How much can the Arizona Legislature limit or expand the powers of the Arizona Board of Regents through statute?

Plain-English summary

State Representatives Mark Finchem and Vince Leach asked two questions about the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), the body that runs the University of Arizona, Arizona State University, and Northern Arizona University:

1. How much can the Legislature define ABOR's powers and duties by statute? Are there constitutional limits?
2. What personal or other liability do ABOR members face when the Board breaks state or federal law?

The AG answered the first question and declined the second.

On the first question: the Legislature has broad statutory authority over ABOR, with one major constitutional caveat.

The Arizona Constitution does not work like the federal Constitution. The federal Constitution is a grant of power; the state Legislature is presumed to have all legislative power unless the state Constitution restrains it. Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 224 (1947). So the Legislature can legislate freely about ABOR unless an express or implied constitutional limit blocks it.

Two constitutional provisions specifically address ABOR:
- Article XI, § 2 vests "general conduct and supervision" of the public school system in a state board of education, the state superintendent of public instruction, county school superintendents, and "such governing boards for the state institutions as may be provided by law" (which includes ABOR).
- Article XI, § 5 sets the appointment process: the governor appoints Regents with Senate consent, and the governor sits as ex-officio member.

Neither expressly limits the Legislature's substantive authority. But Arizona courts read § 2 to imply one significant limit: the Legislature cannot transfer the "general conduct and supervision" of state universities to bodies outside the four entities listed in § 2. That is the holding of Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242 (1949), where the court struck down a voter-passed initiative that would have moved all non-teaching university employees from ABOR's authority to a state civil service board. The court of appeals applied the same rule in Arizona Bd. of Regents v. State Dept. of Admin., 151 Ariz. 450 (Ct. App. 1986), holding that the Legislature could not put ABOR staff under the state merit system.

Outside that narrow personnel-supervision lane, Arizona courts have repeatedly green-lit legislative regulation of ABOR. The Legislature can:
- Expand ABOR's powers (Sullivan, 1935: granting borrowing authority and federal grant acceptance).
- Restrict ABOR's powers (Miser, 1937: applying minimum wage laws to ABOR employees and limiting how it can spend appropriated funds).
- Subject ABOR contracts to auditor review (Frohmiller, 1949).
- Require ABOR to follow procurement rules "substantially equivalent" to the state procurement code (AG Op. I99-015, regarding A.R.S. § 41-2501(E)).
- Set tuition policy if it disagrees with ABOR's tuition decisions (Kromko, 2007 dicta).

On the second question (personal/several liability of ABOR members for unlawful Board actions), the AG declined. The reason: the AG was already in litigation with ABOR (Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2017-012115, filed September 8, 2017), and the AG's office could be asked to defend ABOR risk management cases under A.R.S. § 41-621. Answering the liability question in that posture would create an actual or apparent conflict.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical context: what the opinion meant in 2017

For Arizona legislators

The opinion gave legislators a broad runway. With the limited exception of personnel-supervision rules that effectively transfer authority away from ABOR, the Legislature could legislate about university operations, contracts, procurement, tuition, employment, and budget without constitutional concern. Courts presume statutes about ABOR are constitutional and would only strike them down if they crossed the Article XI, § 2 line.

For ABOR and university administrators

The opinion was a reminder that ABOR is not constitutionally insulated. The Sullivan, Frohmiller, and Miser line of cases makes clear that ABOR holds its powers subject to legislative supervision. The autonomy ABOR has is statutory, not constitutional, except for the narrow Hernandez personnel-authority core.

For state university employees

The Hernandez and ABOR v. State Dept. of Admin. precedents protected the existing personnel structure: non-teaching university employees are administered by ABOR under its plenary personnel authority, not by the state's general civil service system. The opinion implicitly preserved that distinction.

For higher education attorneys

The opinion is a clean restatement of the constitutional framework, helpful as a one-stop authority on the legislative-supremacy / Article XI question. It also catalogs the cases (Sullivan, Hernandez, Frohmiller, Miser, City of Tempe, Kromko) that anyone litigating an ABOR-vs-Legislature question would need.

For ABOR risk-management context

The AG's recusal on the personal-liability question signaled an active ongoing dispute between the AG and ABOR. That posture itself was meaningful: if a Regent or ABOR member needed personal-liability advice, the AG was not the right source for it during this period because of conflicts. They had to look to outside counsel.

Common questions

Q: Why does the Arizona Constitution make universities special?
A: Article XI, § 1(A)(6) charges the Legislature with providing "for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system" including universities, and § 2 vests "general conduct and supervision" in named bodies including the state institutional governing boards. These provisions make universities "objects for the special care and consideration of the Legislature," but do not give them constitutional autonomy.

Q: What does "general conduct and supervision" actually mean?
A: As courts have applied it, it covers the personnel and operational decisions internal to running the university (hiring non-teaching staff, building maintenance, etc.). Hernandez treated it as an exclusive grant: the Legislature cannot move that authority elsewhere. But it does not insulate ABOR from being subject to substantive statutes about what it can spend, what it must contract for, or what wage laws apply.

Q: Could the Legislature abolish ABOR?
A: The opinion did not directly answer that, but the analysis suggests probably not. ABOR is one of the bodies named in Article XI, § 2 as a vehicle for the "general conduct and supervision" of state institutions. Removing ABOR entirely without a substitute could violate § 2.

Q: Could the Legislature dictate university tuition rates?
A: Yes, per Kromko v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 (2007). Although the court held that ABOR's tuition-setting was not unconstitutional, it noted (in dicta) that the Legislature "is free to enact a different policy or to set tuition itself" if it disagreed.

Q: Could the Legislature put ABOR personnel under the state civil service system?
A: No, per Hernandez and ABOR v. State Dept. of Admin. ABOR has plenary personnel authority over its non-teaching employees under Article XI, § 2.

Q: Could a city apply its building code to a state university?
A: No, per Bd. of Regents v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299 (1960). Local-government zoning and building regulation cannot be applied to a state institution. But the same case noted that the Legislature could decide to give the city that authority if it wanted to.

Q: Why did the AG refuse to answer the liability question?
A: The AG's office was actively litigating against ABOR (Case No. CV2017-012115, Maricopa County) and had defensive obligations under the state risk-management framework (A.R.S. § 41-621 et seq.). Answering questions about ABOR liability in that posture would create a conflict of interest.

Q: Is an AG opinion binding on the Legislature or ABOR?
A: No. AG opinions are persuasive authority. They reflect the AG's reading of the law, not a court's. Courts give them weight but are not bound by them.

Background and statutory framework

The Arizona Constitution and the universities

Article XI, § 1(A)(6) directs the Legislature to provide for a public school system including universities. Article XI, § 2 vests "the general conduct and supervision of the public school system" in:

1. A state board of education
2. A state superintendent of public instruction
3. County school superintendents
4. Such governing boards for the state institutions as may be provided by law

ABOR is the "governing board" for the three state universities (UA, ASU, NAU). Its formation traces back to the Territorial Legislature of 1885 (which created UA and the Tempe Normal School), through 1945 when the three school boards were unified, to 1958 (renaming Tempe to ASU) and 1966 (renaming Flagstaff Normal to NAU).

Article XI, § 5 sets ABOR's appointment process: gubernatorial appointment with Senate consent, plus the governor as ex-officio member.

The legislative-supremacy default

The Arizona Supreme Court has been emphatic that the state Constitution is a limit on, not a grant of, legislative power. Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 224 (1947). The Legislature can legislate on any subject within civil government unless restrained by an express or implied constitutional provision. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 521 (2000), recognizes that implied limits can be drawn from the Constitution's structure as a whole.

The Article XI, § 2 carve-out

The one significant implied limit on legislative authority over ABOR comes from Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242 (1949). That case struck down a voter-passed initiative that would have transferred all non-teaching university employees from ABOR to a civil service board. The court held that this violated Article XI, § 2 because it deprived ABOR (one of the four named bodies in § 2) of its constitutional supervisory power.

The court of appeals extended Hernandez in Arizona Bd. of Regents v. State Dept. of Admin., 151 Ariz. 450 (Ct. App. 1986), holding that the Legislature could not include ABOR staff in the state merit system. AG Op. I89-100 reached the same conclusion for the State Board of Directors for Community Colleges.

Cases recognizing legislative authority

Outside the personnel core, courts have consistently allowed legislative regulation of ABOR:

• Sullivan, 45 Ariz. 245 (1935): Legislature may expand ABOR's powers (here, to borrow money and accept federal grants).
• Devol, 6 Ariz. 259 (Territorial 1899): University is "subject only to the will of the legislature."
• State v. Miser, 50 Ariz. 244 (1937): Minimum wage laws apply to ABOR employees; Legislature may "place any restriction it saw fit upon the expenditure of the funds appropriated to the university."
• Bd. of Regents v. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. 50 (1949): State auditor may disapprove ABOR contract claims.
• Bd. of Regents v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299 (1960): Local building codes cannot bind ABOR (but Legislature may assign that authority to the city if it wants).
• Kromko v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 (2007): Legislature is free to enact different tuition policy or set tuition itself.
• AG Op. I99-015: Legislature may direct ABOR to adopt procurement rules "substantially equivalent" to the state procurement code.

The personal-liability deferral

The AG's office was in active litigation against ABOR (Case No. CV2017-012115, filed Sept. 8, 2017, in Maricopa County Superior Court) and had ongoing defensive obligations under the state's risk-management statute (A.R.S. § 41-621 et seq.). Answering the personal-liability question in that posture risked creating actual or apparent conflicts of interest, so the AG declined.

Citations and references

Constitutional provisions:
- Ariz. Const. art. II, § 6 (free speech as legislative limit example)
- Ariz. Const. art. III (separation of powers)
- Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1(A)(6) (general public school system)
- Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 2 (general conduct and supervision)
- Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 5 (Regents' appointment)

Statutes:
- A.R.S. § 15-1625 (Board jurisdiction over universities)
- A.R.S. § 15-1626 (Board powers)
- A.R.S. § 41-2501(E) (procurement code "substantially equivalent" requirement)
- A.R.S. § 41-621 et seq. (state risk management framework)

Cases:
- Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz. v. Sullivan, 45 Ariz. 245 (1935) (legislative expansion of ABOR powers)
- Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242 (1949) (Article XI, § 2 personnel limit)
- Bd. of Regents of Univ. & State Colleges v. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. 50 (1949) (auditor review of ABOR claims)
- Devol v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 6 Ariz. 259 (Territorial 1899) (university subject to legislative will)
- Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221 (1947) (Constitution as limit, not grant)
- Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516 (2000) (implied constitutional limits)
- State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis, 231 Ariz. 103 (Ct. App. 2012) (implied prohibition test)
- Roberts v. Spray, 71 Ariz. 60 (1950) (legislative power presumption)
- Arizona Bd. of Regents v. State Dept. of Admin., 151 Ariz. 450 (Ct. App. 1986) (state merit system cannot reach ABOR staff)
- State v. Miser, 50 Ariz. 244 (1937) (minimum wage laws apply)
- Bd. of Regents v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299 (1960) (local building codes do not bind ABOR)
- Kromko v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 (2007) (Legislature may set tuition)

Prior AG opinions:
- AG Op. I89-100 (community college board personnel authority)
- AG Op. I99-015 (procurement code application to ABOR)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i17-007-r17-013
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I17-007.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

Mark Finchem
State Representative, District 11
Arizona House of Representatives

Vince Leach
State Representative, District 11
Arizona House of Representatives

Questions Presented

What are the limits, if any, on the Legislature's authority to further define in statute the powers and duties of the Arizona Board of Regents?

What is the extent of the liability—personal, several, or otherwise—that the Arizona Board of Regents or its members would be subject to for actions of the Board that violate enforceable state or federal laws?

Summary Answer

The ability of the Legislature to define in statute the powers and duties of the Board of Regents is unrestricted unless an express or implied constitutional limitation exists. The Arizona Constitution contains two provisions specifically related to the Arizona Board of Regents. It identifies where the general conduct and supervision of the public school system must be vested, Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 2, and sets forth requirements for appointments to governing boards of state educational institutions (including the Board of Regents), id. § 5.

Courts have held that the Legislature cannot transfer administration of university and board personnel to bodies not provided for under Article XI, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution. Except for violations of this section, Arizona courts have repeatedly recognized the authority of the Legislature to expand, restrict, and resolve policy disputes concerning the authority of the Board of Regents.

The Attorney General declines to answer this question. This question could implicate ongoing litigation between the Arizona Attorney General and the Board of Regents. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Special Action Relief, Case No. CV2017-012115, Maricopa County Superior Court (Sep. 8, 2017). Additionally, in other matters, the Attorney General's Office could be asked to defend risk management cases involving the Board of Regents. See A.R.S. §41-621 et seq.

Background

The Arizona Constitution charges the Legislature with providing "for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system," including universities. Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1(A)(6). The Legislature also is constitutionally authorized to establish governing boards vested with "[t]he general conduct and supervision of public schools." Id. § 2. Through these provisions, the Arizona Constitution makes state institutions of higher learning, including universities, "objects for the special care and consideration of the Legislature." Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz. v. Sullivan, 45 Ariz. 245, 256 (1935).

The Legislature has exercised this prerogative since its territorial days. In 1885, the Thirteenth Arizona Territorial Legislature authorized the establishment of the "University of Arizona" in Tucson, Arizona. Laws of the Territory of Arizona Thirteenth Legislative Assembly 272 (1885) (Act No. 99 § 1). The same body vested the government of the University of Arizona "in a Board of Regents." Id. at 273 (Act No. 99 § 3).

The Thirteenth Arizona Territorial Legislature also authorized the establishment of a Territorial Normal School in Tempe, Arizona. Id. at 247 (Act. No. 94 § 1). The government of this school was placed under the direction of a "Board of Education," later named the "Board of Education of the Normal School of Arizona." Id. at 248 (Act. No. 94 § 1); Acts, Resolutions and Memorials passed by the Eighteenth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona 75 (1895) (Act No. § 4) (naming the board of education).

A few years later, in 1899, the Territorial Legislature authorized a normal school in Flagstaff, Arizona, called the "Northern Arizona Normal School." Session Laws of the Twentieth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona 30 (1899) (Act. No. 24 § 1). This school was also placed under the control of the Board of Education of the Normal School of Arizona. Id. (Act No. 24 § 5).

In 1901, the Territorial Legislature divided governance and control of the normal schools in Tempe and Flagstaff into two separate boards of education. The Revised Statutes of Arizona Territory 919, § 3671 (1901). After Arizona became a State, the State Legislature in 1925 allowed both the Tempe and Flagstaff schools to grant bachelor degrees. 1925 Ariz. Sess. Laws 54 (Ch. 23, § 4).

In 1945, the Legislature transferred the "jurisdiction, authority, and duties" of the board of regents of the University of Arizona, and the governing boards of education of the Tempe and Flagstaff colleges to "the board of regents of the university and state colleges of Arizona," thereby uniting the governing boards of the three schools for the first time. 1945 Ariz. Sess. Laws 196 (Ch. 80, H.B. No. 136, § 4).

The colleges in Tempe and Flagstaff were later renamed, respectively, Arizona State University (in 1958) and Northern Arizona University (in 1966). The name of the governing board with "jurisdiction and control over" the three state universities was also changed to the Arizona Board of Regents. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-1625(A). The Legislature has long defined the powers and duties of the Arizona Board of Regents in statute. See, e.g., id. §§ 15-1625 to -1626.

Analysis

Although the Arizona Constitution makes the State's universities "objects for the special care and consideration of the Legislature," Sullivan, 45 Ariz. at 256, the Legislature does not need to trace its authority to a particular constitutional provision in order to enact legislation about State universities. It is well-established that "[t]he Constitution of Arizona is not, as is the Constitution of the United States, to be considered a grant of power or enabling act to the Legislature, but rather is a limitation upon the power of that body." Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 224 (1947). This is because:

[t]he Legislature is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state, and may deal with any subject within the scope of civil government unless it is restrained by the provisions of the Constitution, and the presumption that the Legislature is acting within the Constitution holds good until it is made to appear in what particular it is violating constitutional limitations.

Id. (quotes omitted); Sullivan, 45 Ariz. at 255 (same). Of course, the legislative power may be restricted through an express constitutional provision. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. II, § 6 (freedom of speech and press), and art. III (separation of powers). A limitation on legislative power also may "be implied by the text of the constitution or its structure taken as a whole." Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 521, ¶ 14 (2000). In determining whether an implied prohibition exists, courts consider "the constitution itself and the effect that particular legislation has on the constitution." State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis, 231 Ariz. 103, 113, ¶ 34 (Ct. App. 2012). In the absence of an express or implied constitutional limitation, "the legislature of this state may in the exercise of the sovereign powers of the state, enact any law its discretion may dictate." E.g., Roberts v. Spray, 71 Ariz. 60, 69 (1950).

The Arizona Constitution contains two provisions directly related to the Arizona Board of Regents. First, Article XI, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution identifies where "the government and supervision of the public school system" must be vested. This section provides that "[t]he general conduct and supervision of the public school system shall be vested in a state board of education, a state superintendent of public instruction, county school superintendents, and such governing boards for the state institutions as may be provided by law." Second, Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution specifies how state educational boards are appointed. This section provides: "The regents of the university, and the governing boards of other state educational institutions, shall be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate in the manner prescribed by law, except that the governor shall be, ex-officio, a member of the board of regents of the university."

While neither provision expressly limits the Legislature's authority to define the powers and duties of the Board of Regents, courts have held that the Legislature is prohibited from transferring "the general conduct and supervision" of the State's universities to bodies outside the scope of Article XI, Section 2. In Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 251 (1949), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Article XI, Section 2 prohibited voters, through an initiative, from transferring the supervision of all employees at state universities, other than teachers, from the board of regents to a civil service board. The court had "no hesitation in holding" that this enactment was contrary to Article XI, Section 2, which places "[t]he general conduct and supervision" of educational institutions in special governing boards. Hernandez, 68 Ariz. at 251. The court reasoned: "To permit legislation to throw the employment and supervision of all personnel under the civil service law, except the teaching staff, would necessarily deprive the board of regents of a large portion of its constitutional supervisory power." Id.

The court of appeals has similarly held that the Legislature does not have authority to include staff of the Board of Regents within the state's merit system, declaring that Article XI, Section 2 "provides the board with plenary power over its employees." Arizona Bd. of Regents v. State Dept. of Admin., 151 Ariz. 450, 451 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. I89‑100 (The State Board of Directors for Community Colleges "has plenary power over its employees pursuant to Article XI, § 2 of the Arizona Constitution," including "authority to provide employment benefits through reduced community college district tuition and fees to its employees and the employees' spouses and dependents.").

While educational governing boards have plenary power over personnel administration, the Arizona Supreme Court has long rejected the view that the Board of Regents is "an autonomous body, freed of all [legislative] shackles." Bd. of Regents of Univ. & State Colleges v. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. 50, 60 (1949). From its territorial days, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona announced that "[t]he university is a public institution, placed under the control of the board of regents, with full powers to manage the same, subject only to the will of the legislature." Devol v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 6 Ariz. 259, 261 (1899) (emphasis added).

After Arizona became a State, the Arizona Supreme Court again affirmed that the Arizona Constitution only "directs the establishment of [a university], leaving the legislature free in determining as to particulars." Sullivan, 45 Ariz. at 256. In Sullivan, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the Legislature's ability to expand the powers of the Board of Regents. Id. at 255. It held that the Legislature could confer on the Board of Regents certain corporate powers and privileges, such as borrowing money and accepting federal grants. Id.

The Arizona Supreme Court also has affirmed the authority of the Legislature to reduce the powers of the Board of Regents. In State v. Miser, 50 Ariz. 244, 252 (1937), the court explained that there was no question that the Legislature had power to make minimum wage laws applicable to employees of the Board of Regents, and "could in fact, have placed any restriction it saw fit upon the expenditure of the funds appropriated to the university." The court reasoned that "[i]t was just as much within the province of the legislature to lessen the power of the board of regents" through a minimum wage law as it was to add to the powers of the Board of Regents. Id. at 255. The Arizona Supreme Court also has rejected the argument that the Board of Regents' constitutional powers preclude legislation permitting the state auditor to disapprove claims from payments arising from university contracts. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. at 59‑60. The Attorney General has likewise opined that "[t]he constitutional powers of the [Board of Regents] are not so broad as to allow universities to enter contracts or expend public monies without regard to statutory limits imposed by the Legislature." Ariz. Atty. Gen. Op. I99-015. As such, the Legislature could require the Board of Regents to comply with procurement code requirements. Id. ("[T]he Legislature acted within its authority by directing in A.R.S. § 41‑2501(E) that the [Board of Regents] adopt procurement rules that are 'substantially equivalent' to the procurement code.").

Finally, the Arizona Supreme Court has recognized the ultimate authority of the Legislature to settle policy disputes about the scope of the Board of Regents' authority. In Board of Regents of the Universities and State College of Arizona v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 312, (1960), the court held that the City of Tempe could not apply its building codes and regulations to Arizona State University. Yet, in holding that the Board of Regents' responsibilities must be exercised free of control or supervision by municipalities, the court also acknowledged that "the ultimate power to resolve this controversy rests in the Legislature which concededly may assign exclusive jurisdiction to the Board or to the City." Id. at 305; see also id. at 311 ("The ultimate responsibility for higher education is reposed by our Constitution in the State. The legislature has empowered the Board of Regents to fulfill that responsibility subject only to the supervision of the legislature and the governor.") (emphasis added). Similarly, in Kromko v. Arizona Bd. of Regents—which concerned "whether the 2003–04 tuition increase [ran] afoul of the 'as nearly free as possible' provision"—the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that its decision did not "mean that the Board is free from constitutional constraints in setting tuition." 216 Ariz. 190, 195, ¶¶ 23, 25 (2007). Instead, the court recognized that the Legislature "is free to enact a different policy or to set tuition itself" if it believed that tuition should be lower. Id. ¶ 23.

Thus, the Arizona Constitution (1) identifies where the general conduct and supervision of the public school system must be vested, Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 2, and (2) sets forth requirements for appointments to governing boards of state educational institutions, id. § 5. Except when legislation has violated the Constitution—by transferring authority for the general conduct and supervision of state universities in violation of Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 2—Arizona courts have repeatedly recognized the authority of the Legislature to expand, restrict, and resolve policy disputes concerning the authority of the Board of Regents.

Conclusion

The authority of the Legislature to define the powers and duties of the Board of Regents is unconstrained unless expressly or impliedly restricted by the Arizona Constitution. Except when legislation has violated Article XI, Section 2, Arizona courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the Legislature's authority to determine the particulars of the Board of Regents' powers and duties.

Mark Brnovich
Attorney General