Federal grant funding for our prosecutor's victim-services and administrative staff just expired. Are the counties in our judicial district legally required to keep paying these positions?
Plain-English summary
The Ninth-West Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney, Jana Bradford, ran into a familiar problem: a federal grant that had been covering significant portions of her victim-services and administrative support staff salaries expired on September 30, 2025. She secured patchwork funding from her counties through 2025, but for 2026 only one of the four counties has agreed to continue funding. Bradford argued that because the staff were in place before the grant expired, they qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156, requiring counties to fund them through annual appropriations.
Attorney General Tim Griffin's analysis cuts to the statute's specific reference point. Under § 16-21-156, a quorum court's annual appropriation must include funding "at sufficient levels for operation, but not less than the amounts appropriated by ordinance in effect January 1, 1999" for the salaries and benefits of existing support staff. The 1999 appropriation is the baseline.
So the question is whether the victim-services and administrative positions existed in the 1999 appropriation:
- If yes: the positions qualify as "existing support staff" under § 16-21-156(1), and the county quorum court must appropriate salaries and benefits at levels sufficient for the office's operation, no less than the 1999 amounts.
- If no: the positions are "additional personnel" under § 16-21-156(2), and the quorum court has discretion to fund or not fund them.
The AG noted he could not resolve this as a question of fact. Whether the specific victim-services and administrative positions existed in 1999 is something the prosecutor and counties would need to verify from county records.
The AG also noted the term "support staff" itself is undefined, and whether these positions are "support staff" (as the prosecutor classifies them) is a separate fact question outside the scope of the AG opinion.
What this means for you
If you're a prosecuting attorney facing grant expiration
The timeline of your positions matters. Three actions to take:
- Pull the 1999 appropriation ordinances from each county in your judicial district. Look for line items for victim-services positions, administrative staff, or similar. If the position existed then, you have a strong mandatory-funding argument under § 16-21-156(1).
- Check ordinances in effect January 1, 1999, not just any 1999 ordinance. The statute pinpoints January 1, 1999. Ordinances enacted later in 1999 don't count.
- For positions that didn't exist in 1999, prepare a discretionary-funding pitch. Even though the quorum court isn't required to fund, it can. Make the case based on victim-services demand, statutory duties, federal compliance, etc.
If you're a quorum court member receiving a funding request
Three questions to ask:
- Does the position appear in our 1999 appropriation ordinance? If yes, you have a mandatory funding obligation.
- If yes, what was the 1999 amount? That's the floor. You can fund higher; you can't go lower.
- If the position didn't exist in 1999, do we want to fund it now? Discretionary. Weigh the prosecutor's demand against other county priorities.
If you're a county attorney advising on the 1999-baseline question
Practical issues you'll need to resolve:
- Records. Many counties' 1999 appropriation ordinances may be in physical archives. Make sure you're working from the ordinance "in effect January 1, 1999," not summaries.
- Position-mapping. Position titles change. A "victim coordinator" in 1999 might be called "victim services specialist" today. The substantive question is whether the function existed, not just whether the title matches.
- Cross-county negotiation. When a judicial district has multiple counties, each county's 1999 baseline is independent. One county's mandatory funding doesn't carry over to another.
If you're an Arkansas victim-services advocate
The 1999 baseline is the lever, but it's a fixed reference point that doesn't track grant funding patterns. As federal grants expire, positions added with grant funds typically post-date 1999, which means they fall under the discretionary-funding § 16-21-156(2). That makes them politically vulnerable.
If you want to lock in funding for victim services, the sustainable path is either:
- A statutory amendment that makes victim-services funding mandatory regardless of 1999 baseline, or
- Per-county sustaining appropriations that survive grant cycles.
If you're a state legislator considering reform
§ 16-21-156's 1999-baseline rule is increasingly anachronistic. Twenty-six years on, it locks counties into a snapshot that bears little relation to current judicial-district workload. A statutory amendment to update the baseline (or replace it with a workload-based formula) could be on the agenda.
Common questions
Q: What is the 1999 baseline rule?
A: § 16-21-156 ties mandatory county funding for prosecutor's office support staff to the salary and benefit levels appropriated by ordinance in effect January 1, 1999. Counties must fund those positions at "sufficient levels for operation, but not less than" the 1999 amounts. New positions added after 1999 are discretionary under § 16-21-156(2).
Q: Does the rule mean we have to pay the same dollar amount as 1999?
A: No. "Not less than" the 1999 amount is a floor. The "sufficient levels for operation" language is the substantive standard. So you can pay more, but you cannot pay less than the 1999 amount.
Q: What's "support staff"?
A: Undefined in the statute. The AG declined to define it, treating the question as a fact-specific inquiry. Common interpretations include investigators, victim coordinators, paralegals, and administrative assistants.
Q: How does this interact with the prosecuting attorney's other authorities?
A: § 16-21-146(a) is the general rule: counties annually appropriate sufficient amounts to cover prosecutor salaries and expenses. § 16-21-146(b) lets counties appropriate additional discretionary amounts. § 16-21-156 is a specific overlay imposing the 1999 baseline.
Q: Who decides whether a position existed in 1999?
A: The county quorum court, in the first instance. The prosecuting attorney and county can disagree; the dispute can be resolved through litigation if necessary.
Q: What if grant funding came back?
A: Then the county may not need to appropriate, depending on whether the grant covers full costs. The mandatory-funding rule kicks in only when other funding sources don't cover the operation.
Background and statutory framework
The relationship between Arkansas counties and the prosecuting attorney's office (which is a state-level constitutional office covering one or more counties in a judicial district) has been a long-running funding negotiation. § 16-21-156 was enacted in part to lock in baseline funding so that counties couldn't unilaterally cut prosecutor's staff during budget downturns.
The 1999 reference date isn't arbitrary; it was the legislature's snapshot of the then-existing baseline of prosecutorial support staff at the time the statute was written. The intent was to prevent counties from rolling back support staff below that level.
In practice, the rule has two effects:
- Mandatory floor for legacy positions. Counties cannot unfund positions that existed in 1999.
- Discretionary ceiling for newer positions. Counties have full latitude to fund or not fund positions added after 1999.
Federal grants for victim-services support staff began proliferating after 1999, especially after the Crime Victims Fund grants and Office on Violence Against Women grants accelerated. Many of those grant-funded positions don't appear in 1999 ordinances. When grants expire, the positions fall to county discretion, which is the situation Bradford's office is in.
Citations and references
Statutes:
- A.C.A. § 16-21-146, annual prosecutor's office appropriation
- A.C.A. § 16-21-156: 1999 baseline and discretionary funding
Related AG opinion:
- Op. 95-292 (broad quorum-court discretion in prosecutor funding)
Source
Original opinion text
BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
Opinion No. 2025-116
December 5, 2025
Ms. Jana Bradford
Prosecuting Attorney
Ninth-West Judicial District
316 North First Street
Glenwood, Arkansas 71943
Dear Ms. Bradford:
I am writing in response to your request for my opinion on whether a quorum court must appropriate county funds for the salaries and benefits of existing support staff positions within the prosecuting attorney's office under A.C.A. §§ 16-21-146(a) and 16-21-156(1).
You report that grant funding, which your office has traditionally relied upon for covering significant portions of the salaries and benefits for your "administrative and victim services support staff," expired on September 30, 2025. You were able to secure funding from counties for the remainder of 2025. But for 2026, only "[o]ne county has agreed to continue funding its portion of these positions for 2026," while "the remaining three have declined or not yet appropriated funds to do so."
You also note that "Arkansas law imposes duties on prosecuting attorneys to provide victim and witness services." Because the current support staff were in place before the loss of grant funding, you contend that these positions qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156 and therefore must "be funded by the counties through annual appropriation."
RESPONSE
In my opinion, the administrative and victim services positions do not qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156 unless they existed at the time of the county's 1999 appropriation. If those positions existed then, they qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156, and the county quorum court must appropriate salaries and benefits for the positions at levels sufficient for the office's operation. If the positions did not exist then, the quorum court retains discretion under A.C.A. § 16-21-156(2) to appropriate funds for the positions.
DISCUSSION
Arkansas law requires each quorum court to annually appropriate "sufficient amounts to cover the salaries and expenses of the prosecuting attorney's office." Quorum courts may also appropriate any additional funds "as they deem necessary for the efficient operation" of that office. That annual appropriation must include, "at sufficient levels for operation," the cost of the "salaries and benefits of existing support staff" that are not "less than the amounts appropriated by ordinance in effect January 1, 1999." Additionally, counties must pay "any and all other line item appropriations as approved in the 1999 county budget except for deputy prosecuting attorneys' salaries and benefits." For any "additional personnel and expenses," the county only pays if approved by the quorum court.
Thus, if certain support staff positions existed at the time of the county's 1999 appropriation, the county must appropriate salaries and benefits at levels not less than those in effect on January 1, 1999. If, however, the support staff positions did not exist at the time of the 1999 appropriation but were later added by the prosecutor's office, funding is discretionary and subject to quorum court approval.
Whether the administrative and victim services positions qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156 is a question of fact outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion. In my opinion, if those positions were added after 1999, they do not qualify as "existing support staff" under A.C.A. § 16-21-156(1), and the quorum court has discretion under A.C.A. § 16-21-156(2) to decide whether to appropriate funds for the salaries and benefits of those positions at the prosecuting attorney's office. But if the administrative and victim services positions existed at the time of the county's 1999 appropriation, the county must fund those positions "at sufficient levels for operation, but not less than the amounts appropriated by ordinance in effect January 1, 1999."
Assistant Attorney General William R. Olson prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General