Who pays for an Arkansas circuit court's staff and expenses, the county or the state?

Plain-English summary

Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin worked through a common source of friction between circuit judges and county government: who controls the money that keeps a circuit court running. Circuit courts belong to the state judicial system under Amendment 80, but Arkansas law makes counties pay for many of a circuit court's day-to-day expenses. That split is why the answers change from question to question.

The core holdings:

• A circuit judge decides whether to hire a "secretary" under A.C.A. § 16-13-219(b). The county quorum court cannot refuse to create or fund that position, but it does fix the salary at a "reasonable" level, unless the court shows an "absolute necessity" for a particular amount.
• The county-employee "secretary" position was not made obsolete by the newer, state-employee "trial court administrator." They are two distinct positions under separate statutes, and the legislature never repealed one in favor of the other.
• Circuit court expenses, including juror per diem and mileage, must be budgeted, appropriated, and paid through the county claims process. On mandatory expenses, though, the quorum court and county judge act ministerially, not with discretion.
• A circuit judge's payment order, by itself, is not enough to authorize payment without a quorum court appropriation, unless the expense is "necessary and essential" for the court to operate.
• Counties in a multi-county judicial district are not required to split circuit court costs pro rata. Each county pays for the costs incurred in that county.
• Attorney ad litem fees are paid from state funds appropriated to the Administrative Office of the Courts, so they do not run through the county claims process.

What this means for you

Quorum courts and county officials

The opinion reads A.C.A. § 16-13-219 as delegating to the quorum court the job of fixing a circuit judge's secretary's salary, but not the power to block the position. If a circuit judge requests a secretary, the opinion treats creating and funding that position as "mandatory and ministerial, not discretionary." The quorum court's discretion is limited to setting the salary at a reasonable figure. For circuit court expenses generally, the opinion says they must move through the county's line-item budget and claims process, and that there is no exception letting the court bypass an appropriation, except where an expenditure is necessary and essential to the court's operation.

Circuit judges and trial court administrators

The opinion confirms that a circuit judge may create and fill the statutory secretary position, and that the trial court administrator statutes (A.C.A. §§ 16-13-3301 to 16-13-3305) did not replace it. It also confirms the outer limit of a judge's spending power: a court can order payment on its own only when there is "evidence of absolute necessity" for the court to operate. Absent that showing, the opinion says the power to set and appropriate the amount rests with the General Assembly or its delegate, the quorum court.

County treasurers and clerks

The opinion states that a county treasurer generally cannot disburse county funds without either an approved claim or a quorum court appropriation. It carves out one situation drawn from Arkansas Supreme Court precedent: where the law mandates payment of an expense and does not leave the amount to the quorum court's judgment, a prior appropriation is likely unnecessary, and the court may even impound funds to pay it.

Attorneys advising counties or courts

The opinion turns on the distinction between expenses the legislature has made mandatory and those left to county discretion, and on the separation-of-powers "absolute necessity" test from Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton. It is a useful map of which circuit court costs are state-funded, which are county-funded, and how far a quorum court's control extends over each.

Common questions

Q: Can a county quorum court refuse to fund a circuit judge's secretary?
A: No. The opinion concludes the quorum court cannot refuse to create the secretary position or refuse to pay the salary altogether. Its role is to fix the salary at a "reasonable" level.

Q: Who sets the secretary's salary?
A: The quorum court fixes it, at a reasonable level, unless the circuit court shows an "absolute necessity" for a specific salary. The judge decides whether to hire; the quorum court sets the pay.

Q: Did the trial court administrator position replace the older secretary position?
A: No. The opinion treats them as two distinct circuit court positions governed by separate statutes and overseen by different bodies (one county, one state). The legislature did not repeal or supplant one with the other.

Q: Do juror per diem and mileage go through the county?
A: Yes. The opinion says claims for circuit court expenses, including juror per diem compensation and mileage, must be budgeted, appropriated, and paid under the county claims process, though the county's role on those mandatory costs is ministerial.

Q: Can a judge's order alone force payment without a county appropriation?
A: Only if the expenditure is necessary and essential for the court to operate. Without that showing of absolute necessity, the opinion says the order is not sufficient to authorize payment.

Q: Must every county in a judicial district chip in a pro rata share?
A: No. The opinion finds no pro rata sharing requirement. Each county pays for the circuit court costs incurred in that county, through its administration of justice fund.

Background and statutory framework

Under Amendment 80, circuit courts are part of the state judicial system, but the General Assembly has long required counties to cover certain circuit court expenses. A.C.A. § 16-13-219 provides that "[t]he expenses accruing in the circuit courts," including "reasonable sums for the employment of secretaries by circuit judges," are paid out of the county treasury, and that "the salary of each secretary shall be fixed by the quorum court of the county or counties involved."

The opinion frames the constitutional backdrop with Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 684 S.W.2d 252 (1985): circuit courts have inherent authority to order acts "necessary and essential for the court to operate," but absent "absolute necessity," the power to set salaries and the method of doing so rests with the General Assembly. Where the legislature has delegated a fact-finding or amount-setting role to the quorum court, the court's payment must run through that process (Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962)). Where an expense is mandatory and the amount is fixed by law, it must be paid as long as general fund money is available (Burrow v. Batchelor, 193 Ark. 229, 98 S.W.2d 946 (1936)).

On the "trial court administrator" question, the opinion applies Arkansas's repeal-by-implication rules from Hurt-Hoover Investments, LLC v. Fulmer, 2014 Ark. 461, 448 S.W.3d 696, Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179, and Wright v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 372 Ark. 330, 276 S.W.3d 253 (2008), concluding the secretary and trial court administrator statutes can be read harmoniously and neither repeals the other.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- A.C.A. § 16-13-219 (circuit court expenses; secretaries)
- A.C.A. § 14-14-801(b)(6) (county government powers)
- A.C.A. §§ 16-13-3301 to 16-13-3305 (trial court administrators)
- A.C.A. § 14-23-101 et seq. (county claims process)
- A.C.A. § 14-14-907 (appropriation ordinances)
- A.C.A. § 14-21-101 (county financial management system)
- A.C.A. § 16-10-603(b) (administration of justice fund; uniform court costs)
- A.C.A. § 9-13-106(c)–(d) (attorney ad litem fees)
- Ark. Const. Amendment 55, § 3; Amendment 80

Cases:
- Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 684 S.W.2d 252 (1985)
- Beaumont, Judge v. Adkisson, Judge, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980)
- Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962)
- Burrow v. Batchelor, 193 Ark. 229, 98 S.W.2d 946 (1936)
- Hurt-Hoover Investments, LLC v. Fulmer, 2014 Ark. 461, 448 S.W.3d 696
- Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179
- Wright v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 372 Ark. 330, 276 S.W.3d 253 (2008)
- Indep. Cnty. v. Dunkin, 40 Ark. 329 (1883)

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
Opinion No. 2026-001
July 9, 2026
The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
324 Ouachita Avenue
Hot Springs, Arkansas 71901
Dear Representative McGrew:
I am writing in response to your request for my opinion concerning a circuit court’s hiring of staff
under A.C.A. § 16-13-219. Specifically, you ask the following questions:
1. (a) In the event a circuit judge decides to employ a secretary under the provisions of
16-13-219(b), would the position and the salary of each secretary need to be fixed by the
quorum court of the county or counties involved in accordance with and as required by
16-13-219(b), 14-14-801(b)(6), and Amendment 55, Section 3?
Brief response:The circuit court may create and fill the statutory position of secretary, but
the quorum court is responsible for fixing the secretary’s salary at a
“reasonable” level, absent a showing by the circuit court of an “absolute
necessity” for a certain salary.
(b) May the quorum court refuse to create such a position after request by a circuit judge?
If so, on what bases?
Brief response:No, the quorum court cannot refuse to create the position of secretary if
requested by a circuit court under statute.
(c) Many circuit judges employ trial court administrators, a more specialized and highly
trained position, that exists as an employee of the State of Arkansas. Is the countyemployee secretary position referenced in 16-13-219(b) made obsolete and supplanted by
the more recent trial court administrator position that exists as state employee?
Brief response:No. The positions of “secretary” and “trial court administrator” are two
distinct circuit-court positions governed by separate statutes and subject
to the authority of separate public bodies—one county and one state.
TIM GRIFFIN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 2
Additionally, the General Assembly has not repealed and “supplanted”
one position with the other.
2. Are circuit court claims for expenses required to be budgeted, appropriated and paid in
accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
3. Are circuit court claims for juror per diem compensation or mileage required to be
budgeted, appropriated, and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to
14-23-101 et seq.?
Brief response:To answer Questions 2 and 3 together, claims for circuit court expenses—
including juror per diem compensation or mileage—must be budgeted,
appropriated, and paid under the county claims process, although the
authority of the quorum court and county judge in processing such claims
is ministerial, not discretionary.
4. (a) Would an order by a circuit judge for payment [of] any of the matters above under
questions number 1, 2, or 3 be sufficient by itself to authorize payment without a sufficient
appropriation by the quorum court and the approval of the claim by the county judge?
Brief response:Only if the expenditure is necessary and essential for the court to operate.
Absent a showing of absolute necessity, the circuit judge’s order is not
sufficient to authorize payment.
(b) May payment for the matters above be submitted for payment by the county clerk or
approval by the county judge of a claim, without an appropriation by the quorum court?
Brief response:No. Because a secretary’s salary “shall be fixed by the quorum court,” an
appropriation by the quorum court is necessary before payment may be
made.
(c) May the county treasurer disburse county funds from the county general fund or any
funds in the hands of the county treasurer in the absence of the approval of a claim? And
an appropriation by the quorum court of a sufficient sum in the budget?
Brief response:No. The county treasurer cannot disburse county funds from the county
general fund or any other funds in the treasurer’s possession without
approval of a claim or an appropriation by the quorum court.
5. County budgets are to include line-item appropriations in accordance with the county
financial management system.
(a) Is there an exception to the requirements of the financial management system and lineitem budgets for the circuit court budgets which would authorize payments without
appropriations by the quorum court?

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 3
Brief response:There is no exception that would authorize such payments without an
appropriation by the quorum court, unless the expenditure is necessary and
essential for the court to operate.
(b) Are the various counties in the judicial district required to participate and appropriate
funds pro rata share of the utilities and building/content insurance for the circuit courts?
Brief response:No. The applicable statutes do not impose a pro rata sharing requirement
for circuit court expenses.
(c) To the extent state funds are sufficient, is it necessary that attorney ad litem funding be
budgeted, appropriated, and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to
14-23-101 et seq.?
Brief response:No. Because an attorney ad litem is paid from funds appropriated for that
purpose to the Administrative Office of the Courts, such funding is not
budgeted, appropriated, and paid through the county claims process.
DISCUSSION
While circuit courts are part of the state judicial system under Amendment 80, the General
Assembly has required counties to cover certain circuit court expenses. As a result, responsibility
for paying circuit court expenses is not uniform: some expenses are paid through state
appropriations, while others are paid through county appropriations. Thus, my answers to your
questions vary depending on the governing statute for a particular circuit court expense,
particularly when the question involves job positions, as the quorum court is not required to
approve and appropriate funding for all circuit-court positions.
Question 1(a): In the event a circuit judge decides to employ a secretary under the provisions of
16-13-219(b), would the position and the salary of each secretary need to be fixed by the quorum
court of the county or counties involved in accordance with and as required by 16-13-219(b),
14-14-801(b)(6), and Amendment 55, Section 3?
Generally, circuit courts have the constitutional authority under the separation of powers doctrine
to order acts that “are necessary and essential for the court to operate.”1 But absent “evidence of
absolute necessity,” the power to set salaries and the method by which salaries are determined
resides with the General Assembly.2
The General Assembly has established such a method in A.C.A. § 16-13-219. Under that statute,
“[t]he expenses accruing in the circuit courts,” including “reasonable sums for the employment of
1 Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 28, 684 S.W.2d 252, 255 (1985).
2
Id.

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 4
secretaries by circuit judges,” must be paid out of the county treasury, and “the salary of each
secretary shall be fixed by the quorum court of the county or counties involved.”
While fixing a circuit-court employee’s salary is typically outside a quorum court’s inherent
discretion3—that power lies with the General Assembly4—the quorum court may exercise power
delegated to it by the General Assembly. Here, A.C.A. § 16-13-219 delegates to the quorum court
the responsibility to fix a “reasonable” salary for a circuit judge’s secretary.
5
Thus, under that statute: (1) the circuit judge decides whether to hire a secretary; (2) the quorum
court is required to fix the secretary’s salary; and (3) that salary must be “reasonable,”
6
absent a
showing by the circuit court of an “absolute necessity” for a certain salary.
Question 1(b): May the quorum court refuse to create such a position after request by a circuit
judge? If so, on what bases?
Even though quorum courts, as discussed above, are responsible for fixing the secretary’s salary
at a “reasonable” level, that authority does not include the power to refuse to create the statutory
position when requested by a circuit court judge or to refuse to pay the salary altogether.
7 Under
A.C.A. § 16-13-219, “expenses accruing in the circuit courts shall be paid out of the county
treasury,” and those expenses “shall include reasonable sums for the employment of secretaries by
circuit judges.”8 Such acts are mandatory and ministerial, not discretionary. Thus, quorum courts
cannot refuse to create and fund a secretary position if requested by a circuit court judge.
Question 1(c): Many circuit judges employ trial court administrators, a more specialized and
highly trained position, that exists as an employee of the State of Arkansas. Is the countyemployee secretary position referenced in 16-13-219(b) made obsolete and supplanted by the
more recent trial court administrator position that exists as state employee?
The positions of “secretary” and “trial court administrator” are two distinct circuit-court positions
governed by separate statutes: A.C.A. § 16-13-219 (secretaries) and A.C.A. §§ 16-13-3301 to
3 Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 27, 684 S.W.2d at 255.
4 Beaumont, Judge v. Adkisson, Judge, 267 Ark. 511, 514–15, 593 S.W.2d 11, 13–14 (1980).
5 Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 225, 357 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1962) (concerning the constitutionality of the legislature
delegating certain “power to determine some fact or state of things” to another public entity).
6 A.C.A. § 16-13-219.
7 See, e.g., Burrow v. Batchelor, 193 Ark. 229, 98 S.W.2d 946, 946–47 (1936) (holding that statutorily-mandated court
expenses, including the salaries of certain court positions, take precedence over permissive expenditures and must be
paid if funds are available).
8
(Emphases added).

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 5
16-13-3305 (trial court administrators). The General Assembly did not expressly repeal the statute
concerning secretaries when it enacted the statutes authorizing trial court administrators.
9
But a statute or part of a statute may still be “repealed by implication” in two circumstances. First,
if two statutory provisions are in “irreconcilable conflict” with one another,10 “there is an implied
repeal by the latter one, which governs.”11 For example, if a later statutory provision prohibits
what an earlier statute permitted, “the earlier statute is (no doubt about it) implicitly repealed.”12
Second, a statutory provision can be repealed by implication if “the General Assembly takes up
the whole subject anew, covering the entire subject matter of the earlier statute and adding
provisions clearly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the former provision.”13
But both methods of repealing by implication are “not favored” and “never allowed” unless “there
is such an invincible repugnancy between the provisions that both cannot stand.”14 Otherwise, even
statutes or parts of statutes that appear to conflict must be read harmoniously, if possible.15
Because the General Assembly did not “take up the whole subject anew” when it enacted statutes
concerning trial court administrators, the second type of repeal does not apply.
In my opinion, it is possible to read the statutes harmoniously: they concern distinct positions that
are subject to different financial oversight and decision-making authorities. Thus, the General
Assembly has not repealed and “supplanted” the circuit court position of “secretary” with the
circuit court position of “trial court administrator.”
Question 2: Are circuit court claims for expenses required to be budgeted, appropriated, and
paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
Question 3: Are circuit court claims for juror per diem compensation or mileage required to be
budgeted, appropriated and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-
23-101 et seq.?
9 See Act 268 of 2015 and Act 716 of 2019.
10 Hurt-Hoover Invs., LLC v. Fulmer, 2014 Ark. 461, 6, 448 S.W.3d 696, 700.
11 Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 16, 309 S.W.3d 179, 189.
12 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 327 (2012).
13 Fulmer, 2014 Ark. at 6, 448 S.W.3d at 700.
14 Wright v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 372 Ark. 330, 333, 276 S.W.3d 253, 256 (2008) (noting that “the
repugnancy … must be abundantly clear”); Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 92-245.
15 Wright, 372 Ark. at 333, 276 S.W.3d at 256; Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 92-245.

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 6
Circuit court expenses that “shall be paid out of the county treasury” are mandatory obligations
for the county.16 Such expenses include “reasonable office expenses and office supplies,” the
“reasonable sums for the employment of secretaries,” and juror compensation as “part of the
current expenses of holding the Circuit Courts.”17
Demands concerning county funds are subject to the county claims process unless (1) expressly
exempt by statute; (2) another statutory payment process governs payment in lieu of the county
claims process; or (3) the expense is necessary and essential to the circuit court’s operation. I have
no information to suggest that any of those exceptions apply here.
The county court has the power to allow or reject claims submitted through the county claims
process,
18 and no funds “appropriated by the county quorum court … shall be paid out of the
county treasury” except under order by the county court.19 But claims for circuit court expenses
are “imposed by law and must be paid as long as there is money within the general fund to pay
them.”20 Thus, even though the quorum court and the county judge do not have discretion to decide
whether such expenses are funded—their acts being ministerial—circuit court claims for expenses
must be budgeted, appropriated, and paid under the county claims process.
Question 4(a): Would an order by a circuit judge for payment [of] any of the matters above
under questions number 1, 2, or 3 be sufficient by itself to authorize payment without a sufficient
appropriation by the quorum court and the approval of the claim by the county judge?
Circuit courts’ constitutional authority to order payment requires “evidence of absolute necessity”;
otherwise, that power lies with the General Assembly or its delegatee—here, the quorum court.
21
Absent such a showing of absolute necessity, the circuit judge’s order is not sufficient to authorize
payment.
Question 4(b): May payment for the matters above be submitted for payment by the county clerk
or approval by the county judge of a claim, without an appropriation by the quorum court?
16 A.C.A. § 16-13-219(a) (emphasis added).
17 Id. §16-13-219(a)–(b); Indep. Cnty. v. Dunkin, 40 Ark. 329, 331–32 (1883) (noting that compensation of jurors in
the circuit court is “a part of the current expenses … which the statute directs shall be paid out of the county treasury
of the county in which the Court is held”).
18 A.C.A. § 14-23-101(a).
19 Id. § 14-23-104.
20 Burrow, 193 Ark. at 229, 98 S.W.2d at 946–47.

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 7
Because a secretary’s salary “shall be fixed by the quorum court,” an appropriation by the quorum
court is necessary before payment may be made.
22
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a circuit court may impound county funds to pay court
reporter and grand jury stenographer salaries in the amounts set by the legislature.23 To the extent
that the law mandates payment of an expense without providing for the quorum court to decide the
amount of that payment, prior appropriation by the quorum court is likely unnecessary.
Question 4(c): May the county treasurer disburse county funds from the county general fund or
any funds in the hands of the county treasurer in the absence of the approval of a claim? And
an appropriation by the quorum court of a sufficient sum in the budget?
Claims that do not require the quorum court to “determine some fact or state of things” upon which
the payment depends do not require approval by the quorum court before being disbursed, since
the General Assembly has already dictated that they “shall” be paid.24 Generally, the county
treasurer cannot disburse county funds from the county general fund or any other funds in the
treasurer’s possession without approval of a claim or an appropriation by the quorum court.
Question 5(a): Is there an exception to the requirements of the financial management system
and line-item budgets for the circuit court budgets which would authorize payments without
appropriations by the quorum court?
Arkansas Code § 14-21-101 creates a uniform county financial management system, including
detailed line-item budgeting and controls over expenditures and disbursements. County
expenditures must be authorized by appropriation ordinances, typically through line-item
budgets.25 There is no exception that would authorize payments without appropriations by the
quorum court.
Question 5(b): Are the various counties in the judicial district required to participate and
appropriate funds pro rata share of the utilities and building/content insurance for the circuit
courts?
The Department of Finance and Administration certifies “for each county the county’s monthly
share of uniform court costs and filing fees to be retained by the county in circuit court matters,”
and the quorum court annually establishes “the amount of uniform filing fees and court costs to be
appropriated.”26 The county treasurer then disburses funds monthly from the county administration
22 A.C.A. § 16-13-219(b)(2).
23 Burrow, 93 Ark. at 229, 98 S.W.2d at 946–47.
24 Hooker, 235 Ark. at 225–26, 357 S.W.2d at 539–40 (1962); A.C.A. § 16-13-219(a).
25 A.C.A. § 14-14-907.
26 Id. § 16-10-603(b)(1)(A)–(B).

The Honorable Richard McGrew
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-001
Page 8
of justice fund.27 The General Assembly has not created a pro rata sharing requirement for circuit
courts; instead, each county pays for certain circuit court expenses incurred in that county through
its administration of justice fund. That is, there is no requirement for a county to pay for circuitcourt costs incurred in another county in the same judicial circuit. This differs from how counties
previously handled pro rata funding of state district courts, which was changed by Act 371 of 2025.
Question 5(c): To the extent state funds are sufficient, is it necessary that attorney ad litem
funding be budgeted, appropriated, and paid in accordance with the county claims process
pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
Attorneys ad litem are appointed by a circuit judge when appropriate, and “the fees for services
and reimburseable [sic] expenses shall be paid from funds appropriated for that purpose to the
Administrative Office of the Courts.”
28 Because these payments do not concern county funds,
attorney ad litem funding is not budgeted, appropriated, and paid through the county claims
process.
Assistant Attorney General William R. Olson prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
27 A.C.A. § 16-10-603(b).
28 Id. § 9-13-106(c)–(d).