Can Arkansas keep taking a person's state tax refund to pay old court fines, and what hearing rights apply?

Plain-English summary

Arkansas lets government agencies grab a person's state income tax refund to pay off certain debts. This process, the "setoff," is spelled out in A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321. In Garland County, the sheriff's office uses it to collect unpaid fines and fees owed to the circuit courts. Attorney General Tim Griffin answered eight questions about how that works.

The main points:

• A sheriff's office can act as the collecting "claimant agency" for the courts. The opinion concludes the Garland County Sheriff's Office qualifies as a "claimant agency" because it serves as the county collector of court fines under a county ordinance.
• If a debtor asks for a hearing, either the circuit court or the sheriff's office (as claimant agency) can hold it.
• That hearing is narrow. The hearing officer can only correct errors in the amount owed. It cannot reduce, waive, or eliminate a fine for any other reason, because those amounts were set in the original criminal case and cannot be relitigated.
• There is no deadline in the setoff statutes for holding the hearing, but no collection can proceed until the debt's validity is finally determined, and a debtor can sue if the agency unreasonably delays.
• The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act applies, and the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
• A judge who sentenced the defendant can also serve as the hearing officer without an automatic conflict, because the hearing is not the same "matter" as the criminal case.
• Most importantly for people carrying old court debt: neither the ten-year nor the five-year civil statute of limitations applies to criminal fines and costs. The county can keep using the setoff until the judgment is paid, even on fines more than five years old.

What this means for you

People who owe old court fines and fees

The opinion concludes that criminal fines and costs do not expire under the civil statutes of limitations. Based on this opinion, a person who owes unpaid court fines in Arkansas can have their state income tax refund offset toward that debt indefinitely, until the criminal judgment is satisfied, even if the fine is more than five years old. If you request a hearing, the opinion says the hearing officer can only fix a miscalculation of the amount owed; it is not a chance to argue the fine down or have it forgiven.

County officials and sheriffs collecting court debt

The opinion reads the setoff subchapter, which A.C.A. § 26-36-302 directs be "liberally construed," as permitting a sheriff's office to act as a collection agency for the circuit courts and to qualify as a claimant agency (as the "county collector" under A.C.A. § 26-36-303(1)(A)(xi)). It also confirms the hearing must follow Administrative Procedure Act procedures and that no collection can move forward until there is a final determination of the debt's validity.

Circuit judges asked to serve as hearing officers

The opinion states that a judge who imposed the fine can later serve as the hearing officer without an inherent conflict of interest, because the limited setoff hearing is not the same "matter" as the underlying criminal case. It still points to Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct and the "appearance of bias" standard, so recusal would be required if actual bias or prejudice is shown.

Attorneys advising clients on court debt

The opinion answers several procedural questions the statutes leave open: the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, there is no fixed hearing deadline (though the APA lets a debtor sue for unreasonable delay under A.C.A. § 25-15-214), and previously litigated issues cannot be reopened at the setoff hearing.

Common questions

Q: Can Arkansas take my tax refund to pay a court fine that's over five years old?
A: Yes. The opinion concludes neither the ten-year nor the five-year civil statute of limitations applies to criminal fines and costs, so the county can keep using the tax refund setoff until the judgment is satisfied.

Q: If I request a hearing, can I get my fine reduced or waived?
A: No. The opinion says the hearing officer's authority is limited to correcting errors in the calculated amount owed. It cannot reduce, waive, or eliminate the fine, because that was decided in the criminal case.

Q: Who holds the hearing, the court or the sheriff?
A: Either. The opinion concludes that both the circuit court and the sheriff's office, acting as the claimant agency, may conduct the administrative hearing.

Q: Is there a deadline for the agency to hold my hearing?
A: The setoff statutes set no specific deadline, and neither does the Administrative Procedure Act. But no collection can proceed until the debt's validity is finally determined, and you can sue in circuit court if the agency unreasonably fails or delays to act.

Q: Does it violate my rights if the same judge who sentenced me runs the hearing?
A: Not automatically. The opinion says the setoff hearing is a different "matter" than the criminal case, so serving in both roles does not by itself create a conflict, absent evidence of actual bias or prejudice.

Background and statutory framework

The Arkansas income tax refund setoff, A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321, lets a "claimant agency" intercept a debtor's state tax refund to satisfy a debt. Under A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a), a debtor may request a hearing to determine "whether the claimed sum asserted as due and owing is correct, and if not, an adjustment to the claim shall be made," and A.C.A. § 26-36-310(c) bars reconsidering issues "which have been previously litigated."

The opinion treats the sheriff's office as a "claimant agency" by combining the statute's list (which includes a "county collector," A.C.A. § 26-36-303(1)(A)(xi)) with A.C.A. § 16-13-709(a)(1)(A)(i), which makes each county's quorum court designate an office responsible for collecting circuit court fines, and Garland County's ordinance designating the sheriff as that collector. It reads the words by their ordinary meaning under Wickham v. State, 2009 Ark. 357, 324 S.W.3d 344 (2009).

On the statute-of-limitations question, the opinion relies on Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S.W. 975 (1926), holding that the civil limitations statutes (A.C.A. §§ 16-56-114 and 16-56-115) "relate exclusively to civil actions and have no application to criminal proceedings," and concurs with a prior AG opinion that the civil-judgment enforcement language in A.C.A. §§ 5-4-204(b) and 16-92-102(a) does not import a limitations period onto criminal fines. On judicial impartiality, it draws on C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 368 Ark. 540, 247 S.W.3d 870 (2007), Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, 683 S.W.3d 177, and Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 498 S.W.3d 733.

Citations and references

Statutes and rules:
- A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321 (income tax refund setoff)
- A.C.A. § 26-36-310 (hearing; scope; timing)
- A.C.A. § 26-36-303 (definition of claimant agency)
- A.C.A. § 26-36-302 (liberal construction)
- A.C.A. § 16-13-709(a)(1)(A)(i) (designation of fine collector)
- A.C.A. §§ 25-15-201 through -221 (Administrative Procedure Act); § 25-15-214 (suit for agency delay)
- A.C.A. §§ 16-56-114, 16-56-115 (civil statutes of limitations)
- A.C.A. §§ 5-4-204(b), 16-92-102(a) (enforcement of criminal fines and costs)
- Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d), Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct

Cases:
- Wickham v. State, 2009 Ark. 357, 324 S.W.3d 344 (2009)
- C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 368 Ark. 540, 247 S.W.3d 870 (2007)
- Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, 683 S.W.3d 177
- Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 498 S.W.3d 733
- Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S.W. 975 (1926)

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
Opinion No. 2026-015
June 24, 2026
The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Post Office Box 22900
Hot Springs, Arkansas 71903
Dear Representative Warren:
You report that “the Garland County Sheriff’s Office collects outstanding fines and fees on behalf
of the Garland County Circuit Courts” through state income tax refund setoffs under A.C.A.
§§ 26-36-301 through -321. Under A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a), a debtor may request a hearing before
the “claimant agency” to determine “whether the claimed sum asserted as due and owing is correct,
and if not, an adjustment to the claim shall be made.” You further report that, while the sheriff’s
office is not named as a “claimant agency” under A.C.A. § 26-36-303, “the sheriff’s office is
effectively acting as a collection agency on behalf of the court.” You have asked the following
questions:
1. Under Arkansas law, if a hearing is requested, would the hearing properly be conducted
by the court or the sheriff’s office on behalf of the court?
Brief response: If a debtor requests an administrative hearing under A.C.A.
§ 26-36-310(a), either the Garland County Circuit Court or the Garland
County Sheriff’s Office may conduct the administrative hearing as the
claimant agency.
2. Pursuant to A.C.A. §§ 26-36-309 and -310, if the validity of the debt and the amount are
the only relevant issues to be considered at the hearing, and if the amount is not correct,
an adjustment shall be made:
(a) In the event that the sheriff’s office is authorized to conduct the hearing, what
authority does the sheriff’s office have to adjust a prior court order setting fines and
fees?
(b) In the event that the court conducts the hearing, is the court’s authority to make an
adjustment limited to correcting errors in the calculation of the amount owed, such

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 2
as credits or debits inaccurately recorded, or may the court reduce, waive, or
eliminate previously ordered fines and fees for reasons other than correcting errors?
Brief response: The hearing officer’s authority is restricted to correcting errors in the
calculation of the amount owed. The hearing officer may not reduce,
waive, or eliminate previously ordered fines and fees for any other
reason.
3. Under Arkansas law, is there a deadline for the agency to conduct a hearing after it has
been requested, and if so, what is the applicable deadline?
Brief response: There is no specific deadline in A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321 for
the claimant agency to conduct an administrative hearing after it has
been requested.
4. Further, if a court conducts the hearing, should the hearing proceed through the existing
criminal case in which the fines and fees were originally assessed, and a record be
maintained in that case, or should it be conducted through a separate, administrative
proceeding?
Brief response: The administrative hearing should proceed through an administrative
process that is separate from the criminal case in which fines and fees
were assessed.
5. In the event of a hearing, what procedures should be used to conduct the hearing, and
what is the standard of proof?
Brief response: Sections 26-36-301 through -321 do not prescribe specific procedures
for conducting these administrative hearings. The applicable standard
of proof for an administrative hearing is a preponderance of the
evidence.
6. In the event of a hearing, does the Administrative Procedure Act apply?
Brief response: Yes. Under A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a), the claimant agency “shall grant a
hearing according to procedures established under the Arkansas
Administrative Procedure Act.”
7. If the sentencing court is the same court that conducts the hearing, is there any conflict
of interest or appearance of impartiality that should be of concern to the hearing judge?
Brief response: Absent additional circumstances, the same person acting as the circuit
court judge and then as the hearing officer does not create a conflict of
interest or an appearance of bias.

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 3
8. What is the applicable statute of limitations to use the setoff procedure authorized by
A.C.A. § 26-36-301, et seq.? May this procedure be used to collect fines and fees that are
more than five years old, but remain unpaid and uncollected?
Brief response: Neither the ten-year nor the five-year statutes of limitations apply to
criminal judgments for fines and costs. Accordingly, the county may
continue to use the state income tax refund setoff procedures under
A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321 until the criminal judgments for
fines and costs are satisfied.
DISCUSSION
Before responding to your questions, I must first address whether A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301
through -321 permit the Garland County Sheriff’s Office to act as a “collection agency” for the
Garland County Circuit Courts. This subchapter contains no express language prohibiting another
entity from acting as a collection agency for a claimant agency. And A.C.A. § 26-36-302 directs
that “[t]his subchapter shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes as far as legally
and practically possible.” Because there is no statutory limitation on an entity acting as a collection
agency for a claimant agency and because the subchapter is to be liberally construed, a reviewing
court would likely find that the Garland County Sheriff’s Office may act as a collection agency for
the Garland County Circuit Courts under this subchapter.
Question 1: Under Arkansas law, if a hearing is requested, would the hearing properly be
conducted by the court or the sheriff’s office on behalf of the court?
If a debtor requests an administrative hearing under A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a), either the Garland
County Circuit Court or the Garland County Sheriff’s Office can conduct that administrative
hearing as the claimant agency. While a circuit court clearly falls within the definition of a
“claimant agency,”1 a reviewing court would likely find that the sheriff’s office also qualifies as a
claimant agency. Subdivision A.C.A. § 26-36-303(1)(A)(xi) includes a county collector within
that definition, and A.C.A. § 16-13-709(a)(1)(A)(i) requires each county’s quorum court to
“designate a county official, agency, or department [to] be primarily responsible” for collecting
fines assessed in circuit court. Here, the Garland County Quorum Court enacted Ordinance
No. O-95-21, which provides that the county sheriff “will serve as collector of all fines assessed
in [the Garland County circuit courts].”2 Based on the ordinary meaning of “county collector,” a
reviewing court would likely find that the Garland County Sheriff’s Office operates in that
1 A.C.A. § 26-36-303(1)(A)(vii) (listing “Arkansas circuit, county, or district courts” among the entities that qualify
as claimant agencies).
2 Garland Cnty. Code of Ordinances, § 18.1, Collector of court fines designated, https://library.municode.com/
ar/garland_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO_CH18CO.

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 4
capacity.3 Accordingly, as the county collector, the sheriff’s office qualifies as a claimant agency
under A.C.A. § 26-36-303(1)(A)(xi).
Question 2: Pursuant to A.C.A. § 26-36-309 and -310, if the validity of the debt and the amount
are the only relevant issues to be considered at the hearing, and if the amount is not correct, an
adjustment shall be made:
(a) In the event that the sheriff’s office is authorized to conduct the hearing, what authority
does the sheriff’s office have to adjust a prior court order setting fines and fees?
(b) In the event that the court conducts the hearing, is the court’s authority to make an
adjustment limited to correcting errors in the calculation of the amount owed, such as credits
or debits inaccurately recorded, or may the court reduce, waive, or eliminate previously
ordered fines and fees for reasons other than correcting errors?
Regardless of whether the Garland County Circuit Court or the Garland County Sheriff’s Office
conducts the administrative hearing, the hearing officer’s role is limited. The hearing officer must
determine “whether the claimed sum asserted as due and owing is correct, and if not, an adjustment
to the claim shall be made.”4 The scope of the hearing is also limited: “No issues may be considered
at the hearing which have been previously litigated.”5 Based on this statutory framework, the
hearing officer’s authority is restricted to correcting errors in the calculation of the amount owed.
The hearing officer may not reduce, waive, or eliminate previously ordered fines and fees for any
other reason.
Question 3: Under Arkansas law, is there a deadline for the agency to conduct a hearing after
it has been requested, and if so, what is the applicable deadline?
There is no specific deadline in A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321 for the claimant agency to
conduct an administrative hearing after it has been requested. Similarly, the Arkansas
Administrative Procedure Act does not impose a specific deadline for conducting an administrative
hearing.
6 The Act does, however, allow a debtor to sue the claimant agency in circuit court for
“unlawfully, unreasonably, or capriciously fail[ing], refus[ing], or delay[ing] to act.”7 And A.C.A.
§ 26-36-310(b) provides that “no action shall be taken in furtherance of collection through the
3 Wickham v. State, 2009 Ark. 357, 5, 324 S.W.3d 344, 347 (2009) (“When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation,
we are mindful that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads,
giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language”).
4 A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a).
5 Id. § 26-36-310(c).
6 Id. §§ 25-15-201 through -221.
7 Id. § 25-15-214.

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 5
setoff procedure” until a there has been a “final determination at hearing of the validity of the
debt.”
Question 4: Further, if a court conducts the hearing, should the hearing proceed through the
existing criminal case in which the fines and fees were originally assessed, and a record be
maintained in that case, or should it be conducted through a separate, administrative
proceeding?
The administrative hearing should proceed through an administrative process that is separate from
the criminal case in which the fines and fees were originally assessed.
Question 5: In the event of a hearing, what procedures should be used to conduct the hearing,
and what is the standard of proof?
Sections 26-36-301 through -321 do not prescribe specific procedures for conducting these
administrative hearings. The scope of the administrative hearings, however, is limited to
determining “whether the claimed sum asserted as due and owing is correct, and if not, an
adjustment to the claim shall be made.”8 With this limitation in mind, the rules of the Labor
Standards Section of the Division of Labor offer some guidance in conducting administrative
hearings.9 Finally, the standard of proof for an administrative hearing is a preponderance of the
evidence.10
Question 6: In the event of a hearing, does the Administrative Procedure Act apply?
Yes. Under A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a), the claimant agency “shall grant a hearing according to
procedures established under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act.”
Question 7: If the sentencing court is the same court that conducts the hearing, is there any
conflict of interest or appearance of impartiality that should be of concern to the hearing judge?
There is no inherent conflict of interest when the circuit court judge later acts as the hearing officer
in an administrative hearing to determine “whether the claimed sum asserted as due and owing is
correct, and if not, [to make] an adjustment to the claim.”11 The Arkansas Supreme Court has
8 Id. § 26-36-310(a). As noted above, A.C.A. § 26-36-310(c) provides that “[n]o issues may be considered at the
hearing which have been previously litigated.”
9 See 11 C.A.R. § 10-107.
10 C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 368 Ark. 540, 547, 247 S.W.3d 870, 874 (2007) (“The traditional
standard required in a civil or administrative proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence”).
11 A.C.A. § 26-36-310(a). As noted above, A.C.A. § 26-36-310(c) provides that “[n]o issues may be considered at the
hearing which have been previously litigated.”

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 6
explained that hearing officers “are also subject to the ‘appearance of bias’ standard applicable to
judges”12 and that judges and hearing officers enjoy “a presumption of honesty and integrity.”13
Under Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, however, a judge must
“disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might be
reasonably questioned,” including when the judge “previously presided as a judge over the matter
in another court.” Importantly, neither the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct nor the Arkansas
Supreme Court has defined what constitutes “the matter in another court.” But the Court has
clarified that a previous case did “not stand for the principle that a dependency-neglect proceeding
and a corresponding criminal case constitute the same ‘matter’ to require disqualification under
the rules.”14 Instead, the Court focused on whether the judge’s “impartiality might be reasonably
questioned” to find that the judge should have recused.15 Thus, if a judge has “presided over a
different matter involving similar facts,” the reviewing court would require recusal only if the
judge demonstrated “bias or prejudice.”16
In this context, the administrative hearing is not the same “matter” as the original criminal
proceeding because the hearing is limited to determining whether the fine or fee has been paid.
Accordingly, without evidence of actual bias or prejudice, the judge’s service first as the circuit
court judge and then as the hearing officer does not create a conflict of interest or an appearance
of bias.
12 C.C.B., 368 Ark. at 545, 247 S.W.3d at 873 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
13 Id. at 546, 247 S.W.3d at 874 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
14 Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, 7, 683 S.W.3d 177, 186.
15 Id. at 8, 683 S.W.3d at 187 (“This court’s majority decision [in Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 498 S.W.3d 733]
to reverse on Judge Elmore’s refusal to recuse herself was predicated on only one thing—‘[t]he fact that Judge Elmore
herself found that [JF’s] questioning of her impartiality required her to withdraw as the finder-of-fact, in essence,
demonstrates that the questioning of [Judge Elmore’s] impartiality was reasonable’”).
16 Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 13, 498 S.W.3d 733, 740 (dissenting opinion); see also Nelson, 2024 Ark. at 7,
683 S.W.3d at 186. The Nelson court flatly refused to adopt the broad interpretation of “matter” embraced by the
Ferguson concurring opinion (i.e., “the same basic facts, the specific party, the brief time between the two proceedings,
and similar factors”). Id. at 8, 683 S.W.3d at 187 (“Despite the concurrence stating that Judge Elmore’s presiding over
both the DN proceeding and the criminal case should have implicated Rule 2.11’s prohibition against a judge presiding
over a case when she has already presided over the matter in another court—that matter being the abuse of JF’s child—
that is neither binding precedent, nor isthat what happened here. Thus, the concurrence upon which Nelson improperly
relies is inapposite to this case”); Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 9–10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39 (concurring opinion). The
dissenting opinion from Ferguson likely has the best interpretation: “It has long been the rule that a judge who heard
a case on the trial level will not be part of the panel hearing an appeal from her own decision.” Ferguson, 2016 Ark.
at 13, 498 S.W.3d at 740 (dissenting opinion) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Honorable Les Warren
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-015
Page 7
Question 8: What is the applicable statute of limitations to use the setoff procedure authorized
by A.C.A. § 26-36-301, et seq.? May this procedure be used to collect fines and fees that are
more than five years old, but remain unpaid and uncollected?
Although A.C.A. § 16-56-114 grants a ten-year statute of limitations for judgments in civil
proceedings and A.C.A. § 16-56-115 provides a general five-year statute of limitations, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has held these statutes “relate exclusively to civil actions and have no
application to criminal proceedings.”17 My predecessor previously opined that “the ten year
‘statute of limitations’ on civil judgments has no applicability to criminal judgments for fines and
costs.”18 He reasoned that, even though A.C.A. §§ 5-4-204(b) and 16-92-102(a) allow criminal
judgments for costs and fines to “be executed, collected, and enforced in any manner that civil
judgments are so executed,” that language is “not strong enough to conclude that the legislature
intended to impose this [ten-year] limitation on the administration of the courts themselves.”19 I
concur with this reasoning and conclude that neither the ten-year nor the five-year statutes of
limitations apply to criminal judgments for fines and costs. Accordingly, the county may continue
to use the state income tax refund setoff procedures under A.C.A. §§ 26-36-301 through -321 until
the criminal judgments for fines and fees are satisfied.
Assistant Attorney General Jodie Keener prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
17 Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 838, 286 S.W. 975, 976 (1926).
18 Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 1991-282.
19 Id.