Should Jonesboro and Monette get a 60/40 or 50/50 share of Craighead County road tax, and are the underlying 1921 and 1925 acts still constitutional?

Plain-English summary

Senator John Cooper asked whether Jonesboro and Monette should receive half or three-fifths of county road tax collected on property within their city limits. The general law divides these receipts equally between a county and city unless a special act provides another division. Act 8 of 1925 and Act 431 of 1921 give Jonesboro and Monette, respectively, three-fifths.

The AG concluded that neither act was unconstitutional as local or special legislation. At the time they were enacted, the Arkansas Constitution prohibited only certain specified kinds of local or special laws, and these tax-division acts did not fall in those categories. Amendment 14 later barred the legislature from passing new local or special acts, but the AG read it as leaving preexisting acts in place unless repealed.

The conclusion was conditional: assuming Acts 8 and 431 remained in effect, Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths of in-city road-tax collections. The opinion did not decide any other constitutional challenge; the requester identified no constitutional grounds, and the AG addressed local and special legislation because similar acts had been challenged on that basis.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Check whether the acts remain in force and whether later law affects road-tax distributions before applying its conclusion.

Common questions

What is the general division of county road tax collected inside city limits?
The opinion says the county and city share it equally unless a special act sets another division.

What did the two special acts provide?
Act 8 of 1925 gave Jonesboro three-fifths of in-city collections; Act 431 of 1921 did the same for Monette, according to the acts supplied with the request.

Did Amendment 14 invalidate older special acts?
The AG said no. It restricts future local or special acts and expressly permits repeal of existing ones, but does not itself repeal them.

Did the AG decide every possible constitutional issue?
No. He addressed the local-or-special-legislation question he inferred from the request. His conclusion about the shares also assumed the acts were still in effect.

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

STATE OF ARKANSAS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DUSTIN McDANIEL

Opinion No. 2014-019

March 18, 2014

The Honorable John Cooper
State Senator
62 CR 396
Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401

Dear Senator Cooper:

This is my opinion on your questions about dividing county road tax revenues between Craighead County and the City of Jonesboro, and between Craighead County and the City of Monette.

The law provides that county road tax money collected on property within city limits is divided equally between the county and the city unless a special act dictates some other division.

You included with your request copies of Act 8 of 1925 and Act 431 of 1921, which provide for Jonesboro and Monette, respectively, to receive three-fifths of in-city collections.

You ask whether Acts 8 and 431 are constitutional and whether Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths, or half.

RESPONSE

In my opinion, neither Act 8 nor Act 431 is unconstitutional local or special legislation, and, assuming the Acts are still in effect, Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths of the county road taxes collected on property within city limits.

You suggest no constitutional grounds on which the Acts might be questioned. But similar acts have been successfully challenged as constitutionally-prohibited local or special legislation and I assume your question is directed to that issue.

When Acts 8 and 431 were enacted in 1925 and 1921, the constitution prohibited only those local and special laws that took a specified action, namely "changing the venue in criminal cases; changing the names of persons, or adopting or legitimating children; granting divorces; vacating roads, streets or alleys;" or "conferring corporate powers." In my opinion, the Acts do not take any such action and so are not unconstitutional under either of the quoted provisions.

My opinion is supported by a 1912 Supreme Court case upholding a 1911 act giving Texarkana three-fifths of in-city collections. The Court acknowledged that the act was "in the nature of special legislation" but noted that the constitution did not prohibit all such legislation and deferred to the Legislature's judgment that a special law was appropriate in the circumstances.

Amendment 14, adopted in 1926, provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act. This amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of local or special acts." The amendment restricts the General Assembly's power but does not purport to repeal local or special acts on the books in 1926 or require the General Assembly to do so. Under the amendment's second sentence, the General Assembly has implied discretion to repeal existing local and special acts or to let them stand. Amendment 14's adoption did not in my opinion affect the constitutionality of Act 8 or 431.

My opinion is supported by a post-Amendment 14 case wherein the county challenged acts favoring cities in the division of county road taxes and the Supreme Court twice noted without criticism the trial court's dismissal of a city defendant because the act giving it a favorable share predated Amendment 14.

I have concluded that the Acts are not unconstitutional. It is accordingly my opinion, assuming the Acts are still in effect, that Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths of the county road taxes collected on property within city limits. The law otherwise requiring an equal division allows exceptions by "special act," including, in my view, Acts 8 and 431.

Assistant Attorney General J. M. Barker prepared this opinion, which I approve.

Sincerely,

DUSTIN McDANIEL
Attorney General

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