AR Opinion No. 2025-112 2026-01-20

Does the Arkansas Attorney General have an opinion on whether Act 573 of 2025 (Ten Commandments classroom posters) is constitutional or whether universities have to grant religious accommodations from it?

Short answer: The AG declined to opine because litigation challenging Act 573 is pending in federal court. The AG flagged that he believes the Act is constitutional and pointed to a brief filed in the Eighth Circuit, but that's an advocacy position, not a formal opinion.
Disclaimer: This is an official Arkansas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Arkansas attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

The President of the University of Arkansas System asked the AG four constitutional and statutory questions about Act 573 of 2025, the law requiring posters of the Ten Commandments in classrooms and other rooms across Arkansas's K-12 and higher-education facilities:

  1. Is Act 573 constitutional under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause as applied to public colleges?
  2. Does conducting classes in rooms with such posters constitute religious discrimination against employees or students under federal Title VII or the Arkansas Civil Rights Act?
  3. Is the university legally required (and authorized) to grant employee religious-accommodation requests to remove the poster from a workspace?
  4. Same question, but for student requests in classrooms or libraries where they study?

Attorney General Tim Griffin declined to opine on any of the four questions, citing the AG's longstanding policy not to issue opinions on matters in pending litigation. The pending case is Stinson v. Fayetteville School District No. 1, No. 5:25-cv-05127 (W.D. Ark.), filed June 11, 2025, currently on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Griffin attached an Eighth Circuit brief he had recently filed and signaled, in the brief, his view that Act 573 is constitutional. He did not analyze the religious-accommodation questions.

Practical effect for the University: until the Eighth Circuit rules (and possibly the Supreme Court after that), Arkansas public universities have to make their own legal judgments about Act 573 compliance and any accommodation requests, with no formal AG guidance to lean on.

What this means for you

If you're a Provost, Dean, or General Counsel at an Arkansas public university

You don't have an AG opinion to rely on. The AG's brief in the Eighth Circuit signals what the State's litigation position is, not what the law conclusively requires. Until the federal courts resolve Stinson, your decisions about how to display the posters and how to handle accommodation requests are exposed to suit from either direction: a religious-discrimination claim if you compel a workspace display over an employee's objection, or an Establishment Clause challenge if you don't comply with Act 573 at all.

A few practical guideposts:

  • Track the Stinson appeal. The Eighth Circuit's holding will be controlling in Arkansas. Sign up for ECF/PACER alerts on the case, and watch for an injunction or stay that would change your compliance obligation in the interim.
  • Have a written process for religious-accommodation requests. Title VII (2023, Groff v. DeJoy) raised the bar for employers refusing religious accommodation requests. You need to evaluate each request individually under "substantial increased cost" and document your analysis.
  • Don't rely on this opinion's silence as cover. Declining to opine is not the same as approving anything. A court won't credit "the AG didn't say no" as a defense.

If you're a faculty member or student with a religious objection to the poster

This opinion does not answer your question. The university has discretion to grant or deny accommodation, and a denial doesn't bar you from filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC (employees) or pursuing a constitutional claim (students). Talk to a civil rights attorney before deciding whether to formalize an objection. The Stinson appeal in the Eighth Circuit is the case to watch.

If you're a litigator or law-school clinical instructor

This is a clean example of the AG's "decline-on-pending-litigation" policy in action, and it leaves a substantive vacuum. The AG's choice to attach his Eighth Circuit brief is unusual and worth noting in casebook commentary on the AG-opinion-versus-litigation-position distinction.

If you're a journalist tracking Act 573 implementation

What's missing here is a state-law gloss on the religious-accommodation questions, which would have been state-law-only territory the AG could have addressed without touching the pending federal litigation. The choice to decline on all four questions, including the accommodation ones, is itself the story.

Common questions

Q: What does Act 573 of 2025 actually require?
A: The opinion does not summarize the Act. Public reporting and the Stinson complaint indicate Act 573 mandates the display of poster-sized copies of the Ten Commandments in every classroom of public schools and public institutions of higher education in Arkansas. Read the Act text directly before making compliance decisions.

Q: Is "the AG declined to opine" the same as the AG saying the Act is constitutional?
A: No. A non-opinion has no precedential or persuasive weight on the merits. The AG's separate Eighth Circuit brief is an advocacy filing in his official capacity, not a formal AG opinion under A.C.A. § 25-16-706.

Q: Why does the AG decline to opine on pending litigation?
A: Long-standing executive-branch practice. The cited prior opinions are 2025-043, 2016-027, and 2010-047. The reasoning is institutional: a written AG opinion can be cited in the litigation by either side, and the AG's office wants to keep its formal opinion power separate from its role as the State's lawyer in active cases.

Q: Does the federal Stinson litigation foreclose state-law religious-discrimination claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act?
A: No. Stinson is a federal constitutional case. State-law claims under A.C.A. § 16-123-601 et seq. would survive any federal ruling on the Establishment Clause. The AG's decision to decline on all four questions, however, leaves the state-law claims unmapped at the AG level.

Q: Can a university grant a faculty-member accommodation by removing a poster from one classroom?
A: That's the unanswered question. Title VII requires reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship. Whether removing a single poster is "reasonable" or instead "undue hardship" given the statute's mandate is contested. Document each accommodation decision with a written analysis, and consider the Groff v. DeJoy "substantial increased cost" standard.

Background and statutory framework

Act 573 of 2025 is part of a wave of state laws requiring public schools and universities to display the Ten Commandments in classrooms. Louisiana enacted similar legislation in 2024; that statute was enjoined by the Fifth Circuit in Roake v. Brumley, and Texas enacted comparable legislation in 2025.

The Stinson case challenges Act 573 under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, plus the Equal Protection Clause and the Religion Clauses of the Arkansas Constitution. The complaint, filed June 11, 2025, names the Fayetteville School District and other defendants. Briefing in the Eighth Circuit is the procedural posture as of this opinion's January 20, 2026 issuance.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., requires employers to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs absent undue hardship. Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), raised the standard for "undue hardship" from the TWA v. Hardison "de minimis cost" standard to "substantial increased cost in relation to the conduct of [the employer's] particular business."

The Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, A.C.A. § 16-123-601 et seq., provides parallel protection for religious discrimination in employment under state law.

Citations and references

Statutes and laws:
- Act 573 of 2025 (Arkansas)
- U.S. Const. amend. I (Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses)
- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
- A.C.A. § 16-123-601 et seq. (Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993)

Cases:
- Stinson v. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 5:25-cv-05127 (W.D. Ark., filed June 11, 2025), pending Eighth Circuit appeal

Companion AG opinions on the decline-on-pending-litigation policy:
- Op. 2025-043
- Op. 2016-027
- Op. 2010-047

Source

Original opinion text

BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201

Opinion No. 2025-112

January 20, 2026

President Jay B. Silveria
University of Arkansas System
2404 North University Avenue
Little Rock, Arkansas 72207

Dear President Silveria:

You have requested my opinion regarding the legal obligations of an Arkansas public institution of higher education under Act 573 of 2025. You have asked these questions:

  1. Is Act 573 constitutional as applied to a public institution of higher education under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

  2. Does it constitute unlawful religious discrimination against employees or students who are atheistic, agnostic, or followers of religions other than Protestant Christianity under federal law (such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or state law (such as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 or A.C.A. § 16-123-601 et seq.) for an institution of higher education to conduct classes and other activities in rooms where posters of the Ten Commandments have been installed pursuant to the Act?

  3. Under state or federal law, where a poster required under the Act has been installed in a classroom, library, or other space where an employee of the institution works, is an Arkansas public institution of higher education legally required and authorized to grant a religious accommodation of removal of the poster for an employee who objects to the presence of the poster because it conflicts with the sincerely held religious or personal beliefs of the employee?

  4. Under state or federal law, where a poster required under the Act has been installed in a classroom, library, or other space where a student takes classes or studies, is an Arkansas public institution of higher education legally required and authorized to grant a religious accommodation of removal of the poster for a student who objects to the presence of the poster because it conflicts with the sincerely held religious or personal beliefs of the student?

RESPONSE

I must respectfully decline to opine on your questions because of pending litigation, the outcome of which could directly affect the issues you raised. It is the long-standing policy of the Office of the Attorney General, as a member of the executive branch, to decline to opine on matters that are pending before the courts for resolution. Please see the attached brief I recently filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. As the arguments in the brief make clear, I believe Act 573 is constitutional.

I regret that I cannot be of further assistance in this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of future assistance in some other respect.

Deputy Attorney General Kelly Summerside prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,

TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General