Is the special language in Arkansas Act 274 of 2014, which let ADEQ recover post-closure landfill costs, unconstitutional logrolling under the one-subject rule?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Bryan King asked whether section 45 of Act 274 of 2014, special language tucked into an Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) appropriation act, violated the one-subject rule of Article 5, section 30 of the Arkansas Constitution. The trigger fact: an $18 fee on each residence and business in the Ozark Mountain Solid Waste District, ostensibly to pay post-closure costs for the NABORS landfill that the district had purchased with bonds. The fee had been imposed by court order, with the court relying in part on the special language in Act 274.

Attorney General Leslie Rutledge declined to issue an opinion on the constitutionality question. Her reasoning: the fee itself was the product of a court order, not directly the product of section 45. Asking whether the special language was unconstitutional would, in effect, be asking whether the court order was sound, and her office's longstanding practice was to decline to opine on facially valid court orders.

She did, however, walk through the one-subject doctrine. Article 5, section 30 requires general appropriation bills to embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; all other appropriations must be made by separate bills "each embracing but one subject." Arkansas Supreme Court precedent reads "one subject" generously: as long as the different parts of the act "relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title" and "accomplish a purpose of one design," the rule is satisfied. The opinion catalogued five upheld bills and reaffirmed that statutes are presumed constitutional, with the burden falling on the challenger.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2019. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The NABORS Landfill litigation produced significant subsequent rulings and at least one Arkansas Supreme Court decision. The Ozark Mountain Solid Waste District itself was the subject of legislative reorganization. Anyone relying on this opinion's procedural framing (the court-order disposition) or its catalog of one-subject case law should pull current versions of Act 274 of 2014, § 8-6-714, and any later cases citing back to this string of authorities.

Historical context

The factual setup

The Ozark Mountain Solid Waste District purchased the NABORS Landfill using bonds. The landfill ran into financial trouble, and ADEQ ended up using money from the Landfill Post-Closure Trust Fund to cover closure costs. Act 274 of 2014, an appropriation act for ADEQ's operating expenses, included a piece of "special language" in section 45 that let ADEQ sue the district and "all of the entities composing the district" to recover Trust Fund money expended on closure.

A court order then imposed an $18 fee on each residence and business in the district. The court appears to have relied at least in part on the section 45 language. Senator King wanted to know whether section 45 itself violated the constitutional one-subject rule for appropriation acts.

Why the AG declined to opine

The AG's reasoning is procedural, not substantive. The fee was imposed by court order, not directly by the legislature. To answer the senator's question, the AG would have had to evaluate whether the court correctly applied section 45. The office's longstanding practice (citing Ops. Att'y Gen. 2009-048, 98-221, and 90-052) is to decline to opine on the validity of court orders that appear facially valid. The AG honored that practice here.

What the AG did say about Article 5, section 30

Even while declining to opine on the merits, the AG mapped the doctrinal terrain so the senator (and any future researcher) would have a road map.

The text. Article 5, section 30 reads, in relevant part:

[T]he general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the State; all other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.

The judicial gloss.

• First Nat. Bank of Stuttgart v. Clinton, 304 Ark. 411, 802 S.W.2d 928 (1991): the requirement is met "so long as the different parts of the act relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title."
• Clinton v. Taylor, 284 Ark. 238, 240, 681 S.W.2d 338, 339 (1984): the various sections must "accomplish a purpose of one design."
• Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620, 626, 798 S.W.2d 918, 921 (1990): the rule does not bar substantive provisions in appropriation bills if "all [provisions] relate to but one subject."
• Cottrell v. Faubus, 233 Ark. 721, 723, 347 S.W.2d 52, 53 (1961): the purpose is "to prevent the inclusion of separate and unrelated appropriations in a single bill, because that practice opens the door to the evils that have come to be known as logrolling and pork barrel legislation."
• Reid v. Jones, 261 Ark. 550, 552, 551 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1977), quoting State v. Sloan, 66 Ark. 575, 53 S.W. 37 (1899): the test is met "so long as the different parts of the act relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title; and that the unity of object must be looked for in the ultimate end, and not in the details or steps leading to the end."

The catalog of upheld bills. The AG listed five examples of bills the Arkansas Supreme Court had sustained:

• Act 36 of 1989 (1st Extra. Session): farm-mediation funding plus repeal of an exemption (one general object: funding farm mediation). First Nat. Bank of Stuttgart.
• Act 67 of 1989 (1st Extra. Session): AHTD personnel and operating expenses, plus abolition of two agencies and transfer of duties (one subject: AHTD administration). Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n.
• Act 258 of 1957: oil-producer severance-tax credit plus qualifying procedures (one subject: stimulating new oil sourcing). P & O Falco, Inc. v. Riley, 271 Ark. 562, 610 S.W.2d 255 (1980).
• Act 1010 of 1976: General Assembly expenses for both the 1973 and 1976 extended sessions (same subject). Reid.
• Act 465 of 1961: 20-section, 11-page education appropriation (entire bill related to education). Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962).

The constitutionality presumption. Statutes are presumed constitutional, with the burden of proving otherwise on the challenger. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999); ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997); Cozad v. State, 303 Ark. 137, 792 S.W.2d 606 (1990). If a statute can be construed as constitutional, a court must do so. Jones v. State, 333 Ark. 208, 969 S.W.2d 618 (1998). Courts presume the General Assembly knew the constitutional scope of its powers when enacting the statute. McLeod v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 205 Ark. 225, 168 S.W.2d 413 (1943).

What the senator was left with

A roadmap, not a ruling. Anyone wanting to challenge section 45 of Act 274 in court would face: (1) the legislative-deference presumption; (2) the broad "ultimate end" reading of "one subject"; and (3) a body of case law in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has rarely struck down an appropriation bill on Article 5, section 30 grounds. The AG's silence on the merits was itself a soft signal.

Common questions

Q: Why didn't the AG just answer the question?
A: Because the $18 fee was imposed by a court order. The AG's office has a longstanding practice of declining to opine on facially valid court orders, and answering Senator King's question would have required second-guessing the court's reading of section 45.

Q: Does that mean section 45 of Act 274 was constitutional?
A: The AG made no determination either way. She also did not say the section was constitutional. The "decline to opine" disposition leaves the question unresolved.

Q: What is the one-subject rule for appropriation acts?
A: Article 5, section 30 says general appropriations cover only ordinary expenses of the three branches; all other appropriations must be in separate bills, each on one subject. Arkansas case law reads the one-subject requirement broadly: a bill is valid if its parts "relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title."

Q: How often have Arkansas courts struck down an appropriation under Article 5, section 30?
A: The opinion lists five upheld bills and zero struck-down bills. The case law leans heavily toward upholding appropriation acts that contain mixed substantive and appropriating provisions, as long as the mix has a single overarching object.

Q: Could a private resident challenge the $18 fee?
A: A private challenge would face the legal standards summarized in this opinion: the constitutionality presumption, the broad one-subject reading, and the practical fact that the fee was imposed by court order. The opinion did not address standing, statutes of limitations, or whether the court's order was now final.

Background and statutory framework

The Ozark Mountain Solid Waste District is a regional solid-waste management district under Arkansas's solid-waste statutes. Districts are authorized to acquire, own, and operate landfills and to issue bonds to finance them. The NABORS landfill in Baxter County was the district's primary disposal site. Financial difficulties left the district unable to meet its obligations, triggering use of the Landfill Post-Closure Trust Fund administered by ADEQ.

Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-714(d) and Section 45 of Act 274 of 2014 form the legal scaffolding for ADEQ's recovery actions. Act 274 of 2014 was an appropriation act for ADEQ. Section 45 is "special language" giving ADEQ authority to sue the district and the entities composing it to recover Trust Fund money expended on landfill closure if the district files for bankruptcy, is unable to meet its debt obligations, or is insolvent.

Article 5, section 30 of the Arkansas Constitution is the one-subject rule. Combined with Article 19, section 31 (which created the independent citizens commission for elected constitutional officers' salaries), it controls how the General Assembly must structure appropriation bills.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has read Article 5, section 30 to allow substantive provisions in appropriation acts so long as the substantive provisions and the appropriating provisions share "the same general object fairly indicated by [the act's] title." The "logrolling" concern is the doctrinal anchor: the rule exists to prevent unrelated appropriations from being lumped together to create coalitions for measures that could not pass alone.

Citations and references

Constitutional and statutory provisions:

• Ark. Const. art. 5, § 30 (one-subject rule for appropriations)
• Ark. Const. art. 19, § 31 (independent citizens commission)
• Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-714(d) (ADEQ recovery authority)
• Act 274 of 2014, § 45 (special language giving ADEQ recovery rights against solid waste districts)

Cases:

• First Nat. Bank of Stuttgart v. Clinton, 304 Ark. 411, 802 S.W.2d 928 (1991), Ark. Supreme Court, broad reading of one-subject
• Clinton v. Taylor, 284 Ark. 238, 681 S.W.2d 338 (1984), Ark. Supreme Court, "one design" test
• Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620, 798 S.W.2d 918 (1990), Ark. Supreme Court, substantive provisions allowed if related
• Cottrell v. Faubus, 233 Ark. 721, 347 S.W.2d 52 (1961), Ark. Supreme Court, anti-logrolling purpose
• Reid v. Jones, 261 Ark. 550, 551 S.W.2d 191 (1977), Ark. Supreme Court, "ultimate end" reading
• State v. Sloan, 66 Ark. 575, 53 S.W. 37 (1899), Ark. Supreme Court, original formulation
• P & O Falco, Inc. v. Riley, 271 Ark. 562, 610 S.W.2d 255 (1980), Ark. Supreme Court, oil severance-tax bill upheld
• Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962), Ark. Supreme Court, education appropriation upheld
• Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999), Ark. Supreme Court, presumption of constitutionality
• ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997), Ark. Supreme Court, presumption of constitutionality
• Cozad v. State, 303 Ark. 137, 792 S.W.2d 606 (1990), Ark. Supreme Court, presumption of constitutionality
• Jones v. State, 333 Ark. 208, 969 S.W.2d 618 (1998), Ark. Supreme Court, must construe as constitutional if possible
• McLeod v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 205 Ark. 225, 168 S.W.2d 413 (1943), Ark. Supreme Court, presumption of legislative knowledge

Related AG opinions:

• Op. Att'y Gen. 2009-048 (decline-to-opine practice on court orders)
• Op. Att'y Gen. 98-221 (decline-to-opine practice on court orders)
• Op. Att'y Gen. 90-052 (decline-to-opine practice on court orders)

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Opinion No. 2018-147
April 2, 2019

The Honorable Bryan King
State Senator
871 CR 814
Green Forest, AR 72638

Dear Senator King:

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning a court order and certain special language in a 2014 appropriation act. As background for your question, you state:

An $18.00 fee has been imposed by a court order on each residence and business in the Ozark Mountain Solid Waste District to pay for the post-closure costs for the NABORS Landfill, which had been purchased by the district using bonds. This court order appears to have been issued under the authority of Arkansas Code § 8-6-714(d) and special language contained in Act 274 of 2014. This was an appropriation act containing special language relating to the Landfill Post-Closure Trust Fund. Section 45 of Act 274 allows ADEQ to file a civil action against a regional solid waste management district and all of the entities composing the district to recover funds expended from the Landfill Post-Closure Trust Fund to achieve final closure of a landfill operated by the district if the district files for bankruptcy, is unable to meet its debt obligation, or is insolvent. The special language at issue was added by a Joint Budget Committee amendment.

You have asked the following question against this background: Is the amendment that imposes the $18.00 fee in violation of the one subject provision of the Arkansas Constitution found in Article 5, Section 30?

RESPONSE

As I understand it, the "amendment" referenced in your question is special language contained in Section 45 of Act 274 of 2014. This 2014 act was an appropriation act for personal services and operating expenses of the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ).

The $18.00 fee you have referenced was not imposed by this special language. Rather, it was imposed by court order, an order that apparently was issued at least in part based on Act 274's special language. Your question, in effect, invites me to opine on the validity of that court order. Consequently, I must respectfully decline to issue an opinion in response to your question. It has been the longstanding practice of this office to decline to officially opine on the sufficiency or appropriateness of court orders, where such orders otherwise appear facially valid. See, e.g., Ops. Att'y Gen. 2009-048, 98-221, 90-052.

I will nevertheless generally address the constitutional provision you have referenced, and the standard that has been developed through case law for determining whether this provision has been transgressed.

DISCUSSION

Article 5, section 30 of the Arkansas Constitution requires appropriation bills (other than those for the ordinary expenses of the three departments of the State of Arkansas) to "be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject."

Article 5, section 30 states in full:

Except as provided in Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 31, the general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expense of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the State; all other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.

This constitutional provision is the basis for the so-called "unity of subject" rule, which generally prohibits combinations of unrelated provisions in an appropriations bill. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the requirement in this clause is met "so long as the different parts of the act relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title." First Nat. Bank of Stuttgart v. Clinton, 304 Ark. 411, 802 S.W.2d 928 (1991). The Court has held that in order to comply with the provisions of Article 5, § 30, the various sections of an appropriations bill must "accomplish a purpose of one design." Clinton v. Taylor, 284 Ark. 238, 240, 681 S.W.2d 338, 339 (1984). According to the Court, Article 5, § 30 does not prohibit the inclusion of a substantive provision in an appropriation bill if "all [provisions] relate to but one subject." Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620, 626, 798 S.W.2d 918, 921 (1990). The Court has explained that the purpose of this rule is "to prevent the inclusion of separate and unrelated appropriations in a single bill, because that practice opens the door to the evils that have come to be known as logrolling and pork barrel legislation." Cottrell v. Faubus, 233 Ark. 721, 723, 347 S.W.2d 52, 53 (1961).

The Court has further explained the doctrine, stating that the constitutional test is met "... so long as the different parts of the act relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general object fairly indicated by its title; and that the unity of object must be looked for in the ultimate end, and not in the details or steps leading to the end; for it is within the province of the legislature to determine and provide what means will contribute to the accomplishment of the general object of an act, and it may include under its title every means convenient or necessary or that might tend to carry into effect the main design, without regard to the secondary objects thereby accomplished." Reid v. Jones, 261 Ark. 550, 552, 551 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1977), quoting State v. Sloan, 66 Ark. 575, 53 S.W. 37 (1899).

In applying this standard, the Court has approved bills as follows:

• Act 36 of 1989 (1st Extra. Session): Upholding bill providing funding for the Arkansas Development Finance Authority farm mediation program and repealing an exemption for commercial banks from the farm mediation program on the grounds that it had as a single general objective the funding of a farm mediation program. First Nat. Bank of Stuttgart, supra.
• Act 67 of 1989 (1st Extra. Session): Upholding bill providing funding for personal services and operating expenses of Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) and abolishing two agencies, while transferring their duties to AHTD because the bill concerns "the same subject, i.e., administration of the AHTD." Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc., 303 Ark. at 626, 798 S.W.2d at 921.
• Act 258 of 1957: Upholding bill providing severance tax credit to oil producers and establishing process for qualifying for tax, and other administrative functions because it relates to same subject: "stimulation of the flow of money into the search for new sources of oil in Arkansas." P & O Falco, Inc. v. Riley, 271 Ark. 562, 565, 610 S.W.2d 255, 256 (1980).
• Act 1010 of 1976: Upholding bill defraying expenses of the General Assembly for the 1973 session and the 1976 extended session because it relates to the same subject. Reid, supra.
• Act 465 of 1961: Upholding education appropriations bill containing twenty sections over eleven pages on the grounds that the entire bill was related to education. Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962).

Finally, in determining whether particular legislation will withstand scrutiny under Article 5, § 30, it must be remembered that statutes are presumed constitutional, with the burden of proving otherwise placed on the challenger. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999); ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997); Cozad v. State, 303 Ark. 137, 792 S.W.2d 606 (1990). If it is possible to construe a statute as constitutional, a court must do so. Jones v. State, 333 Ark. 208, 969 S.W.2d 618 (1998). Moreover, in construing a statute, a court will presume that the General Assembly, in enacting it, possessed the full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. McLeod v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 205 Ark. 225, 168 S.W.2d 413 (1943).

Sincerely,

Leslie Rutledge
Attorney General