AR Opinion No. 2022-034 2022-11-23

Can a county use a sales tax dedicated to 'emergency services' to pay 911 dispatcher salaries?

Short answer: It depends on the language of the levying ordinance and the ballot title approved by Perry County voters in November 2020. The Arkansas Constitution (art. 16, § 11) prohibits using tax revenue for any purpose other than the one for which the tax was levied. The voters' approval, expressed in the ordinance and ballot title, defines that purpose. The local quorum court determines in the first instance whether 911 dispatcher salaries fall within the dedicated 'emergency services' purpose; courts will not disturb that determination unless 'demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted.'
Disclaimer: This is an official Arkansas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Arkansas attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Perry County voters approved a sales and use tax in November 2020 dedicated to "emergency services." The county quorum court wants to use the proceeds to pay 911 dispatcher salaries because the dispatchers keep leaving for higher-paying jobs after Perry County trains them. State Representative Mary Bentley asked the AG: can they?

The AG declined to give a yes-or-no answer, but laid out the framework that governs the question.

Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11 says: "no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose." This is the constitutional dedication rule. The Arkansas Supreme Court treats the rule as turning on the voters' understanding of the purpose, expressed through the ballot title and the levying ordinance.

Three rules from the Court:
1. The ordinance title and ballot title are "the final word of information and warning" to voters about what they were authorizing (Daniel v. Jones, 332 Ark. 489 (1998); Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Rector, 214 Ark. 649 (1949)).
2. The "implication and ordinary meaning" of the ballot title generally controls (Arkansas-Missouri Power).
3. The ballot must be read together with the levying ordinance; neither one alone is conclusive (Maas v. City of Mountain Home, 338 Ark. 202 (1999)).

When the ordinance is ambiguous, courts may consult extrinsic evidence: historical context, contemporaneous conditions, consequences of interpretation, and matters of common knowledge (Mears v. Ark. State Hosp., 265 Ark. 844; Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Mabry, 229 Ark. 261).

The local quorum court decides in the first instance whether a particular expenditure fits the dedicated purpose. Courts review the local determination deferentially: they will not disturb it unless it is "demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted" (McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97 (1925)).

So the answer for Perry County is: read the levying ordinance and the November 2020 ballot title carefully. If "emergency services" reasonably encompasses 911 dispatch operations (which it almost certainly does, given that 911 dispatch is the entry point for emergency response), the quorum court can support the use. If the ordinance and ballot title carved out a narrower purpose (e.g., "emergency medical services" specifically, or only equipment and not personnel), the answer may be different.

The AG's analysis is consistent with prior AG Opinions (2004-121, 97-260, plus the cited case law). The framework also generalizes to other dedicated-tax questions.

What this means for you

Perry County Quorum Court

Three steps before redirecting the tax revenue:

  1. Pull the levying ordinance and the certified November 2020 ballot title. Note the exact wording.
  2. Have the county attorney draft a written opinion that the proposed use (911 dispatcher salaries) fits the stated purpose. The opinion should walk through the ordinance text, the ballot title, and any contemporaneous campaign material that reflected the purpose to voters.
  3. Pass a resolution or ordinance authorizing the expenditure with findings tying the use to the dedicated purpose. The findings should explain why dispatcher salaries are part of "emergency services."

If you take these steps and a court later reviews the use, the deferential "arbitrary and unwarranted" standard from McAdams will likely apply.

Other Arkansas county quorum courts dedicating sales taxes

The same framework governs every dedicated-tax question. Build the dedication purpose carefully into the levying ordinance and ballot title. Tighter dedications (e.g., "to construct and equip a fire station at a specific location") protect voter expectations but limit flexibility. Broader dedications (e.g., "for public safety") preserve flexibility but invite challenge.

A practical drafting tip: include illustrative examples in the ballot title or ordinance ("for emergency services, including but not limited to ambulance, fire, 911 dispatch, and emergency management"). Inclusive language reduces later interpretation disputes.

County 911 dispatch administrators

If your county has a dedicated emergency services tax, your operations probably qualify, but document the link. Track dispatch costs (salaries, training, equipment, technology) and produce reports tied to the tax's dedicated purpose. The reports help the quorum court justify the use to voters and to courts.

County attorneys advising on tax-purpose questions

Build a standard analysis template: (1) levying ordinance text, (2) ballot title text, (3) contemporaneous public statements about the purpose, (4) ordinary meaning of dedication, (5) connection to proposed use. Document each step in writing. The arbitrary-and-unwarranted standard is deferential, but only if the local determination is reasoned.

County voters

Read the ballot title before voting on a dedicated tax. The wording is what locks in the use. If you want flexibility for the county, look for broad language. If you want a specific use, look for specific language. Don't rely on campaign promises; the ordinance and ballot title control.

If you believe the county is misusing tax revenue, you can challenge the use in court. The standard of review is deferential to the quorum court, but a clearly outside-the-purpose expenditure can be enjoined.

Other Arkansas dedicated-revenue stakeholders (state agencies, municipalities)

The framework generalizes beyond county sales taxes. Any tax with a dedicated purpose under Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11 follows the same analysis. State agencies receiving dedicated funds, municipal water/sewer revenues with statutory dedications, and similar streams should be evaluated under the same purpose-of-the-dedication test.

Common questions

What is the constitutional rule on dedicated taxes?
Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11: "no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose." This is the constitutional anti-diversion rule.

What controls when the ordinance and ballot title differ?
The Arkansas Supreme Court treats them as a pair. The ballot title is the "final word" of information to voters, but it must be read with the ordinance. Maas v. City of Mountain Home, 338 Ark. 202, makes clear neither alone is conclusive.

What if the ordinance or ballot title is ambiguous?
Courts can consider extrinsic evidence: historical context, conditions at enactment, consequences of interpretation, and matters of common knowledge. The aim is to determine voter intent.

Who decides whether an expenditure fits the dedicated purpose?
The local governing body (quorum court for counties, city council for municipalities) decides in the first instance. Courts review on a deferential standard.

What is the "demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted" standard?
A reviewing court will not overturn the local determination unless it is clearly outside any reasonable reading of the dedicated purpose. The standard is deferential. McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97.

Can voters re-vote to redirect a dedicated tax?
Generally yes. A new ballot measure changing the dedication or repealing the tax is the proper path for a substantive redirection that goes beyond ordinance interpretation. Local counsel can advise on the procedural mechanics.

What if the county is using emergency-services money for something clearly unrelated, like road paving?
That would likely fail the arbitrary-and-unwarranted test. A taxpayer suit could enjoin the use and require accounting and refund. Cite Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, for the general rule.

Background and statutory framework

Constitutional rule:
- Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11: no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose.

Case law on tax-purpose interpretation:
- Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 708 S.W.2d 531 (1989): general principle of tax dedication.
- Daniel v. Jones, 332 Ark. 489, 966 S.W.2d 226 (1998): ballot title as "final word of information and warning."
- Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Rector, 214 Ark. 649, 217 S.W.2d 335 (1949): ballot title controls voter understanding.
- Maas v. City of Mountain Home, 338 Ark. 202, 992 S.W.2d 105 (1999): ballot must be read with the levying ordinance.
- Mears v. Ark. State Hosp., 265 Ark. 844, 581 S.W.2d 339 (1979): extrinsic evidence in ambiguous cases.
- Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Mabry, 229 Ark. 261, 315 S.W.2d 900 (1958): same.
- McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97, 213 S.W. 355 (1925): "demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted" deferential standard.

Prior AG opinions: 2004-121, 97-260.

The question turns on the November 2020 Perry County levying ordinance and ballot title. Those documents are local public records available from the county clerk and the State Board of Election Commissioners.

Citations

  • Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11 (no diversion of dedicated tax)
  • Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 708 S.W.2d 531 (1989)
  • Daniel v. Jones, 332 Ark. 489, 966 S.W.2d 226 (1998)
  • Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Rector, 214 Ark. 649, 217 S.W.2d 335 (1949)
  • Maas v. City of Mountain Home, 338 Ark. 202, 992 S.W.2d 105 (1999)
  • Mears v. Ark. State Hosp., 265 Ark. 844, 581 S.W.2d 339 (1979)
  • Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Mabry, 229 Ark. 261, 315 S.W.2d 900 (1958)
  • McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97, 213 S.W. 355 (1925)
  • Ark. Att'y Gen. Ops. 2004-121, 97-260

Source

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2022-034
November 22, 2022
The Honorable Mary Bentley
State Representative
142 Shady Lane
Perryville, AR 72126-8103

Dear Representative Bentley:

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning a particular sales and use tax in Perry County. As background for your question, you state:

[A] certain sales and use tax [was] passed by Perry County citizens in the November 2020, election. The net collections from this sales and use tax are to be used for emergency services in Perry County. The Perry County Quorum Court would prefer to utilize these funds to pay and retain its 911 dispatchers as they struggle to keep qualified personnel that transfer to other jurisdictions once they have been properly trained in Perry County.

Your question in this regard is as follows:

Can the Perry County Quorum Court access and utilize the funds from this sales and use tax to pay its 911 dispatchers?

RESPONSE

The answer to your question depends upon the language of the ordinance by which the sales and use tax was levied and the ballot title by which it was presented to the electorate. These matters are local in nature and must be resolved on the local level. I cannot construe or interpret such documents and I consequently cannot opine on the legality of the proposed use of the tax proceeds. I will, however, briefly address the basic legal framework that guides the review.

DISCUSSION

Your question most directly implicates Article 16, Section 11 of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that "no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose." In determining the purpose of a tax, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that "it is to the title of the ordinance and the ballot title 'that the electors had the right to look to ascertain what they were asked to approve[.]'"

Thus, the purpose of the sales and use tax, as stated in the levying ordinance and the ballot title, will be determinative of the manner in which the proceeds may be used. The Court in Daniel v. Jones went on to state that "[t]he ballot title is the final word of information and warning to which the electors had the right to look as to just what authority they were asked to confer[.]" The "implication and ordinary meaning" of the ballot title will, generally, be controlling. The Court has further noted that "[t]he ballot is the 'final word' to the voters only in the sense that it is the last source of information, not in the sense that it is conclusive of the measure's effects. It must be read in conjunction with the levying ordinance."

If the ordinance's language is ambiguous, a court might resort to extrinsic evidence to determine whether a particular use of tax revenues is authorized. A court might look at such factors as evidence of the historical context of the measure, contemporaneous conditions at the time of its enactment, consequences of interpretation, and other matters of common knowledge within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to determine whether the voters intended to approve use of the sales tax revenues for the particular projects in question.

Additionally, generally speaking, it is the responsibility of the local governing body to determine legislatively whether a particular expenditure is within the ballot-designated purpose(s) of a local sales tax, and a court will not disturb its finding unless it is "demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted."

In sum, the language of the ordinance and the ballot title must be reviewed to determine whether the purpose of the tax is stated in a way that encompasses the proposed use(s). I cannot construe or interpret those documents. Consideration of extrinsic factors may also be necessary in the case of ambiguity. The questions are local in nature and must be answered on the local level, ideally with the assistance of local counsel.

For these reasons, I must decline to opine on your question. I hope, however, that the foregoing will be of some assistance in addressing the underlying issues.

Sincerely,

LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General