Can a school employee with a concealed-carry license leave a handgun in a locked car parked at the school even if the superintendent objects?

Plain-English summary

State Representative Karilyn Brown asked whether Act 1078 of 2015 (which amended several Arkansas weapons statutes) allowed a school employee with a concealed-carry license to keep a handgun in a locked car parked at the school, even if the superintendent objected.

Attorney General Leslie Rutledge gave a long, careful analysis. Her summary answer: under Act 1078 and the statutes it amended, a person with a concealed-carry license who is on school grounds for a legitimate reason (a parent picking up a child, for example) can leave a concealed handgun in a locked and unattended car in a designated school parking lot, as long as the parking lot is not being used for a school event and the handgun is hidden from view. Act 1078 and the related amendments prevent a school, school board, or superintendent from prohibiting that conduct for members of the general public who are properly on school grounds. The AG could not give a definitive answer about whether a district's personnel policy might lawfully restrict that conduct by school employees, because the request did not give her enough information to evaluate any specific policy.

The AG also noted (rare candor) that the relevant statutes were ambiguously drafted and that the legislature should consider clarifying them.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

How the AG read Act 1078 and the underlying statutes

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-119 (criminal statute). Makes it a Class D felony to possess a firearm "upon the developed property of a public or private school, K-12." Act 1078 added an exception (subsection (e)(12)(A)) for a person with a concealed-carry license who is carrying the handgun in a motor vehicle or has left it in a locked and unattended motor vehicle in a publicly owned and maintained parking lot. "Parking lot" was defined to include "a designated area or structure or part of a structure intended for the parking of motor vehicles or a designated drop-off zone for children at a school." The plain language of that exception decriminalized the conduct.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306 (concealed-carry licensing law's "prohibited places"). Subsection (14)(A) says no concealed-carry license authorizes a person to carry a concealed handgun "into ... [a] school, college, community college, or university campus building or event." Act 1078 added a parking-lot exception in (14)(B)(iv), but the exception list mentioned only colleges, community colleges, and universities, omitting "school."

The AG read this two ways and reached the same answer either way. First, the prohibition in (14)(A) was about carrying "into" a building or event, not "onto" the grounds. School parking lots are not buildings or events, so the prohibition did not reach them in the first place. Second, even if (14)(A) were read more broadly, the omission of "school" from the parking-lot exception was most likely a drafting error. Reading the two amended statutes together as Act 1078 intended (and observing the cross-reference between them), the legislature must have meant to decriminalize the parking-lot conduct under both the criminal statute and the licensing statute. Otherwise a licensee who left a handgun in his locked car would be decriminalized under § 5-73-119 but still subject to license revocation under § 5-73-306, which is absurd.

Posting signs. Act 1078 also disallowed property owners from posting "no concealed carry" signs to override the parking-lot exception. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(19)(B)(ii). School parking lots fell within that protection.

Why schools cannot override the parking-lot exception for the general public

A school board has broad policy authority but cannot enact a policy contrary to law (Springdale Board of Education v. Bowman, 294 Ark. 66 (1987)). A superintendent has only the authority to implement board policy, not to make it. A district policy that purported to prohibit parents or other members of the public who were lawfully on school grounds from doing what Act 1078 permits would be contrary to law and unenforceable. The opinion stresses that schools can still order any specific person off the grounds for disturbing the school (and prosecute trespass under Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-606), but cannot enact a blanket policy that contradicts Act 1078.

Why the employee question was left open

For employees, the analysis becomes a personnel-policy question. A school board has authority to set personnel policies under Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-205, subject to consultation with a personnel-policies committee (or, in some districts, a recognized teachers' organization). Personnel policies are incorporated as terms of the contracts of licensed personnel. The AG noted that it was "conceivable" a district's personnel policy could address the issue of employees leaving handguns in vehicles in school parking lots, but she had no information about whether any specific policy existed for the district at issue or what it said. Without that, she could not say whether such a policy would be enforceable. The phrase "objections of the superintendent" was too vague: a superintendent on his own could not impose such a restriction, but a properly adopted board policy might.

What the opinion did not bless

The AG explicitly noted she did not "encourage" the practice and that schools retain the power to exclude persons or vehicles that do not have a legitimate reason to be on school grounds. She also emphasized that nothing in Act 1078 made it permissible to carry a firearm (concealed or open) onto school grounds generally. The parking-lot exception is narrow.

Common questions

Could a superintendent unilaterally bar a teacher from keeping a licensed handgun in a locked car?
The opinion implies not. A superintendent does not have independent rulemaking authority over personnel terms. The board would need to adopt a policy through the proper process. Whether such a board policy would be enforceable as applied to school employees the AG declined to decide.

Does the parking-lot exception apply when there is a school event in the parking lot?
No. The opinion repeatedly says the parking lot must not be in use for a school event for the exception to apply.

Was the legislature's omission of "school" from the § 5-73-306 parking-lot exception intentional?
The AG thought it was probably a drafting error. Arkansas courts will sometimes supply an obvious missing word when needed to carry out manifest legislative intent, but that doctrine is narrowly applied. The AG acknowledged she could not predict with certainty how a court would resolve it, which is part of why she urged legislative clarification.

What is the relationship between this opinion and Opinion 2015-120?
Opinion 2015-120 (issued the same day to Representative Michelle Gray) asked essentially the same question. The AG simply enclosed a copy of this opinion as her answer.

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2015-099
January 21, 2016
STATE OF ARKANSAS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
The Honorable Karilyn Brown
State Representative
P. O. Box 6677
Sherwood, AR 72124-6677
Dear Representative Brown:
You have requested my opinion on the following question concerning Act 1078 of 2015, which amended several statutes that address the carrying of firearms:

Is it permissible for a school employee who possesses a concealed carry license to keep a handgun in his or her locked vehicle while the vehicle is parked in a designated parking lot on the school's property, even over the objections of the school district superintendent?

Because you have asked specifically about people with concealed-carry licenses, I confine my answer to those individuals.

RESPONSE

Your question requires a close analysis of Act 1078 and several provisions of law amended by that Act. I have undertaken such an analysis and explain my opinion below. However, at the threshold, I wish to make clear that I do not write the laws and I am not empowered to re-write them. My duty related to Attorney General Opinions is confined to offering an accurate and dispassionate legal interpretation of the laws passed by the General Assembly. Candor and transparency require me to concede that there are ambiguities in the relevant statutory text that make interpretation difficult here. I believe that additional legislative clarification is warranted to remove the ambiguities in the relevant statutory text and make clearer the meaning of Act 1078 in this context. All Arkansans, including law enforcement, would benefit from such legislative clarification.

In general, a person may not bring a firearm onto public or private school property. However, under Act 1078 and the statutes amended by the Act, a person with a concealed-carry license who is on school grounds for a legitimate reason, for example, a father picking up his son from school, may leave his concealed handgun in his locked and unattended car in a designated parking lot of a public school (so long as the parking lot is not being used for a school event and the handgun is hidden from public view). I do not encourage this practice. And I want to emphasize that schools have the power to prohibit any person (or vehicle) from entering or remaining on school property if the person or vehicle does not have a legitimate reason for being there.

I have not been provided enough information to answer your question as it relates to a school employee. The phrase "objections of the school district superintendent" is too vague to serve as the basis for an extended analysis of whether and how a school district might properly prohibit, limit, or regulate conduct of its employees in ways that would violate Act 1078 if applied to non-employees, for example, a parent of a child attending the school. Assuming that all applicable procedures have been followed, it is conceivable that a school's personnel policies may address the permissibility of an employee leaving a licensed concealed handgun in a locked car in a designated school parking lot. But I have no information to suggest that is the case with regard to the district at issue under your question; and I cannot, absent more specific information, analyze whether such policy would be consistent with the law.

ANALYSIS OF ACT 1078

In addressing the relevant statutory provisions, I am guided by standard rules of statutory interpretation. The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary meaning and usually accepted meaning in common language. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. The language under discussion must be read in light of its context. When construing a statute, each section is to be read in light of every other section. In addition, the courts will not interpret a statute in a way that yields an absurd result.

1. Act 1078 and Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-119

Act 1078 of 2015 amended several criminal statutes relating to the possession of weapons and several statutes that are part of the concealed handgun licensing law to address concealed handguns in motor vehicles. One of the amended criminal statutes, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-119, makes it a crime to possess a firearm "[u]pon the developed property of a public or private school, K-12." Section 5-73-119 identifies a number of circumstances, however, under which it is "permissible to carry a handgun under this section." Act 1078 amended the list of exceptions to include the following:

The person has a license to carry a concealed handgun under § 5-73-301 et seq. and is carrying a concealed handgun in his or her motor vehicle or has left the concealed handgun in his or her locked and unattended motor vehicle in a publicly owned and maintained parking lot.

"Parking lot" for this purpose means "a designated area or structure or part of a structure intended for the parking of motor vehicles or a designated drop-off zone for children at a school."

The plain language of Act 1078's amendment to section 5-73-119(e)(12)(a) clearly decriminalized the act of a person with a concealed-carry license keeping a handgun concealed in his locked and unattended vehicle in a designated parking lot on the school's property. Moreover, by cross-referencing the concealed handgun law (section 5-73-301 et seq.), which was simultaneously amended by Act 1078, section 5-73-119(e)(12)(A) also affirmatively expressed the General Assembly's understanding that the concealed handgun law, as amended, allows a concealed-carry licensee to leave a concealed handgun in his locked and unattended motor vehicle (hidden from public view) in a designated parking lot on the school's property.

2. Act 1078 and Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306

The concealed handgun law (section 5-73-301 et seq.) creates a licensing regime for persons who desire to carry a concealed handgun. One section of the law, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306, specifies certain locations where concealed-carry licensees cannot carry their handguns ("prohibited places"). If a licensee violates the concealed handgun law by bringing a concealed handgun into a prohibited place, his concealed-carry license will be immediately subject to revocation for failure to comply with the concealed-carry licensing rules.

As relevant here, section 5-73-306 states: "No license to carry a concealed handgun issued pursuant to this subchapter authorizes any person to carry a concealed handgun into: ... (14)(A) A school, college, community college, or university campus building or event."

There are several places specified by statute to which the prohibitions do not apply. Act 1078 amended the list of non-prohibited places to include the following: "[S]ubdivision (14)(A) of this section does not apply to: ... (iv) A publicly owned and maintained parking lot of a college, community college, or university if the licensee is carrying a concealed handgun in his or her motor vehicle or has left the concealed handgun in his or her locked and unattended motor vehicle."

"Parking lot" for this purpose is defined the same as under section 5-73-119: "an area, structure, or part of a structure designated for the parking of motor vehicles or a designated drop-off zone for children at a school."

The operative question is whether the concealed handgun law prohibits a person with a concealed-carry license from keeping a handgun concealed in his locked and unattended vehicle in a designated parking lot on the school's property. If the concealed handgun law prohibits this conduct, then of course a school employee could not do it. If the concealed handgun law allows it, a separate analysis will be required to determine whether the superintendent can prohibit a school employee from performing conduct which a general member of the public would be allowed to do.

Section 5-73-306(14)(A) prohibits a person with a concealed-carry license from carrying a concealed handgun "into ... [a] school, college, community college, or university campus building or event." The statutory language of the parking lot exception in this statute (which would negate the prohibition) omits the word "school." In my opinion, the word "building or event" modifies each of the listed educational institutions. That understanding is the best way to make sense of the prohibition's use of the word "into" as opposed to "onto." In short, this is a prohibition concerning bringing a concealed weapon into a school building or into a school event, not a general prohibition against bringing a concealed handgun onto school grounds. The General Assembly knows how to include public grounds in a prohibition if it wants to do so. Indeed, the General Assembly did so in the very same statute. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-72-306(3)(A) ("No license to carry a handgun issued pursuant to this subchapter authorizes any person to carry a concealed handgun into ... [a]ny building of the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department or onto the grounds adjacent to any building of the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the concealed handgun law does not prohibit a concealed-carry licensee from leaving a concealed handgun in his locked and unattended car on school property. This lack of prohibition under the concealed handgun law means the concealed-carry licensee is permitted to engage in such conduct unless prohibited by some other statute. And, given what I have already said about the relevant criminal laws above in section 1, it is clear that this conduct is permitted.

Even assuming arguendo, the prohibition in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-72-306(14)(A) applied as a general prohibition to all school, college, community college, and university grounds, the scope of the parking lot exception in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(14)(B)(iv) is ambiguous. That is because, while the parking lot exception omits the word "school," the applicable definition of parking lot in the concealed handgun law clearly includes and anticipates a K-12 school. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-301(6). Given this ambiguity, it is appropriate to use legislative intent, specifically the purpose and objective of the Act, to guide our interpretation of the statute.

In my opinion, one intended purpose and objective of Act 1078 was to allow a concealed-carry licensee to leave his concealed handgun in his locked and unattended car in a publicly owned parking lot (whether at a school, college, university, or elsewhere) without fear of either prosecution or license revocation. My opinion is bolstered by the fact that Act 1078 simultaneously amended both the concealed handgun law and the general criminal prohibition on possessing a firearm on school grounds, and Act 1078's amendment to the criminal statutes specifically and expressly cross-referenced the concealed handgun law. As explained above, the only logical way to read section 5-73-119(e)(12)(A)'s cross reference of the concealed handgun law is that the General Assembly believed the amendments it made to the concealed handgun law allows a concealed-carry licensee to leave a concealed handgun in his locked and unattended motor vehicle in a designated parking lot on school property. Statutes on the same subject matter are to be read consistently and in harmony with each other, if possible. This rule of statutory construction is particularly applicable where, as here, the exact same act amends both statutes simultaneously and specifically cross-references one statute in the amended section of the other.

Illogical results could flow from interpreting the concealed handgun law to prohibit the conduct that the criminal statute allows. For example, while a person who has a concealed-carry license will not violate the criminal statute (section 5-73-119) if he leaves the concealed handgun in the vehicle in a school district parking lot, his concealed-carry license will be immediately subject to revocation for failure to comply with the concealed-carry licensing rules. And the next time he left his concealed handgun in a locked vehicle in a school parking lot he would be subject to criminal penalties (since he would no longer have a concealed-carry license). In short, it seems to be an illogical result to decriminalize the act of leaving the licensed concealed handgun in a school parking lot, and at the same time subject the licensee to revocation of his or her concealed-handgun license for this same conduct.

A reading of Act 1078 as a whole suggests that the General Assembly intended to avoid such results by amending the criminal statutes and the concealed handgun law coextensively so that a concealed-carry licensee could carry his concealed handgun into what would otherwise be a prohibited location without fear of either prosecution or license revocation. Accordingly, even if the prohibition in section 5-72-306(14)(A) applies to all school grounds, as opposed to just school buildings and events, I read the parking lot exception to include school parking lots such that the exception in the criminal law and the concealed handgun law would be coextensive.

The question remains, however, why the Legislature omitted the word "school" from the parking lot exception in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-306(14)(B)(iv). The most likely answer is that the omission of the word "school" was a drafting error. Drafting errors can be disregarded in order to carry out the legislative intent. I cannot predict with certainty whether the Court would say the absence of the word "school" in section 5-73-306(14)(B)(iv) constitutes one of these instances of an obvious omission. That is what makes the proper interpretation of the parking lot exception in section 5-73-306(14)(B)(iv) an exceedingly difficult and close call.

It is therefore my opinion that Act 1078 of 2015 and the statutes amended by the Act allow a person with a concealed-carry license to leave his concealed handgun in a locked, unattended car in a designated parking lot of a public school (so long as the parking lot is not being used for a school event and the handgun is hidden from public view). It is my further opinion that the Act and the statutes amended by the Act prevent a school, a school board, or a superintendent from prohibiting this conduct by a member of the general public, such as parents of school attendees, who are otherwise properly on school grounds. As the school district's chief executive officer, a school superintendent is charged only with the authority to implement board policy, not to pronounce it. And while a school board has broad authority with regard to policy matters, it cannot enact a policy that is contrary to law. A policy that purported to prohibit parents of school children or other members of the public legitimately on school grounds from engaging in conduct allowed by Act 1078 and the statutes amended thereby would, in my opinion, be contrary to law and unenforceable. Indeed, Act 1078 went to great lengths to make sure owners and others in control of property could not find a way around the parking lot exception. For example, while the concealed-handgun law generally allows owners and controllers of property to post signs prohibiting concealed-carry licensees from carrying on their property, Act 1078 specifically disallowed such posting in publicly owned and maintained parking lots, which include school parking lots.

I lack sufficient information, however, to answer your question as it relates to a school employee. The phrase "objections of the school district superintendent" is too vague to serve as the basis for an extended analysis of whether and how a school district might properly prohibit, limit, or regulate conduct of its employees in ways that would violate Act 1078 if applied to the general public. Generally, a school superintendent is charged with overseeing the day-to-day operations of the district, and has no authority, independent of the school board, to regulate the terms and conditions of a teacher's employment.

With regard to personnel matters in particular, the superintendent may recommend to the board a proposal to change or enact a personnel policy. However, the board has the final authority and duty to act on any personnel proposal. Thus only the board can ultimately approve the terms of personnel policy. Assuming that all applicable procedures have been followed, it is conceivable that a school's personnel policies may address the permissibility of an employee leaving a licensed concealed handgun in a locked car in a designated school parking lot. But I have no information to suggest that is the case with regard to the district at issue under your question; and I cannot, absent more specific information, analyze whether such policy would be consistent with the law.

Sincerely,
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General