Can two Arizona fire districts merge their operations under a single joint authority without putting it on the ballot, and is that a disenfranchisement of voters?

Plain-English summary

In October 2015, two Yavapai County fire districts (Central Yavapai and Chino Valley) signed an intergovernmental agency agreement to form the Central Arizona Fire and Medical Authority (CAFMA), effective July 1, 2016. The two districts continued to exist with their own five-member boards. CAFMA also got a five-member board, populated by members drawn from the two underlying districts.

Representatives David Stringer and Noel Campbell asked the AG three questions:
1. Was the CAFMA arrangement lawful under Arizona law?
2. Did it disenfranchise Central Yavapai voters or otherwise violate the Arizona Constitution?
3. If there was disenfranchisement or illegality, what could be done?

The AG answered yes, no, and nothing.

Question 1: Lawful. A.R.S. § 48-805.01(B) expressly allows "[c]ities, towns, counties and fire districts" to form "a separate legal entity pursuant to section 11-952, for the purposes of jointly exercising powers held in common by the contracting parties." The governing body of that joint entity is composed of officials from the contracting parties' boards. The new entity is itself a political subdivision with its own statutory powers. No voter approval is required.

The opinion request had asked whether CAFMA "effectively merged" the districts and "circumvent[ed]" the merger rules in A.R.S. §§ 48-820 and 48-822. The AG said no. The Legislature explicitly framed the joint operating entity in A.R.S. § 48-805.02(D)(3) as an "alternative" to merger or consolidation. The legal distinction is significant: in a merger or consolidation, the participating fire districts "are dissolved by operation of law and no longer exist" (A.R.S. §§ 48-821(C), 48-823(C)). Under a joint operating entity, the original districts continue to exist with their own boards and statutory authority. CAFMA was the latter.

Question 2: No disenfranchisement. The AG walked through Arizona's case law on voter disenfranchisement and found none of it fit:
- Cases about disqualifying voters from elections (Moore v. City of Page, Parker v. City of Tucson). Inapplicable: nobody is being disqualified.
- Cases about redistricting eliminating someone's right to vote (Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting, Mayor & Council of City of Tucson v. Royal). Inapplicable: no redistricting.
- Cases about invalidating signatures or election results (Hunt v. Campbell, Grounds v. Lawe, Johnson v. Maehling). Inapplicable: no contested elections.

Two specific theories were raised. First, that voters were disenfranchised because they were not asked to approve CAFMA. The AG: there is no general right to vote on something the law does not require voter approval for. § 48-805.01 expressly says no voter approval is needed. Even mergers and consolidations don't always require voter approval (A.R.S. § 48-820(H), § 48-822(C)(9)).

Second, that Central Yavapai taxpayers were "subsidizing" Chino Valley operations through CAFMA. The AG took no position on whether such a subsidy was occurring, but concluded that even if it was, no Arizona case treated such cross-subsidies as disenfranchisement.

Question 3: No legal recourse. Since neither (1) nor (2) showed unlawfulness, no legal recourse was available.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical context: what the opinion meant in 2018

For Arizona fire districts

The opinion confirmed an important governance tool. Fire districts could share staff, equipment, and operational structure under a joint operating entity without giving up their own existence as political subdivisions or going through the dissolution-style process for merger or consolidation. CAFMA-style joint authorities became a workable middle path for districts that wanted operational integration but not full merger.

For special-district consolidation consultants

The opinion's treatment of A.R.S. § 48-805.02(D)(3) as making the joint operating entity an "alternative" to merger or consolidation was a useful framing point. It meant consultants could legitimately propose joint authorities as a non-merger option without worrying that a court would later treat the joint authority as a de facto merger and apply merger rules.

For Central Yavapai and Chino Valley voters

The opinion was a direct rejection of the voter-disenfranchisement framing some had used to challenge CAFMA. It was clear: the law did not require a vote for the joint authority to be formed, and voters retained their existing rights to elect their own district boards. Whether the cross-district financial flows in CAFMA were good policy was a different question; it was not a constitutional one.

For state legislators

The opinion implicitly invited the Legislature to revisit the policy if it disagreed. If the Legislature wanted joint operating entities to require voter approval, it could amend § 48-805.01. If it did not, the existing scheme stood. The AG's job was to apply the law as written.

For other Arizona special districts (water, sanitation, library, etc.)

The CAFMA analysis is fire-district-specific, but the underlying intergovernmental cooperation framework (A.R.S. § 11-952) is general. Other special districts can use § 11-952 to form joint legal entities for shared services, with case-by-case analysis of whether their enabling statutes also require voter approval.

Common questions

Q: What is a joint operating entity?
A: Under A.R.S. § 48-805.01 (for fire districts) and § 11-952 (for other intergovernmental cooperation), two or more participating governments can create a separate political subdivision to "jointly exercise[] powers held in common by the contracting parties." It is its own legal entity, governed by a board drawn from the contracting parties.

Q: Is a joint operating entity the same as a merger?
A: No. In a merger or consolidation, one or more of the original districts is dissolved (A.R.S. §§ 48-821(C), 48-823(C)) and ceases to exist. In a joint operating entity, the original districts continue to exist with their own boards. § 48-805.02(D)(3) treats the joint operating entity as an "alternative" to merger or consolidation.

Q: Who governs CAFMA?
A: A five-member board, with members drawn from the boards of Central Yavapai and Chino Valley Fire Districts. The two underlying districts also have their own five-member boards, which are separately elected.

Q: Did CAFMA require a public vote?
A: No. A.R.S. § 48-805.01 does not require voter approval for a joint operating entity. The statute envisions district board action, not a ballot measure.

Q: Even if no vote was required, isn't there a Constitutional issue if voters are kept out of a major decision?
A: Per the opinion, no. Arizona courts have not recognized a freestanding constitutional right to vote on government decisions that are not statutorily required to be on the ballot. Voter disenfranchisement claims have only succeeded when voters were disqualified from an election they were entitled to vote in, or when redistricting or signature invalidation eliminated their existing voting rights.

Q: What if the financial structure of CAFMA results in one district subsidizing the other?
A: The AG took no position on whether that was actually happening. But even if it was, the AG found no Arizona case law treating cross-district financial flows as disenfranchisement. The remedy for taxpayers concerned about subsidies is at the ballot box (electing district board members who would change the agreement) or through state legislative action.

Q: Could a court still hear a challenge to CAFMA?
A: A court could hear it, but per this opinion's analysis, the challenger would lose on the merits. The AG's opinion is not binding on a court, but it would be persuasive authority and a court would have to find some legal theory the AG missed.

Q: Could fire districts undo a joint operating entity?
A: Yes. The participating districts can dissolve the joint entity by mutual agreement. The opinion does not address the procedure in detail; it would presumably follow the agreement's own termination terms or a fresh intergovernmental action.

Background and statutory framework

Fire district governance options

Arizona law gives fire districts three structural options for working together:

1. Operational status quo with intergovernmental agreements (IGAs). Districts can sign IGAs for specific shared services without forming a new entity.
2. Joint operating entity under A.R.S. § 48-805.01. Districts form a new political subdivision (a separate legal entity) to jointly exercise common powers. The original districts continue to exist. Examples: CAFMA.
3. Merger or consolidation under A.R.S. §§ 48-820 to -823. Two or more districts combine into one. The merged or consolidated districts are dissolved by operation of law.

The Legislature treats these as distinct paths. § 48-805.02(D)(3) explicitly calls the joint operating entity an "alternative" to merger or consolidation.

A.R.S. § 48-805.01 mechanics

Per § 48-805.01(B), the joint entity:
- Is "a political subdivision of this state."
- Has the governmental and proprietary powers common to the contracting parties (and any specified in the agreement).
- Has the rights and immunities of the contracting parties under the constitution and statutes.
- Has its property immune from taxation.

Its governing body is composed of officials elected to one or more of the underlying contracting parties' boards (or their designees). No voter approval is required to create the joint entity.

Voter disenfranchisement under Arizona law

Arizona courts recognize voter disenfranchisement claims in three broad categories:
1. Disqualification from voting. Cases like Moore v. City of Page (45-day notice that prevented unregistered voters from registering) and Parker v. City of Tucson (felons and circulation rights).
2. Redistricting. Ariz. Minority Coal. and Mayor & Council of City of Tucson v. Royal (redistricting that denied citizens the right to vote in upcoming elections).
3. Invalidating signatures or results. Hunt v. Campbell, Grounds v. Lawe, Johnson v. Maehling (election result and recall petition signature challenges).

The opinion concluded that none of these doctrinal categories applied to a CAFMA-style joint operating entity formed without a vote, because there was never a vote that voters were disqualified from, and no existing right to vote was eliminated.

When mergers actually require a vote

The AG noted that even fire district mergers and consolidations don't always require a vote. § 48-820(H) and (L) allow a merger without an election if the affected districts get written consent from a single 30%+ taxpayer in each district. § 48-822(C)(9) and (F) impose a similar carve-out for consolidations. So even the comparison ("you would have had to vote on a merger") was not always accurate.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- A.R.S. § 11-952 (intergovernmental cooperation; separate legal entity)
- A.R.S. § 48-805.01 (fire district joint operating entities)
- A.R.S. § 48-805.02(D)(3) (joint operating as alternative to merger)
- A.R.S. § 48-820 (fire district merger; voter approval and exceptions)
- A.R.S. § 48-821(C) (merged districts dissolved)
- A.R.S. § 48-822 (fire district consolidation; voter approval and exceptions)
- A.R.S. § 48-823(C) (consolidated districts dissolved)

Cases:
- Moore v. City of Page, 148 Ariz. 151 (Ct. App. 1986) (election timing and voter registration)
- Parker v. City of Tucson, 233 Ariz. 422 (Ct. App. 2013) (felony rights restoration for petition circulators)
- Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 211 Ariz. 337 (Ct. App. 2005) (redistricting and disenfranchisement)
- Mayor & Council of City of Tucson v. Royal, 20 Ariz. App. 83 (1973) (city redistricting eliminating voting rights)
- Hunt v. Campbell, 19 Ariz. 254 (1917) (election results)
- Grounds v. Lawe, 67 Ariz. 176 (1948) (election results)
- Johnson v. Maehling, 123 Ariz. 15 (1979) (recall petition signatures)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i18-003-r17-021
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I18-003.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

David Stringer

State Representative, District 1

Arizona House of Representatives

Noel Campbell

State Representative, District 1

Arizona House of Representatives

Questions Presented

Whether the Central Arizona Fire and Medical Authority Joint Powers Agreement implemented between Central Yavapai Fire District and Chino Valley Fire District (the "Agreement") is proper under state law.

Whether the Agreement disenfranchises Central Yavapai Fire District voters or otherwise violates Arizona's Constitution.

If there was any disenfranchisement or illegality, what recourse may be available.

Summary Answer

Arizona law expressly allows fire districts to enter into agreements to form separate legal entities such as the Central Arizona Fire and Medical Authority ("CAFMA"). The Agreement does not disenfranchise Central Yavapai Fire District voters or otherwise violate the Arizona Constitution under the theories proffered in the opinion request. As a result, no legal recourse is available.

Background

In October 2015, the Central Yavapai and Chino Valley fire districts entered into an intergovernmental agency agreement, effective July 1, 2016, to form CAFMA. Central Yavapai Fire District and Chino Valley Fire District continue to exist, and each has a five-member board. CAFMA also has a five-member board, whose members are drawn from the Central Yavapai and Chino Valley fire district boards.

Analysis

I. Arizona law expressly permitted the Central Yavapai and Chino Valley fire districts to enter into the Agreement.

Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 48-805.01 permits "[c]ities, towns, counties and fire districts" to "form a separate legal entity pursuant to section 11-952, for the purposes of jointly exercising powers held in common by the contracting parties." A.R.S. § 48-805.01(B).[1] When they do so, "[t]he governing body of [such] a separate legal entity . . . shall be composed of officials elected to one or more of the governing bodies of the political subdivisions that are parties to the agreement, or their designees." Id. The newly formed legal entity itself "[i]s a political subdivision of this state," with "[t]he governmental and proprietary powers that are common to the contracting parties specified in the agreement" and those provided by statute, as well as "[t]he rights and immunities of the parties that are granted by the constitution and statutes of this state, including immunity of its property from taxation." Id. § 48-805.01(B)(1)(a)–(b). The creation of such a joint operating entity does not require voter approval. The Chino Valley and Central Yavapai fire districts formed such a separate legal entity when they created CAFMA through the Agreement pursuant to § 48-805.01.

You have asked whether this agreement "effectively merged" the districts and "circumvent[ed] the statutory requirements of A.R.S. §§ 48-820 and 48-822," which govern the merger and consolidation of fire districts. Title 48 makes it clear, however, that entities' creation of such a joint operating entity is an available "alternative" to merger or consolidation. A.R.S. § 48-805.02(D)(3) (emphasis added). The language of this provision confirms that a "joint operating alternative" is distinct from merger or consolidation. Id. Following the merger or consolidation of fire districts, for example, the fire districts that were merged or consolidated into another district "are dissolved by operation of law and no longer exist." Id. §§ 48-821(C), 48-823(C). In contrast, when two fire districts create a joint operating entity pursuant to A.R.S. § 48-805.01, as the Chino Valley and Central Yavapai fire districts did here, those fire districts continue to exist as separate legal entities with separate elected governing bodies. See id. § 48-805.01(B).

II. The Agreement does not disenfranchise Central Yavapai Fire District voters or otherwise violate Arizona's Constitution.

You have also asked whether the Agreement disenfranchises Central Yavapai Fire District voters or otherwise violates Arizona's Constitution, and suggest two reasons why it might: first, because voters were not asked to approve the Agreement or CAFMA's creation; and second, because Central Yavapai Fire District taxpayers allegedly "are subsidizing the operations of the Chino Valley Fire District through [the] Agreement."

Arizona courts have considered whether voters are disenfranchised in cases where Arizona citizens were or might be disqualified from participating in an election. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Page, 148 Ariz. 151, 157–58 (Ct. App. 1986) ("city did not impermissibly disenfranchise voters" where it held an election 45 days after it was called, "thereby preventing unregistered voters from registering before the fifty-day cutoff"); see also Parker v. City of Tucson, 233 Ariz. 422, 431, ¶ 23 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that, "in order to circulate initiative petitions in Arizona, the circulator's civil rights must have been restored by the state in which he or she was convicted" of a felony). Arizona courts have also opined whether voters are disenfranchised where redistricting allegedly denied citizens the right to vote. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 211 Ariz. 337, 347, ¶ 27 (Ct. App. 2005) (no disenfranchisement, because no "citizen would be denied the right to vote under the redistricting plans"); Mayor & Council of City of Tucson v. Royal, 20 Ariz. App. 83, 88 (1973) (city redistricting disenfranchised voters who would no longer be able to vote in upcoming election). Finally, Arizona courts have considered voter disenfranchisement in cases where referendum signatures or election results might be invalidated in whole or part. See, e.g., Hunt v. Campbell, 19 Ariz. 254, 266 (1917) (election results); Grounds v. Lawe, 67 Ariz. 176, 184 (1948) (election results); Johnson v. Maehling, 123 Ariz. 15, 19 (1979) (recall petition signatures).

None of these cases suggests that the Agreement disenfranchises Central Yavapai Fire District voters under either of the theories described above. First, we are aware of no case holding that voters are disenfranchised when they are not asked to vote on something that they are not statutorily required to approve. Here, as discussed above, Arizona law does not require voters to approve fire districts' agreement to form a joint operating entity pursuant to A.R.S. § 48-805.01, as the Central Yavapai and Chino Valley fire districts did when they formed CAFMA. Even if the Central Yavapai and Chino Valley fire districts had merged, however, that would not necessarily implicate voters' right to vote, because the applicable statutes provide that neither merger nor consolidation of fire districts always requires voter approval. See A.R.S. § 48-820(H) & (L) (allowing a merger without an election if, among other things, each affected district "obtain[s] written consent to the merger from any single taxpayer residing within each of the affected districts who owns thirty percent or more of the net assessed valuation of the total net assessed valuation of the district as of the date of the district's resolution [of merger] is submitted to the board of supervisors"); id. § 48-822(C)(9) & (F) (similar rule for consolidations).

You have also suggested a second possible reason why CAFMA or the Agreement might disenfranchise voters: because Central Yavapai Fire District taxpayers are allegedly "subsidizing the operations of the Chino Valley Fire District through [the] Agreement." We express no opinion about whether such a subsidy is, in fact, occurring. Even if it is, however, we are not aware of any case holding or even suggesting that such a subsidy amounts to disenfranchisement.

Conclusion

Based on the available information, the Agreement discussed herein is valid under Arizona law. It does not disenfranchise Central Yavapai Fire District voters or violate the Arizona Constitution under any of the proffered theories.

Mark Brnovich

Attorney General

[1] Among other things, A.R.S. § 11-952 authorizes public agencies to "enter into agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action" or "form a separate legal entity" to "exercise those powers jointly held by the contracting parties." A.R.S. § 11-952(A).