If a juvenile gets multiple consecutive sentences for crimes that include a homicide, do the parole eligibility waiting periods stack?

Plain-English summary

Prosecuting Attorney Carol Crews asked whether Arkansas's juvenile-parole statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(2)(A), allowed stacking parole eligibility periods when a juvenile was convicted of multiple consecutive offenses and at least one involved another person's death. The AG concluded the answer was yes. The statute had two parallel subsections. Subsection (a)(1), governing non-homicide juvenile sentences, expressly prohibited stacking and required parole eligibility "no later than after twenty (20) years of incarceration, including any applicable sentencing enhancements, and including an instance in which multiple sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently." Subsection (a)(2)(A), governing sentences for offenses in which a death occurred (25 years for first-degree murder, 30 years for capital murder), said nothing about consecutive sentences. The AG applied the canon against surplusage: if the legislature had to write an explicit anti-stacking clause in subsection (a)(1), then the absence of that clause in subsection (a)(2) meant stacking was permitted there. The opinion gave a worked example: a juvenile sentenced to 40 years for kidnapping plus 40 years for first-degree battery, both consecutive, was still eligible for parole after 20 years (no stacking under (a)(1)); but adding a consecutive life sentence for first-degree murder pushed the eligibility horizon out to 65 years (the 40 plus the 25 for first-degree murder, stacked under (a)(2)).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What is the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act?
A: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621 was the parole-eligibility statute for offenders sentenced for crimes committed before they turned 18. It set fixed maximum waiting periods for parole eligibility based on the type of offense.

Q: Why does the AG say silence in one subsection means stacking is allowed?
A: Because the parallel non-homicide subsection had an explicit anti-stacking clause, the AG reasoned the General Assembly knew how to bar stacking when it wanted to. Reading both subsections to forbid stacking would make the explicit clause in (a)(1) "superfluous," which a basic canon of statutory construction does not allow.

Q: How would this work for a juvenile with one homicide and one non-homicide sentence, run consecutively?
A: The opinion's example resolved this directly. The non-homicide sentences stay capped at 20 years for parole eligibility (no stacking). The homicide sentence's 25 or 30-year clock then runs from when that sentence begins, stacked on top of the 20.

Q: Does this apply to juveniles tried as adults?
A: The statute applied to anyone "convicted and sentenced to the department or the division for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age," which would include juveniles transferred to adult court.

Q: Was the AG's interpretation binding on courts?
A: No. AG opinions are persuasive only. A court interpreting § 16-93-621 directly would not be bound, though the analysis here tracks ordinary statutory-construction rules an Arkansas court would also apply.

Background and statutory framework

Arkansas adopted the Fair Sentencing of Minors framework in part to align state law with the U.S. Supreme Court's juvenile-sentencing decisions. Section 16-93-621(a)(1) capped parole eligibility at 20 years for non-homicide juvenile offenders, regardless of whether multiple sentences ran consecutively or concurrently. Section 16-93-621(a)(2)(A) set 25 years for first-degree murder under § 5-10-102 and 30 years for capital murder under § 5-10-101.

The opinion's reasoning leaned on two well-established statutory-construction canons: reading the statute as a whole (Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 205, 4 S.W.3d 493, 496 (1999); Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 939, 311 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1958), citing Berry v. Sale, 184 Ark. 655, 43 S.W.2d 225 (1931)) and giving effect to every word so that no language is reduced to surplusage (Locke v. Cook, 245 Ark. 787, 793, 434 S.W.2d 598, 601 (1968)).

The AG also illustrated the practical consequence with a hypothetical: 40 years for kidnapping + 40 years for first-degree battery, consecutive, still triggers parole eligibility at 20 years under the (a)(1) cap. Add a consecutive life sentence for first-degree murder, and parole eligibility becomes the 20-year cap for the non-homicide sentences plus the 25-year period for first-degree murder, totaling 65 years before the inmate could come up for parole.

Citations

• Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(1)
• Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(2)(A)
• Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (capital murder)
• Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102 (first-degree murder)
• Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 4 S.W.3d 493 (1999)
• Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958)
• Berry v. Sale, 184 Ark. 655, 43 S.W.2d 225 (1931)
• Locke v. Cook, 245 Ark. 787, 434 S.W.2d 598 (1968)

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2019-041
February 7, 2020

The Honorable Carol Crews
Prosecuting Attorney
Twentieth Judicial District
P.O. Box 550
Conway, AR 72033

Dear Ms. Crews:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on a question concerning the parole eligibility of certain minors, which is paraphrased below:

In the case of a minor who was convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses and in which the death of another person did occur, does Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(2)(A) allow for parole eligibility periods to be added together, or "stacked"?

RESPONSE

The answer to your question is yes.

DISCUSSION

The Code provision you have asked about states:

A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the department or the division for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, in which the death of another person occurred, and that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty-five (25) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or no later than after thirty (30) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, including any applicable sentencing enhancements, unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.

Standing alone, this subdivision does not provide any guidance as to whether parole eligibility periods may be stacked for minors serving multiple sentences. It simply states that a minor is "eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty-five (25) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of murder in the first degree" or "no later than after thirty (30) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of capital murder."

However, this subdivision of the statute cannot be read in isolation. Rather, we must "look to the language under discussion in the context of the statute as a whole," reading "each section ... in light of every other section." The above subdivision must be considered together with the following subdivision of the same statute:

A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the Department of Correction or Division of Correction for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age and in which the death of another person did not occur is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty (20) years of incarceration, including any applicable sentencing enhancements, and including an instance in which multiple sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently, unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.

By specifically referencing consecutive and concurrent sentences, subdivision 16-93-621(a)(1) clearly prohibits stacking parole eligibility periods for minors convicted of multiple crimes not involving the death of another person. That specific prohibition in subdivision 16-93-621(a)(1), coupled with subdivision 16-93-621(a)(2)(A)'s silence on the matter, means that stacking sentences to determine parole eligibility is permitted under subdivision 16-93-621(a)(2).

Indeed, the specific prohibition on stacking contained in subdivision 16-93-621(a)(1) demonstrates that where the General Assembly intended to prohibit stacking, it did so in unambiguous language. Moreover, a common rule of statutory construction is to give effect to each word of a statute so that no language is reduced to surplusage. If we read both subdivisions to prohibit stacking, but only one of the subdivisions includes a clause explicitly prohibiting stacking, then the inclusion of that clause becomes superfluous.

In sum, I believe a proper reading of the statute prohibits the stacking of sentences to determine the parole eligibility for a minor convicted and sentenced for multiple crimes when the death of another person did not occur. Such a minor would be eligible for parole after no more than twenty years of incarceration, regardless of whether the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively or concurrently. But in the case of a minor who was convicted of multiple crimes in which the death of another person did occur and the minor was ordered to serve the sentences consecutively, the parole eligibility periods would be stacked together, and the minor would not be eligible for parole until all of the parole eligibility periods had passed. For example, a minor sentenced to forty years' imprisonment for one count of kidnapping and forty years' imprisonment for one count of first-degree battery could only serve up to twenty years' imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole, even if the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. However, if the same minor also committed first-degree murder, for which he received a life sentence, and that sentence was ordered to be served consecutively with the other two sentences, then the minor could serve as many as sixty-five years' imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole.

Sincerely,

LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General