Can an Arkansas school district let a booster club and an outside ad agency sell broadcast rights to high school football games and keep the proceeds, without going through the public-school-facility sale rules or competitive bidding?

Plain-English summary

Mountain Home Public Schools had a long-running KTLO Radio broadcast deal for its high school football games. In August 2025, the long-time announcers were unexpectedly replaced mid-broadcast. The Baxter Bulletin then raised questions about KTLO and the Bomber Booster Club selling advertising using the district's intellectual property without the kind of formal procurement process that would normally apply to district assets. Representative Stetson Painter asked the AG three questions about how Arkansas law applies to broadcast rights, ad agencies, and booster-club proceeds.

Attorney General Tim Griffin's three answers:

Question 1: Does A.C.A. § 6-21-816 (sale or lease of public school facilities) cover broadcast rights?

No. The statute applies only to physical school buildings and real property. Broadcasting rights are intangible intellectual property, which falls outside the scope of "public school facility" or "real property" as those terms are used in Arkansas law. So the procedural requirements in § 6-21-816 (notice, valuation, sale or lease procedure) don't apply.

But Article 14, Section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution does. That provision requires that all school property, including intellectual property: be used "for the respective purposes to which it belongs," meaning for the benefit of the school district. The school board has broad discretion under Gray v. Mitchell, 373 Ark. 560 (2008), but the arrangement must produce a benefit to the school.

Question 2: Can a school district hire an ad agency without competitive bidding?

Yes, in two circumstances:

1. Under $20,000. A.C.A. § 6-21-304(a)(1)(A)(i)(a) only requires bidding for purchases of $20,000 or more. The Commissioner adjusts this threshold annually for the CPI.
2. Personal or professional services. Even at higher dollar amounts, services that qualify as "personal or professional services" are exempt. Comprehensive branding work (strategy, messaging, logo and website design) typically qualifies as personal services because it requires special skill, experience, and business judgment. Pure media-buying, however, usually doesn't qualify and is subject to bidding if it meets the threshold.

The opinion also expressly forbids splitting purchases across multiple smaller contracts to evade the $20,000 threshold (A.C.A. § 6-21-304(a)(1)(A)(iii)).

Question 3: Can a booster club keep ad proceeds without routing them through district accounts?

Yes. Booster clubs are typically separate 501(c)(3) entities and don't operate as part of the school. They can fundraise off the use of district intellectual property without proceeds passing through district accounts.

But the district can't just give intellectual property away. Article 14, Section 2 still requires that the use of the property benefit the school. The school board must determine that the arrangement provides a benefit. If a court later concluded the booster club was effectively a private gift recipient with no school benefit, the arrangement would be unconstitutional.

What this means for you

If you're a school superintendent or athletic director

Three rules to follow:

1. Document the school benefit before granting any IP rights. When a booster club or third-party broadcaster wants to use your district's name, logo, mascot, broadcast rights, or other intellectual property, the school board must make an explicit finding that the arrangement benefits the district. The benefit doesn't have to be cash flowing to the district, it can be marketing, community engagement, increased student-recruiting, etc.: but document it.
2. Under-$20,000 ad-agency contracts skip bidding. If your media-buying or branding work fits, you can negotiate directly. Don't split a $40,000 contract into two $20,000 contracts to evade bidding; that's expressly barred.
3. Branding work tends to be personal services. Pure media-buying usually isn't. If you contract with an agency for a holistic brand identity, that's personal services. If you contract for raw ad-space placement, that's commodities. Plan accordingly.

If you're a school board member

Your fiduciary duty under Article 14, Section 2 is real. Vote on the record with a finding of benefit when the district grants intellectual-property rights to a booster club or third party. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Gray v. Mitchell gave school boards wide latitude to decide what counts as a "benefit," but you need a finding to lean on if a constituent or court later asks.

A few questions to ask before approving an arrangement:

• What does the district get in return?
• Who has approval authority over the booster club's spending of these funds?
• Does the booster club's use of district IP carry any reputational or compliance risk?
• Is there a written agreement, with termination rights and audit access?

If you're a booster club organizer

This opinion is mostly favorable, but it confirms two limits:

1. You can't act without district authorization. The opinion says the district "may grant permission to a third-party entity, such as a booster club, to use the district's intellectual property only if the board determines that the arrangement will benefit the district." If you're operating without express board approval, get it.
2. Keep your finances separate and clean. Your 501(c)(3) status depends on it. Don't commingle district funds with booster funds. If the district later asks for an accounting (typically routine), be ready.

If you're a journalist covering a school-property dispute

The newsworthy framing here is the gap between procedural protections that apply to physical assets versus intangible assets. The state requires public notice and a sale procedure when a district sells a building, but no formal procedure when a district grants away its broadcast rights. Article 14, Section 2 is the only constitutional backstop, and it's largely deferential to school boards. Pay attention to whether the board made a documented finding of benefit; if not, that's the angle.

If you're a state legislator

This opinion may suggest the existing statute leaves a gap. § 6-21-816 doesn't reach intangible property, and § 6-21-304 only addresses purchases by the district, not grants from the district. If you want to require a more formal process for valuable intangible assets like broadcast rights, that would take a statutory amendment.

Common questions

Q: What if a booster club uses district IP without permission?
A: That's a misuse the district could enjoin. The IP belongs to the district. Practically, most booster clubs operate with the district's tacit approval; making it explicit through a written agreement is the right move.

Q: Does the AG's $20,000 threshold change with inflation?
A: Yes. § 6-21-304(a)(1)(B)(i) requires the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education to adjust the threshold annually based on the CPI. The actual current threshold may be higher than $20,000.

Q: What counts as "personal services" versus "professional services"?
A: Personal services require special skill, experience, or business judgment. Professional services require formal professional training (legal, architectural, engineering, land surveying). Advertising rarely qualifies as professional (no licensure), but often qualifies as personal.

Q: Can the booster club resell broadcast rights to a third party?
A: Only with the district's authorization. The booster club's authority is derivative; it has whatever rights the district grants and no more.

Q: What if the broadcast rights are worth a lot? Does the dollar value change anything?
A: Not under § 6-21-816: that statute doesn't apply at any dollar value to intangibles. But the higher the value, the more important it is to document the school benefit under Article 14, Section 2. A $5,000-value arrangement might survive constitutional review on minimal documentation; a $500,000-value arrangement won't.

Q: Why isn't the Mountain Home/KTLO situation in this opinion analyzed in detail?
A: AG opinions answer general questions of law. The AG can't adjudicate specific factual disputes between a district and a third party. That happens in court. The opinion gives the legal framework; whether Mountain Home's specific arrangement complies is a fact question for a school board, an auditor, or a court.

Background and statutory framework

Arkansas's school-procurement framework has a few moving parts.

Sale of facilities. A.C.A. § 6-21-816 governs disposition of unused or underused public school facilities. It defines "public school facility" to mean any school building or space, including grounds, used for any purpose (extracurricular activity, organized physical activity, prekindergarten, district administration, instruction). The statute is squarely about physical real property. The AG read "real property" using A.C.A. § 26-1-101(9) (the tax-context definition), which means land plus buildings, structures, improvements, and "all rights and privileges belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto." That's the immovable-tangible-property meaning. Intellectual property, broadcast rights, trademarks, mascot likenesses, etc.: falls outside.

Competitive bidding. A.C.A. § 6-21-304 requires competitive bidding for school-district purchases of commodities (supplies, goods, equipment, services other than personal/professional services) at $20,000 or more. The threshold is CPI-adjusted annually. Personal and professional services are exempt at any dollar value. The district can also reject all bids and negotiate, provided all responsible bidders have notice and an opportunity to negotiate.

Article 14, Section 2. "[N]o money or property belonging to the public-school fund, or to this State, for the benefit of schools or universities, shall ever be used for any other purpose than for the respective purposes to which it belongs." The Arkansas Supreme Court interprets this to require that school property be used for the benefit of the district. Gray v. Mitchell, 373 Ark. 560 (2008), held that a severance payment to a terminated superintendent benefited the district by allowing it to hire a preferable replacement; the court applied a deferential standard. Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70 (1962), said the school board's primary duty is to provide educational facilities, "not to maintain property values."

Recodification note. A.C.A. § 19-11-203 (technical/general services definition) and § 19-11-801 (personal/professional services exemption) were recodified by Act 419 of 2025 as § 19-61-103(34) and § 19-65-101 respectively. The substance is unchanged.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- A.C.A. § 6-21-816, sale or lease of public school facilities
- A.C.A. § 6-21-803, public school facility definitions
- A.C.A. § 6-21-304, competitive bidding
- A.C.A. § 6-21-301, commodities definition
- A.C.A. § 6-13-103 and § 6-13-620, school district board duties
- A.C.A. § 6-13-120, board authority over district affairs
- A.C.A. § 26-1-101, real property definition (tax context)
- A.C.A. § 19-61-103, technical and general services
- A.C.A. § 19-65-101, personal and professional services exemption
- Ark. Const. art. 14, §§ 1-2: public school system and school property

Cases:
- Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S.W.2d 3 (1962), school board's primary duty is educational, not property-value
- Gray v. Mitchell, 373 Ark. 560, 285 S.W.3d 222 (2008), deferential review of school-board "benefit" determinations

Code of Arkansas Rules:
- 26 C.A.R. § 30-1124: definition of advertising agency

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201

Opinion No. 2025-104

January 7, 2026

The Honorable Stetson C. Painter
State Representative
Post Office Box 1198
Mountain Home, Arkansas 72654-1198

Dear Representative Painter:

I am writing in response to your request for an opinion regarding the broadcasting rights to high school sporting events, specifically regular-season high school football games. You provided documentation including news articles, emails, and text messages, concerning a dispute that arose when long-time announcers were unexpectedly replaced during the August 18, 2025 broadcast of a Mountain Home Public Schools football game. Following that incident, The Baxter Bulletin raised concerns about KTLO Radio and the Bomber Booster Club selling advertising using the school district's intellectual property.

Against this background, you ask the following questions:

1. Under A.C.A. § 6-21-816 (Sale or lease of public school facilities), should regular-season broadcast rights to high school football games, which are a public asset of intellectual property belonging to the school district, be treated like other valuable property, such as real property, of the district, and therefore subject to the cited code section since statutorily significant monetary value of said intellectual property has been established by an outside private party operating as an agent on the school's behalf in selling such property?

Brief response: No, A.C.A. § 6-21-816 applies only to the sale or lease of physical public school facilities or real property, not to intangible intellectual property like broadcasting rights. But article 14, section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution requires that school district property, including intellectual property, be used for the benefit of the school district.

2. May a school district allow an outside third-party entity (such as an advertising agency) to represent it in such financial matters without employing the bidding process to provide that service and selecting the appropriate bidder?

Brief response: Yes, a school district may hire an advertising agency without soliciting competitive bids under A.C.A. § 6-21-304 if the cost is under $20,000 or if the service qualifies as a personal or professional service, which is exempt from the bidding requirement.

3. May a school district allow some or all proceeds from the sale of its intellectual/real property (broadcasting rights) to go directly to an outside private third party (such as a booster club) with such funds not passing through, nor being accounted for, in district coffers?

Brief response: Yes, a school district may permit a third party, such as a booster club, to keep proceeds it raises from using district-owned intellectual property, like broadcasting rights, provided that the arrangement is authorized by the school district and provides a benefit to the school district.

DISCUSSION

Question 1: Under A.C.A. § 6-21-816 (Sale or lease of public school facilities), should regular season broadcast rights to high school football games, which are a public asset of intellectual property belonging to the school district, be treated like other valuable property, such as real property, of the district, and therefore subject to the cited code section since statutorily significant monetary value of said intellectual property has been established by an outside private party operating as an agent on the school's behalf in selling such property?

No, A.C.A. § 6-21-816 does not govern how a public school district manages its intellectual property or broadcasting rights. But, as discussed below, other constitutional provisions limit how a district may use its intellectual property.

1. Why A.C.A. § 6-21-816 does not apply. Arkansas Code § 6-21-816 applies only to physical school facilities and real property, not to intangible assets like intellectual property or broadcasting rights. The statute provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a school district determines that any public school facility or other real property is no longer needed for school purposes or is unused or underutilized, the school district may sell or lease the public school facility in accordance with §§ 6-13-103 and 6-13-620 and this subchapter.

The statute defines "public school facility" in terms that clearly refer to tangible, physical structures. While the statute does not define "real property," A.C.A. § 26-1-101 (used in taxation contexts) defines it as "not only the land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, with all things therein contained, but also all buildings, structures, improvements, and other fixtures of whatever kind thereon and all rights and privileges belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto." That definition, which is consistent with how the term is generally used in Arkansas and federal law, refers to immovable, tangible property and associated legal interests, not to intellectual property or media rights, which are intangible.

Thus, broadcasting rights do not fall within the scope of A.C.A. § 6-21-816 and are not subject to its requirements regarding the sale or lease of public school facilities. But the Arkansas Constitution and other statutes place limits on how a school district may use its property, including intellectual property.

2. Constitutional requirements. Although the specific statute you cited does not apply, the Arkansas Constitution places limits on how a school district may use its property, including its intellectual property. Article 14, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution requires the state to maintain a general, suitable, and efficient system of public education, which is carried out through local school districts and their boards. As the Arkansas Supreme Court has explained, a school board's primary duty is to provide free education to the children within their districts according to state standards: "[t]he function and duty of the School Board is not to maintain property values but to provide educational facilities for the children within the area."

This principle aligns with the constraints imposed on school property by article 14, section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides: "[n]o money or property belonging to the public-school fund, or to this State, for the benefit of schools or universities, shall ever be used for any other purpose than for the respective purposes to which it belongs."

The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require that school funds and property be used to benefit the school district. Determining what constitutes a "benefit" is largely within the discretion of the school board. Arkansas law, particularly A.C.A. § 6-13-120, grants school boards broad authority to manage district affairs, and courts will not interfere absent a clear abuse of that discretion, which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In applying Article 14, section 2, the Arkansas Supreme Court has emphasized that its role is limited to ensuring that school property and funds are not diverted to purposes unrelated to the operation of schools. Thus, it is largely up to each school district to determine whether a particular arrangement regarding its property benefits the district.

Question 2: May a school district allow an outside private third-party entity (such as an advertising agency) to represent it in such financial matters without employing the bidding process to provide that service and selecting the appropriate bidder?

Yes, a school district may hire an advertising agency without soliciting competitive bids under A.C.A. § 6-21-304 if the cost is under $20,000 or if the service qualifies as a personal or professional service, which is exempt from the bidding requirement.

Competitive bidding is required only when the estimated purchase price of a commodity equals or exceeds $20,000. Even when bidding is required, the district may reject all bids and negotiate a contract instead, provided that all responsible bidders are notified and given a reasonable opportunity to negotiate. A purchase official may not split or parcel commodity purchases to circumvent the $20,000 threshold.

The statute defines commodities as "all supplies, goods, material, equipment, machinery, facilities, personal property, and services, other than personal and professional services, purchased for or on behalf of the school district[.]" Hiring an advertising agency most naturally falls within the category of "services." The state procurement statute defines "[t]echnical and general services" as:

(i) Work accomplished by skilled individuals involving time, labor, and a degree of expertise, in which performance is evaluated based upon the quality of the work and the results produced;

(ii) Work performed to meet a demand, including without limitation work of a recurring nature that does not necessarily require special skills or extensive training; or

(iii) The furnishing of labor, time, or effort by a contractor or vendor not involving the delivery of any specific end product other than reports that are incidental to the required performance.

The Code of Arkansas Rules further defines an "advertising agency" as "a business that provides comprehensive, professional advertising services including, but not limited to: (A) Artwork; (B) Concepting; (C) Designing; and (D) Any other creative services necessary to create, plan, and implement an advertising scheme." Thus, an advertising agency generally falls under the category of "services," making it subject to the bidding requirement unless the purchase is under $20,000 or qualifies as a personal or professional service exempt from bidding.

Although the term "personal and professional services" is not defined in the statute, this office has consistently held that "personal services" are "those services that require special skill, experience, or business judgment." Conversely, this office has understood "professional services" to refer to services by an individual who has received particular professional training to provide the service. For example, legal, architectural, engineering, and land surveying services are typically regarded as professional services.

Determining whether an advertising agency qualifies for the personal or professional services exemption under A.C.A. § 6-21-304 is a fact-specific inquiry. The professional services exemption is unlikely to apply because advertising work generally does not require professional licensure or formal certification, unlike legal, architectural, engineering, or land surveying services. However, advertising services may qualify as personal services, depending on the nature of the work performed.

For instance, if a school district engages an advertising agency to lead a comprehensive branding project, including tasks such as developing brand strategy, crafting key messaging, refining the mission and values, and designing logos or websites, such work would likely qualify as personal services. This is because it requires specialized skill, experience, and business judgment, typically provided by specific individuals or teams with creative and strategic expertise.

In contrast, if the agency's role is limited to facilitating media or ad space purchases without contributing to overall branding strategy or providing other specialized input, that work would likely not qualify as a personal service. In such cases, if the fee paid to the agency equals or exceeds $20,000, the bidding requirement would apply. Importantly, only the amount paid by the school district to the agency for its services is relevant in determining whether competitive bidding is required, not the cost of the ad space itself.

Question 3: May a school district allow some or all proceeds from the sale of its intellectual/real property (broadcast rights) to go directly to an outside third party (such as a booster club) with such funds not passing through, nor being accounted for, in district coffers?

Yes, a school district may permit a third party, such as a booster club, to retain proceeds it raises from using district-owned intellectual property, like broadcasting rights, provided that the arrangement is authorized by the school district and provides a benefit to the school.

Arkansas law does not prohibit a district from granting limited rights to a third-party organization to use its intellectual property for fundraising purposes. Booster clubs are legally separate entities, typically organized as 501(c)(3) nonprofits, and they are responsible for managing their own finances and complying with nonprofit regulations. Because they operate independently, funds raised by booster clubs do not need to pass through district accounts unless those funds are later donated to the district.

While the funds need not pass through the district's accounts unless they are subsequently donated, the right to generate those funds originates from the district's property. As explained in response to Question 1, article 14, section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution requires that the use of school property ultimately benefit the school. Thus, a school board cannot simply give away valuable intellectual property to a third party for that party's private gain. A school district may grant permission to a third-party entity, such as a booster club, to use the district's intellectual property only if the board determines that the arrangement will benefit the district.

Assistant Attorney General Justin Hughes prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,

TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General