finding that business-role terms used in a fingerprinting statute about business entities mean the same thing they mean in the business-entity titles where they are defined.

The opinion works through each Business Role and identifies the matching definition. It also notes that Arizona's default rule (A.R.S. § 29-3407(A)) is that LLC management lies with members unless the articles say otherwise, which is what makes the manager-versus-managing-member split in § 41-4025(E) work in practice.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) (the statute being interpreted)
- A.R.S. § 41-1758.03 (fingerprint clearance cards)
- A.R.S. § 10-140 (corporation officer definitions)
- A.R.S. § 29-301 (partnership definitions)
- A.R.S. § 29-3102 (LLC definitions)
- A.R.S. § 29-3407 (LLC management default)
- A.R.S. § 32-701 (sole proprietor definitions)
- A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(7) (AG opinion authority)
- Pub. L. 92-544; 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.85(j), 50.12 (federal record-sharing approval)

Cases:
- State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260 (App. 2000) (apply statutory definitions when present)
- Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272 (1996) (context, subject matter, and purpose in interpretation)
- State v. Flynt, 199 Ariz. 92 (App. 2000) (read provisions together)
- State v. Garza Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. 107 (1990) (legislature presumed to know existing law)
- In re Adam P., 201 Ariz. 289 (App. 2001) (cross-title definitions example)
- Matter of Est. of Hoover, 140 Ariz. 464 (App. 1984) (criminal-code definition used in civil context)
- Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559 (App. 1986) (securities definition used in racketeering statute)
- State v. Simmons, 238 Ariz. 503 (App. 2015) (cross-chapter definitions)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i24-007-r23-010
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I24-007.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

Jeffrey Glover, Colonel

Director

Arizona Department of Public Safety

Joan Serviss

Director

Arizona Department of Housing

Question Presented

Can the terms "owner," "partner," "general partner," "president," "vice president," "secretary," "treasurer," "manager," and "managing members" (collectively the "Business Roles") in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) be defined by reference to the definitions of these same terms in other parts of the Arizona Revised Statutes?

Summary Answer

Yes, the Business Roles identified in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) may be defined by reference to the definitions of these terms in other contextually-related sections of the Revised Statutes. As used in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E), the Business Roles reference positions in certain business organizations, a context identical to that in which the terms are defined elsewhere. Under these circumstances, traditional statutory construction principles—along with fundamental logic and common sense—support the conclusion that the Business Roles have the same meaning in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) as they do in related parts of the Revised Statutes.

Background

When a state enacts a law authorizing access to federally-held criminal history record information for use in connection with a state agency's licensing or employment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has authority to approve the law before allowing access to the records. See Pub. L. 92-544; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(j); 28 C.F.R. § 50.12.

In 2022, the Arizona Legislature passed H.B. 2165, which is now codified in relevant part as A.R.S. § 41-4025(E). This statute requires certain Department of Housing ("DOH") licensees to obtain fingerprint clearance cards issued by the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") as a condition of licensure, as follows:

Before receiving and holding a license issued pursuant to this article, the owner, if the applicant is a sole proprietorship, all partners, if the applicant is a partnership, the general partner, if the applicant is a limited partnership, the president, vice president, secretary and treasurer, if the applicant is a corporation or other type of association, the manager or managing members, if the applicant is a limited liability company, the individual, if the applicant is a salesperson, and the qualifying party shall submit a valid fingerprint clearance card issued pursuant to section 41-1758.03. The applicant is responsible for providing the department with a valid fingerprint clearance card.

A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) (emphasis added).

Because processing fingerprint clearance card applications requires access to federal criminal history record information, DPS submitted the law to the FBI for approval. The FBI concluded that A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) does not sufficiently identify the specific categories of licensees who must obtain fingerprint clearance cards because the Business Roles are not defined in Title 41. The FBI advised that an Attorney General opinion that definitions in other statutes may apply to the Business Roles would resolve its concerns and allow for the approval of H.B. 2165.

On May 31, 2023, DPS Director Jeffrey Glover and DOH Director Joan Serviss jointly submitted to this Office a request under A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(7) for an Attorney General Opinion as to whether definitions outside Title 41 may apply to the Business Roles in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

Analysis

When "statutory terms are defined," Arizona courts will "apply that definition." State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, 264 ¶ 10 (App. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Business Roles are statutorily defined, but not within Title 41. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 10-140(38) (defining "president"); A.R.S. § 29-301(8) (defining "partner").

Because identical terms can appear in disparate contexts throughout the Revised Statutes, definition provisions generally contain the proviso that definitions apply "[i]n this chapter" or "[i]n this title," e.g., A.R.S. § 29-301 (chapter limitation); A.R.S. § 28-101 (title limitation), implying that the definitions do not necessarily apply outside the chapter or title. But a "statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose" are key to statutory interpretation. Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275 (1996). Courts "construe statutory provisions in light of their place in the statutory scheme . . . so they may be harmonious and consistent." State v. Flynt, 199 Ariz. 92, 94 ¶ 5 (App. 2000). And courts "presume that the legislature knows the existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute." State v. Garza Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. 107, 111 (1990).

When contextually appropriate, courts therefore draw from definitions in disparate parts of the Revised Statutes, notwithstanding language limiting those definitions to a particular title or chapter. See, e.g., In re Adam P., 201 Ariz. 289, 291 ¶¶ 10, 13 (App. 2001) (citing A.R.S. § 28–101 provision defining a "golf cart" as a type of "motor vehicle" in support of conclusion that a golf cart is a "means of transportation" under criminal theft statute); Matter of Est. of Hoover, 140 Ariz. 464, 464–68 (App. 1984) (relying on definition of the term "recklessly" in the criminal code to interpret civil provision barring convicted killer from inheriting from victim under certain circumstances); Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 564–65 (App. 1986) (citing A.R.S. § 44-1801(19)'s definition of "security" to interpret A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)'s provision that racketeering includes "the sale of unregistered securities by an unregistered dealer or salesman"); cf. State v. Simmons, 238 Ariz. 503, 507 ¶ 16 (App. 2015) (relying on the definitions of "facilitation" and "conspiracy" in A.R.S. §§ 13-1003(A) and 13-1004(A) to define those terms in a separate chapter of the criminal code).

While the definitions in Simmons were not limited by chapter, the statute at issue had expressly incorporated certain definitions from outside the chapter without incorporating the definitions of "facilitation" or "conspiracy." 238 Ariz. at 507 ¶ 16. The court nonetheless observed that "the legislature is not required to specifically incorporate statutory definitions into a statute." Id. Moreover, "if the legislature had intended different meanings for the terms 'facilitate' and 'conspire' . . . it could have said so." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

This same analysis applies with at least equal force here because there is a perfect contextual alignment between the Business Roles defined in the business entity titles and the identical Business Roles referenced in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E). Title 29, for example, governs limited liability companies ("LLCs") and sets forth the definition of an LLC "manager." A.R.S. § 29-3102(13). Section 41-4025(E) does not explicitly incorporate definitions from Title 29, but there is no doubt that the term "manager" in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E) references an LLC manager—as opposed to some other type of manager—because the statute expressly provides for the submission of a fingerprint card by "the manager . . . if the applicant is a limited liability company." (Emphasis added.) Statutory construction principles, in combination with fundamental logic and common sense, therefore dictate that an individual who is an Arizona LLC manager as defined in Title 29 is an LLC manager under that same definition for the purposes of A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

This is true with respect to each of the Business Roles, as follows:

"[T]he owner, if the applicant is a sole proprietorship." A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

"Sole proprietor means the owner of a sole proprietorship." A.R.S. § 32-701(26). A "sole proprietorship," in turn, "means a business that is owned by one individual and that does not have a legal distinction between the owner and the business." Id. § 32-701(27).

"[A]ll partners, if the applicant is a partnership." A.R.S. § 41-4025(E)

"Partner means a limited or general partner." A.R.S. § 29-301(8). A "[l]imited partner means a person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a limited partner in accordance with the partnership agreement." Id. § 29-301(6).

"[T]he general partner, if the applicant is a limited partnership." A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

"General partner means a person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a general partner in accordance with the partnership agreement and named in the certificate of limited partnership as a general partner." A.R.S. § 29-301(5).

"[T]he president, vice president, secretary and treasurer, if the applicant is a corporation or other type of association." A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

"President means that officer designated as the president in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or, if not so designated, that officer authorized in the articles of incorporation, bylaws or otherwise to perform the functions of the chief executive officer, irrespective of the name by which designated." A.R.S. § 10-140(38).

"Vice-president means an officer designated as the vice-president in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or an officer authorized in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or otherwise to perform the functions of a vice-president, irrespective of the name by which designated." A.R.S. § 10-140(50).

"Secretary means that officer designated as the secretary in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or that officer authorized in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or otherwise to perform the functions of secretary, irrespective of the name by which designated." A.R.S. § 10-140(43).

"Treasurer means that officer designated as the treasurer in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or that officer authorized in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or otherwise to perform the functions of treasurer, irrespective of the name by which designated." A.R.S. § 10-140(48).

"[T]he manager or managing members, if the applicant is a limited liability company." A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

"Manager means a person that under the [LLC] operating agreement of a manager-managed limited liability company is responsible, alone or in concert with others, for performing the management functions stated in section 29-3407, subsection C." A.R.S. § 29-3102(13).

A "[m]ember means a person that both: (a) [h]as become a member of a limited liability company under section 29-3401 or was a member in a company when the company became subject to [chapter 29] under section 29-3110"; and "(b) [h]as not dissociated under section 29-3602." A.R.S. § 29-3102(15). A "[m]ember-managed limited liability company means a limited liability company that is not a manager-managed limited liability company." Id. § 29-3102(16). By default, "[m]anagement of a limited liability company is reserved to its members unless the articles of organization provide that the company is managed by one or more managers." A.R.S. § 29-3407(A).

Conclusion

The Business Roles are positions in business organizations that the Revised Statutes define in various titles and then reference in an identical context in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E). The definitions recited above may therefore be applied to these terms in A.R.S. § 41-4025(E).

Kris Mayes

Attorney General

[1] Absent a statutory definition, courts will "interpret statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings," State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, 264 ¶ 10 (App. 2000), and will commonly look to ordinary dictionary definitions. E.g., W. Valley View, Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 216 Ariz. 225, 229 ¶ 16 (App. 2007).

[2] For clarity, emphasis is added and internal quotation marks are omitted in the definitions that follow.