AR Opinion No. 2025-107 2025-10-31

Does our county have to reimburse our part-time public defenders for office rent, mileage to court, and other office expenses?

Short answer: The county pays for office equipment, supplies, rent, and other office expenses 'necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office.' But the county does not pay for travel expenses incurred in defending an indigent client; those travel expenses, including mileage from a public defender's home to the courthouse for an indigent client's case, are paid by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission. Whether a specific expense falls into one bucket or the other is a fact question outside the scope of an AG opinion.
Disclaimer: This is an official Arkansas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Arkansas attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Hempstead County has two part-time public defenders, one living in Nevada County and one in Miller County. Both have requested reimbursement for office expenses, rent, and mileage from their homes to the courthouse. Representative Henley asked the AG who pays.

Historically, counties bore the entire cost of public defenders. A.C.A. § 16-87-302 split that responsibility between the county and the state-level Arkansas Public Defender Commission:

The county pays:
- Equipment, supplies, and other office expenses "necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office"
- Office rent, if it is a facility cost or office expense necessary to office operations
- Travel expenses unrelated to the defense of an indigent client, if necessary to office operations

The Commission (state) pays:
- Travel expenses incurred in defending indigent clients

On mileage from home to court: The AG concludes the Commission pays, not the county, when the trip directly concerns an indigent client's case. The reasoning: § 16-87-302(a)(3) makes the Commission responsible for "travel" expenses authorized by § 16-87-212, and "travel" in its ordinary meaning includes mileage from home to court. The AG explicitly aligns with Opinion 2003-303 on this point and notes that Opinion 2004-079's hedging is no longer warranted because Arkansas courts now review agency interpretations de novo (Myers v. Yamato Kogyo, 2020).

Which trips count as indigent-client travel is a fact question the AG will not decide. A trip that is purely administrative (e.g., delivering paperwork to the clerk for a non-indigent matter) likely is not "indigent-client travel." A trip to attend a hearing for an indigent client is.

What this means for you

If you are a county judge or quorum court member

Plan your county's public-defender budget around two cost categories: office overhead (yours) and indigent-client travel (the Commission's). Specific line items to budget on the county side: office rent (if the public defender's office occupies a leased space), equipment, supplies, utilities, IT, and office support staff. You do not budget for the public defender's mileage to court for indigent-client cases. Push back on those reimbursement requests with a citation to this opinion.

If you are a public defender submitting reimbursement requests

Sort your expense submissions by client type. Indigent-client trips go to the Commission. Office-overhead expenses, including office rent, equipment, and supplies, go to the county. Mileage between your home and the courthouse for indigent-client work goes to the Commission, not the county. The AG explicitly endorses Opinion 2003-303's mileage interpretation.

If you are a county attorney getting questions about a denied reimbursement

The opinion gives you firm support to deny county reimbursement for indigent-client travel and mileage. The hedging in Opinion 2004-079 (suggesting that legislative clarification was needed) is no longer the AG's posture; this 2025 opinion squarely follows Opinion 2003-303 and updates the agency-deference reasoning to match Myers v. Yamato Kogyo (2020).

If you are at the Arkansas Public Defender Commission

The opinion confirms the Commission's responsibility for indigent-client travel costs and reads that responsibility broadly to include home-to-courthouse mileage. Build that into your reimbursement processing. The AG does not address how the Commission and a public defender should distinguish travel for indigent vs non-indigent client work; that allocation belongs to the Commission as a fact question.

Common questions

What does "office expenses" cover?
Equipment, supplies, and other expenses "necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office." The AG declines to give a closed list because "[w]hether a given expense falls under one of these categories is a fact question outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion."

Who pays office rent?
The county, if the rent is "a facility cost or office expense necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office." Whether a specific rent qualifies is a fact question.

My public defender is part-time. Does that change anything?
The statute does not distinguish between part-time and full-time public defenders. The county-vs-Commission allocation is the same. Practical effect: a part-time defender working from home with no leased office may have minimal county-paid expenses but real Commission-paid travel expenses for indigent client work.

My public defender lives in another county. Does that affect mileage?
No. The statute does not condition Commission-paid travel on the defender's residence. If the trip is for an indigent-client case, the Commission pays.

What if the trip is for a non-indigent matter?
The county pays, if the trip is necessary to office operations. The county does not pay if the trip has no work justification.

Why doesn't the AG just give a clear yes/no on each expense?
Because the AG opines on questions of law, not facts. Whether a specific expense is necessary to office operations, or whether a specific trip relates to an indigent client, requires looking at the actual circumstances.

The earlier opinion (2004-079) sounded uncertain. Is this opinion settled?
The 2004 opinion noted that the Commission had been interpreting the statute differently and suggested legislative clarification. This 2025 opinion drops that hedging and notes that under current case law (Myers v. Yamato Kogyo), Arkansas courts no longer defer to agency interpretations and review them de novo. The AG's reading of the statute (Commission pays indigent-client travel including home-to-court mileage) controls.

Background and statutory framework

Pre-1990s split. Counties bore all public-defender costs (Op. 2004-079).

A.C.A. § 16-87-302 split the responsibility:
- (a)(3): "Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall be responsible … for the payment of the costs of certain expenses, as authorized by § 16-87-212"
- (b)(1)(A): The county pays for "equipment, supplies, and other office expenses necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office"

A.C.A. § 16-87-212(a)(2)(A): Lists "travel" as a separate Commission-paid expense item.

Statutory construction. Roberson v. Phillips County Election Comm'n (2014) requires interpreting statutes "just as it reads," giving words "their ordinary and usually accepted meaning." Black's Law Dictionary defines "travel expense" broadly to include "an expense (such as for meals, lodging, and transportation) incurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade."

End of agency deference. Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co. (2020) eliminated the prior practice of deferring to administrative agency interpretations of statutes. Courts now review agency statutory interpretations de novo. This change strengthens the AG's reading because the AG no longer needs to defer to a different Commission interpretation of "travel."

Prior AG opinions. Op. 2003-303 first reached the conclusion the AG endorses here (Commission pays indigent-client mileage). Op. 2004-079 hedged the conclusion under prior agency-deference doctrine. Op. 2025-107 (this opinion) revives Op. 2003-303's clean reading.

Citations

Statutes:
- A.C.A. § 16-87-212 (Commission-authorized expenses, including travel)
- A.C.A. § 16-87-302 (allocation between county and Commission)

Cases:
- Roberson v. Phillips County Election Comm'n, 2014 Ark. 480, 449 S.W.3d 694
- Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd., 2020 Ark. 136, 597 S.W.3d 613

Other AG opinions:
- 2003-303 (mileage analysis, endorsed)
- 2004-079 (prior hedging, superseded)

Source

Original opinion text

BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
Opinion No. 2025-107
October 31, 2025
The Honorable Dolly Henley
State Representative
Post Office Box 128
Washington, Arkansas 71862

Dear Representative Henley:

I am writing in response to your request for my opinion concerning a county's responsibility to reimburse public defenders.

You report that Hempstead County has two part-time public defenders, one residing in Nevada County and the other in Miller County. You state, "Both deputy public defenders have submitted and seek reimbursements for office expenses, rent[,] and mileage from their homes to court."

In light of the above, you ask two questions:

  1. Under A.C.A. § 16-87-302, is Hempstead County required to reimburse its deputy public defenders for office expenses, rent[,] and mileage to and from their homes to court?

  2. Under A.C.A. § 16-87-302 and other applicable Arkansas law, is Hempstead County required to reimburse its deputy public defenders for any other possible work-related expenses?

Brief response: To answer the questions together, Hempstead County must reimburse deputy public defenders for office-related expenses and rent, but not for travel expenses incurred in indigent representation. Those expenses fall within the purview of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.

DISCUSSION

Question 1: Under A.C.A. § 16-87-302, is Hempstead County required to reimburse its deputy public defenders for office expenses, rent, and mileage to and from their homes to court?

Question 2: Under A.C.A. § 16-87-302 and other applicable Arkansas law, is Hempstead County required to reimburse its deputy public defenders for any other possible work-related expenses?

Historically, counties were responsible for paying all costs incurred by public defenders, including salaries and expenses. But now, under A.C.A. § 16-87-302, that responsibility is divided between two governmental bodies: the Arkansas Public Defender Commission (the State) and the county within a judicial district. You specifically ask whether the county must reimburse for office expenses, rent, and mileage from a home to court.

  1. Office expenses. The county pays for "equipment, supplies, and other office expenses necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office." Whether a given expense falls under one of these categories is a fact question outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion.

  2. Rent. The county pays for rent if it is a facility cost or office expense "necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office." I take "rent" as used in your question to mean office rent. Whether a particular rent is a covered facility cost or office expense is a fact question outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion.

  3. Mileage. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission pays for "travel" expenses if they concern the defense of an indigent client. Travel expenses unrelated to the defense of an indigent client are paid by the county if necessary to the "effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office." Whether a given expense concerns travel related or unrelated to the defense of an indigent client is a fact question outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion.

It appears that the undefined word "travel" in the applicable statute has created some confusion about whether mileage to and from the courthouse in a case should be paid as "operating expenses" by the county or as "travel" expenses for an indigent client's case by the Commission. In Opinion 2003-303, my predecessor concluded that under A.C.A. § 16-87-302, "the Commission, not the county, should properly be charged" mileage for travel incurred by the public defender's office when related to indigent defense. In Opinion 2004-079, my predecessor qualified his previous conclusion. While my predecessor appears to have remained confident in his original interpretation of the word "travel," he noted that "the legislative history and the Commission's interpretation for this statute leaves the matter in doubt" and "[l]egislative clarification appears warranted."

Based on the plain language of the statute and the subsequent change in case law concerning the weight of an agency's interpretation of a statute, I agree with Opinion 2003-303's conclusion that the Public Defender Commission, not the county, is responsible for paying mileage for travel incurred by the public defender's office.

One must interpret a statute "just as it reads" and must give "the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language." Courts determining the meaning of statutes no longer give "deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes." Rather, they review agency interpretations of statutes de novo.

The next important question is whether mileage for travel from a personal home, and not just an office, to the courthouse is "travel" under A.C.A. § 16-87-302(a)(3) that the Commission must pay. No statute, Attorney General opinion, or court case squarely addresses this issue.

Still, A.C.A. § 16-87-302(a)(3) provides that the "Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall be responsible … for the payment of the costs of certain expenses, as authorized by § 16-87-212," which includes "travel" set off as a separate item in a list of authorized expenses. Although "travel" is undefined, its ordinary meaning encompasses mileage for travel to and from the courthouse. The General Assembly has the authority to define or limit the term. But in my opinion, a court likely would find that mileage to and from a public defender's home to court would be the responsibility of the Public Defender Commission if it directly concerns an indigent client's case. Whether a given expense concerns travel related or unrelated to the defense of an indigent client is a fact question outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion.

Assistant Attorney General William R. Olson prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General