Can a school district employee involved in procurement host a fundraising dinner where attendees (including vendors) bid for invitations and the proceeds go to a related education foundation?

Plain-English summary

The Chandler Unified School District has run an annual Superintendent's dinner for 17 years to raise money for the Chandler Education Foundation, a separate non-profit that supports the district. People (including past and present district vendors) bid for invitations; the bid amounts all go to the Foundation; the Superintendent personally pays the dinner's catering costs.

In 2018, the legislature added A.R.S. § 15-213(N), making it a class 6 felony for school employees involved in procurement to "solicit, accept or agree to accept any personal gift or benefit" of three hundred dollars or more from a person or vendor that has secured or taken steps to secure a district transaction. The district's lawyer asked: does this dinner break the new law?

Solicitor General Dominic Draye said no. The key word is "personal." A.R.S. § 15-213(S)(1) defines "gift or benefit" broadly (any payment, distribution, donation, etc.). Donations to the Foundation fit that broad definition. But § 15-213(N) only prohibits personal gifts and benefits. "Personal" means "of or relating to a particular person" (Webster's). A donation that goes to the Foundation, not to the Superintendent personally, is not "personal."

The opinion was issued under A.R.S. § 15-253(B), which requires the AG to "concur, revise or decline to review" opinions submitted by attorneys representing school districts (with county attorney consent). The district's own counsel had reached the same conclusion through a slightly different statutory-construction route (whether "personal" modified both "gift" and "benefit"). The opinion revised the district attorney’s submission and noted another canon that could support applying “personal” to both “gift” and “benefit.”

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical context: what the opinion meant in 2018

For school district superintendents and procurement officers

The opinion addressed a dinner whose invitation bids all went to an independent foundation supporting the district. The Superintendent paid the dinner expenses personally. On those facts, the donations were not personal gifts or benefits under A.R.S. § 15-213(N).

For education foundations and district vendors

The opinion said district vendors could bid for invitations to this dinner, with the full bid amounts donated to the Chandler Education Foundation. It did not decide how the statute applies to a different fundraiser or a donation that benefits a particular person.

Common questions

Q: What does A.R.S. § 15-213(N) actually prohibit?
A: It makes it a class 6 felony for a school district employee involved in procurement to solicit, accept, or agree to accept "any personal gift or benefit with a value of three hundred dollars or more" from a person or vendor that has done business or sought business with the district. A personal gift or benefit with a value of less than three hundred dollars is a class 1 misdemeanor. Items of nominal value (greeting cards, t-shirts, mugs, pens) don't count.

Q: Why isn't a vendor's donation to the foundation a "gift" to the Superintendent?
A: Because it goes to the foundation, not to the Superintendent. § 15-213(N) requires the gift or benefit to be "personal." "Personal" means "of or relating to a particular person." The described donation to the Foundation was not for or related to any particular person.

Q: Does this opinion decide other donation arrangements?
A: No. It addresses bids for this dinner that are donated in full to the independent Foundation while the Superintendent covers the dinner expenses.

Q: What if a county attorney's opinion already said this was OK?
A: A.R.S. § 15-253(B) requires county attorneys (and attorneys representing districts with county attorney consent) to submit school-related opinions to the AG for review. The AG can "concur, revise or decline to review." Here, the opinion says it revised the opinion submitted by the District’s attorney.

Background and statutory framework

In 2018, the Legislature added subsection (N) to A.R.S. § 15-213. It sets criminal penalties for specified district procurement employees who solicit or accept a personal gift or benefit from a person or vendor that has secured or taken steps to secure a district transaction. The threshold for a class 6 felony is three hundred dollars; a smaller personal gift or benefit is a class 1 misdemeanor.

The criminal text:

A person who supervises or participates in contracts, purchases, payments, claims or other financial transactions … is guilty of a class 6 felony if the person solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any personal gift or benefit with a value of three hundred dollars or more from a person or vendor that has secured or has taken steps to secure a contract, purchase, payment, claim or financial transaction with the school district or school purchasing cooperative.

The definitions:

• "Gift or benefit" (§ 15-213(S)(1)): "a payment, distribution, expenditure, advance, deposit or donation of monies, any intangible personal property or any kind of tangible personal or real property."
• "Personal" (not statutorily defined; opinion uses Webster's): "of or relating to a particular person."

The opinion concluded that the donation to the Foundation described in the request was not for or related to any particular person.

Statutory canon support: the opinion's footnote 3 invokes the series-qualifier canon (Scalia & Garner, Reading Law): "When there is a straightforward parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series." So "personal" modifies both "gift" and "benefit." Even without the series-qualifier canon, the opinion notes that "gift or benefit" is a single defined term in § 15-213(S)(1), so "personal" applies as a single qualifier.

The result: A.R.S. § 15-213(N) does not bar the described dinner when vendors obtain invitations by donating to the Foundation.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• A.R.S. § 15-213(N), (S) (criminal procurement gift restriction; "gift or benefit" definition)
• A.R.S. § 15-253(B) (AG review of school-related county attorney opinions)

Prior AG opinions:

• Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. I88-052 (Substitute Opinion) (1988): "county attorney" includes attorneys representing school districts with county attorney consent

Authority:

• Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 150 (Thomson/West 2012), series-qualifier canon

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i18-012-r18-017
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/i18-012.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

William J. Sims III

Sims Murray

Question Presented

Does Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 15-213(N) prohibit a school district employee who participates in procurement decisions from auctioning off an event for attendees—who may include vendors who contract with the district—where all monies collected benefit an independent foundation that supports the district?

Summary Answer

No. Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-213 does not prohibit the event described. Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-213(N) imposes criminal penalties on school district employees involved in procurement who receive a "personal gift or benefit" from "a person or vendor that has secured or has taken steps to secure a contract, purchase, payment, claim or financial transaction with the school district." Donations to an independent foundation that supports the school district do not fall within the definition of "personal gift or benefit." Thus, they do not violate the prohibition in A.R.S. § 15-213(N).

Background

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-253(B), an attorney for the Chandler Unified School District (the "District") submitted an opinion he provided to the District's Superintendent for review. Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-253(B) requires the Attorney General to "concur, revise or decline to review" opinions of county attorneys relating to school matters. [1] This Opinion revises the opinion submitted by the District's attorney.

For the past seventeen years, the District's Superintendent has hosted a dinner to support the Chandler Education Foundation (the "Foundation"), a non-profit entity with a mission "to provide community support for excellence in education and promote lifelong learning and responsible citizenship for Chandler Unified School District students." [2] A person may secure an invitation to the dinner by submitting a bid, the amount of which is donated to the Foundation. Any member of the public—including past and present vendors of the District—may bid for an invitation to the dinner. All funds paid to attend the dinner are donated to the Foundation, and no portion is deducted to pay the dinner expenses; the District's Superintendent personally covers those costs.

Analysis

In 2018, the Legislature amended A.R.S. § 15-213 by, inter alia, adding subsection N, which provides:

A person who supervises or participates in contracts, purchases, payments, claims or other financial transactions, or a person who supervises or participates in the planning, recommending, selecting or contracting for materials, services, goods, construction, or construction services of a school district or school purchasing cooperative is guilty of a class 6 felony if the person solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any personal gift or benefit with a value of three hundred dollars or more from a person or vendor that has secured or has taken steps to secure a contract, purchase, payment, claim or financial transaction with the school district or school purchasing cooperative. Soliciting, accepting or agreeing to accept any personal gift or benefit with a value of less than three hundred dollars is a class 1 misdemeanor. A gift or benefit does not include an item of nominal value such as a greeting card, t-shirt, mug or pen.

A.R.S. § 15-213(N). Under this section, if donations to the Foundation to attend the Superintendent's dinner are a "personal gift or benefit" to the Superintendent, they are prohibited. A "gift or benefit" is "a payment, distribution, expenditure, advance, deposit or donation of monies, any intangible personal property or any kind of tangible personal or real property." A.R.S. § 15-213(S)(1). Accordingly, a donation to the Foundation meets the definition of "gift or benefit." However, such a donation is only prohibited if it is "personal." [3]

"Personal" is defined as "of or relating to a particular person." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1993). The donation to the Foundation described here is not for or relating to any particular person. As such, it is not a "personal gift or benefit" barred by A.R.S. § 15-213(N).

Conclusion

Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-213(N) does not bar the District's Superintendent, or any other District employee who participates in contracting for materials, goods, services, or construction, from hosting a dinner attended by vendors of the district when the vendors obtain an invitation to the dinner by making donations to the Foundation.

Dominic E. Draye

Solicitor General

Footnotes

[1] The term “county attorney” in A.R.S. § 15-253(B) includes elected county attorneys as well as attorneys who represent school districts with the consent of the county attorney. Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I88-052, at 2 (Substitute Opinion) (1988). The opinion revised herein falls in the latter category.

[2] Chandler Education Foundation, Who We Are: Mission & History, https://www.chandleredfoundation.org/who-we-are/mission.html.

[3] The opinion submitted by the District’s attorney discussed whether the term “personal” in A.R.S. § 15-213(N) modified both “gift” and “benefit,” and determined that it did because “gift or benefit” is a single defined term that did not call for the application of the nearest-reasonable-referent canon of construction. One could also apply the series-qualifier canon to reach the same result. The series-qualifier canon provides that “[w]hen there is a straightforward parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 150 (Thomson/West 2012).