When does the 30-day clock start for an Arkansas teacher to sign and return a teaching contract under the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Bill Sample asked the AG to construe A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(c)(1), which says "[n]o teacher shall be required to sign and return a contract for the next school year any sooner than thirty (30) days after the contract is issued to the teacher." The question: does "issued" mean physically delivered, or does it mean made available with notice?

AG Dustin McDaniel held that "issued" means made reasonably available with notice, not physically delivered. The 30-day clock starts when the district informs the teacher (e.g., by email) that the contract is available; it does not have to wait until the teacher walks into the superintendent's office and picks it up.

The reasoning rests on three pillars:

1. Dictionary meaning. "Issued" means "supply or distribute" (New Oxford American Dictionary) or "circulate or distribute in an official capacity" (American Heritage Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary). It does not mean "received" or "delivered" in ordinary usage. Garrett v. McDonagh and Arkansas Tobacco Control Board v. Santa Fe approve resort to dictionary definitions when the legislature leaves a term undefined.

2. Statutory context (Green v. Mills). Other provisions of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act use precise delivery language when they mean it. A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(b)(2)(A) requires a "notice of nonrenewal" to be "delivered in person to the teacher or mailed by registered or certified mail to the teacher at the teacher's residence address." Similar language appears in §§ 6-17-1507 (termination) and -1508 (suspension), and § 6-17-1509(a), (b) measures the request-for-hearing window from when the notice "is received by the teacher." The General Assembly knows how to require actual receipt when it wants to. Its choice not to in § 6-17-1506(c)(1), and instead to use the broader "issued," is meaningful.

3. Persuasive authority. Zimmer v. Susquehanna County Planning Commission (a Pennsylvania case) construed an analogous "issued" provision in a zoning appeal statute as meaning sent out or mailed, not received or delivered.

The AG drew one important boundary. Once the district has "issued" the contract by notifying the teacher of availability, the contract must still be reasonably available under the particular circumstances. If the district claims it is available but in fact the teacher cannot get to it, the timing of effective issuance is a question of fact. The opinion gives an example: an email announcement starts the clock as long as the contract is reasonably available to the teacher. If, however, the superintendent's office is locked or otherwise inaccessible, the analysis would be different.

The AG also flagged a procedural detail not changed by the opinion. The statute requires the poll worker (in election law) and the custodian (in personnel records) to compare specific information at specific points. The same is true of the TFDA's other provisions. The teacher can be required to come into the office and sign without prior review, but the 30-day window protects the teacher from being rushed. As long as the district waits 30 days after notification before requiring a signed contract back, the teacher has time to review.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What's the practical effect for school districts at the time of this opinion?
A district can email a teacher on, say, May 1, telling the teacher the next-year contract is in the superintendent's office for review and signature. May 1 starts the 30-day clock. The district can require the contract be signed and returned by June 1.

What if the teacher claims they didn't see the email?
The "reasonably available" qualifier matters. If the teacher is on documented medical leave and not checking email, or if the district has reason to know the teacher isn't receiving emails, the actual availability assessment shifts. The AG's opinion is general; specific edge cases are factual.

Can a teacher demand a copy be delivered?
Not under the contract-signing provision of § 6-17-1506(c)(1). Different rules apply to notices of nonrenewal, termination, or suspension, which explicitly require personal delivery or registered/certified mail. The contract-signing window uses a more flexible standard.

Why did the legislature use a different word for contract-signing notices versus disciplinary notices?
The disciplinary notices carry stronger procedural protections for the teacher. Termination and nonrenewal involve adverse action; the legislature understandably required formal delivery so the teacher could not be deprived of statutory rights through a missed notice. A contract offer is the opposite: a benefit being offered to the teacher. The 30-day window protects the teacher from being rushed, but the law does not require actual delivery to start the clock.

What if the district's email lists the wrong address for the contract pickup location, or the office is closed?
That goes to whether the contract is "reasonably available." A district that intentionally or carelessly misdirects the teacher cannot claim to have issued the contract. A district that gives accurate notice but the teacher chooses not to act can.

Does this rule apply to digital contracts as well as paper?
The opinion does not address digital contracts directly, but its logic does. If the district notifies the teacher that the contract is available at a specified web portal, that should "issue" the contract under § 6-17-1506(c)(1) as long as the portal is reasonably accessible to the teacher.

Background and statutory framework

The Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983, codified at A.C.A. §§ 6-17-1501 et seq., structures the contract, nonrenewal, suspension, and termination process for licensed public school teachers in Arkansas. § 6-17-1506(c)(1) (Repl. 2014) protects teachers from being rushed into signing contracts.

Other TFDA provisions use precise delivery language: § 6-17-1506(b)(2)(A) (notice of nonrenewal); § 6-17-1507 (termination); § 6-17-1508 (suspension); § 6-17-1509(a), (b) (30-day hearing-request window keyed to receipt). The contrast supports the AG's reading that the legislature deliberately chose "issued" rather than "delivered" or "received" in § 6-17-1506(c)(1).

The State Board of Education has training documents directing schools on contract issuance procedures (cited in the opinion). Administrative interpretations are entitled to substantial deference (the AG's frequent reliance on this point in adjacent opinions).

Citations

• A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(b)(2)(A) (delivery for nonrenewal notice)
• A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(c)(1) (Repl. 2014) (30-day contract signing window)
• A.C.A. § 6-17-1507 (Repl. 2014) (termination)
• A.C.A. § 6-17-1508 (Repl. 2014) (suspension)
• A.C.A. § 6-17-1509(a), (b) (Repl. 2014) (hearing-request window keyed to receipt)
• Garrett v. McDonagh, 303 Ark. 348, 796 S.W.2d 582 (1990) (undefined terms get ordinary meaning)
• Arkansas Tobacco Control Board v. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, 360 Ark. 32, 39, 199 S.W.3d 656 (2004) (dictionaries as construction aid)
• Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 4 S.W.3d 493 (1999) (statute construed as a whole)
• Zimmer v. Susquehanna County Planning Commission, 14 Pa. Commw. 435, 322 A.2d 420 (1974) (persuasive construction of "issued")
• Op. Att'y Gen. 2007-281 (AG cannot supply missing statutory definition)

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2014-062
July 11, 2014

The Honorable Bill Sample
State Senator
2340 North Highway 7
Hot Springs, Arkansas 71909

Dear Senator Sample:

You have requested my opinion on several questions concerning a particular provision of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983, as amended ("TFDA"). Your questions pertain to A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(c)(1) (Repl. 2014), which states that "[n]o teacher shall be required to sign and return a contract for the next school year any sooner than thirty (30) days after the contract is issued to the teacher." You ask the following specific questions regarding this subsection:

1. Does the term "issued" mean that the school district must provide a copy of the contract to the teacher?

2. Is it permissible for the school district to retain the contract in the superintendent's office and require the teacher to visit the superintendent's office and sign the contract without any opportunity for the teacher to review the contract beforehand?

3. Would the 30-day period to sign and return the contract granted in the [TFDA] begin on the day the contract availability is announced via e-mail or on the day that the contract was physically or digitally provided to the teacher?

RESPONSE

These questions all focus on A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(c)(1)'s reference to the contract being "issued to the teacher," the concern apparently being whether the 30-day period for signing and returning the contract begins to run upon the teacher's actual receipt of the contract or alternatively upon the school district's providing the teacher with notice of the contract's availability. In my opinion, the latter alternative is the proper reading of this provision. That is, for the reasons discussed below, it is my opinion that the contract is "issued" to the teacher for purposes of subsection -1506(c)(1) when the district makes it reasonably available to the teacher. As to your particular questions, therefore, the answer to your first question is "no," in my opinion, if by "must provide a copy" you mean the district must deliver the contract to the teacher so that the teacher has actually received it in order for the time period under the statute to begin to run. Although the premises of your second question are somewhat unclear, I assume the district in this scenario tells the teacher the contract is in the superintendent's office and does not actually deliver the contract to the teacher. In my opinion, the district will have "issued" the contract, for purposes of subsection -1506(c)(1), when it notified the teacher that the contract is available in the superintendent's office. It is my opinion in response to your third question that the 30-day period will begin to run from the date of the email as long as the contract is reasonably available to the teacher under the particular circumstances.

Question 1 - Does the term "issued" mean that the school district must provide a copy of the contract to the teacher?

Given its context, this question appears to reflect a concern that the 30-day period under A.C.A. § 6-17-1506(c)(1) for a teacher to sign and return a contract may not begin to run until the teacher has actually received the contract. In my opinion, such a concern is misplaced.

The term "issued" as used in subsection -1506(c)(1) is not defined, and I of course cannot supply a definition of a term that the General Assembly has left undefined. But under established rules of statutory construction, it will always be presumed in the absence of a controlling definition that the legislature intended to use words in their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. And the Arkansas Supreme Court has sometimes resorted to dictionary definitions in order to determine the meaning of a word or phrase. In this regard, the New Oxford American Dictionary defines the verb "issued" as "supply or distribute (something)." The American Heritage Dictionary somewhat similarly defines the transitive verb "issue" as "circulate or distribute in an official capacity ...." Black's Law Dictionary defines "issue" in relevant part as "[t]o send out or distribute officially".

While these definitions, standing alone, are not necessarily dispositive of the question you have raised concerning subsection 6-17-1506(c)(1), they are instructive in that they illustrate that the word "issued" is not commonly defined to mean "received" or "delivered." The common definitions take on further significance, moreover, when they are considered along with another rule of statutory construction. It is well-established that when construing a specific portion of a statute, we must interpret the portion in the context of the statute as a whole. A reading of A.C.A. § 6-17-1506 as a whole reveals that the General Assembly has been clear in specifying when personal delivery is required under the TFDA. Subsection -1506(b) provides as follows regarding a "notice of nonrenewal":

A notice of nonrenewal shall be delivered in person to the teacher or mailed by registered or certified mail to the teacher at the teacher's residence address as reflected in the teacher's personnel file.

This same "notice" procedure applies in connection with a teacher's recommended termination or suspension. In both cases, notice must be "delivered in person to the teacher or sent by registered or certified mail to the teacher at the teacher's residence address as reflected in the teacher's personnel file." Additionally, and of particular significance in construing the 30-day period under subsection 6-17-1506(c)(1), pursuant to A.C.A. § 6-17-1509, "a teacher who receives a notice of recommended termination or nonrenewal" may request a hearing by filing a written request with the school board "within thirty (30) calendar days after the written notice of proposed termination or nonrenewal is received by the teacher."

Had the legislature intended for the 30-day period under subsection 6-17-1506(c)(1) to run from the time the teacher actually receives the contract, it could easily have so stated as it did in these other TFDA provisions.

Based on a reading of both section 6-17-1506 and the TFDA as a whole, therefore, I conclude that, if faced with the question, our court would hold that the word "issued" under -1506(c)(1) means supplied, distributed, or sent out, and cannot be properly interpreted as "received" or "delivered." Thus, the answer to your first question is "no," in my opinion, to the extent the question suggests the district must deliver the contract to the teacher so that the teacher has actually received it in order for the time period under -1506(c)(1) to begin to run.

My conclusion is reinforced by the prospect of our court looking to other jurisdictions for guidance in this instance, given the absence of controlling precedent on the question. According to my research, a state appellate court in at least one other jurisdiction has interpreted the word "issued" in the manner set out above. In Zimmer v. Susquehanna County Planning Commission, 14 Pa. Commw. 435, 322 A.2d 420 (1974), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed the question of an untimely filing of a zoning appeal under a statute requiring that appeals to court are to be taken "by appeal filed within thirty days after notice of the decision is issued." After noting the common definition of "issued," the court held that when the legislature used this word, it intended it to mean "sent out" or "mailed" rather than "received":

Understanding the common usage of the word "issued" to be "sent forth," "emitted," or "put into circulation," it would appear that the Legislature intended that the event from which the time for appeal is to be measured is the date that notice of the Planning Commission was sent forth or mailed to the appellants. Does the context of the Code allow the word "issued" to be properly interpreted as "received" or "delivered" rather than "sent out"? We think not.... Had the Legislature intended to measure the appeal period from the event of "receipt" or "delivery" of the notice of the decision, as argued by appellants, it could have employed the language "after notice of the decision is received" or "delivered" in Section 1006, rather than the word "issued."

Question 2 - Is it permissible for the school district to retain the contract in the superintendent's office and require the teacher to visit the superintendent's office and sign the contract without any opportunity for the teacher to review the contract beforehand?

I assume the district in this scenario tells the teacher the contract is in the superintendent's office and does not actually deliver the contract to the teacher. For the reasons explained above, there is no requirement that the contract be delivered to the teacher. Rather, subsection 6-17-1506(c)(1) refers to the contract being "issued" to the teacher; and in my opinion, the district issued the contract to the teacher for purposes of -1506(c)(1) when it notified the teacher that the contract is available in the superintendent's office.

Question 3 - Would the 30-day period to sign and return the contract granted in the [TFDA] begin on the day the contract availability is announced via e-mail or on the day that the contract was physically or digitally provided to the teacher?

A definitive answer to this question may depend upon what is meant by the contract's "availability." While there is no requirement that the contract be delivered to the teacher, physically or otherwise, the contract must in my opinion be reasonably available to the teacher. With regard, therefore, to an announcement via email, it is my opinion that the 30-day period under the statute will begin to run from the date of the email as long as the contract is reasonably available to the teacher under the particular circumstances.

Deputy Attorney General Elisabeth A. Walker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DM/EAW:cyh