Why did Arkansas reject the ballot wording for a proposed Amendment 68 abortion measure?

Plain-English summary

The Arkansas Attorney General rejected the proposed popular name and ballot title for an amendment that would revise Amendment 68 and direct the state to protect unborn life from conception until birth. The AG said ambiguities in the amendment itself made it impossible to "fairly or completely summarize" the proposal for voters.

The opinion stressed that certification review did not address the proposal's merits. Its task under A.C.A. § 7-9-107 was to determine whether the ballot wording honestly, intelligibly, and fairly described the proposed change.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant in 2013

Ballot-measure sponsors

The sponsor could not circulate the proposal under the submitted popular name and ballot title. The AG invited a redesigned measure and revised ballot wording after the ambiguities were resolved.

Voters and election officials

The opinion treated clarity about changes to existing law as essential. It found that the submitted language did not adequately explain what deleting the references to state policy and the Federal Constitution would accomplish.

Advocacy groups and constitutional lawyers

The rejection rested on drafting defects, not an endorsement or rejection of the proposal's policy. The opinion also identified uncertainty about how the proposal related to federal law, Amendment 68's public-funding exception, contraceptives, in-vitro fertilization, and the undefined timing of conception.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG reject the proposal because he opposed its abortion policy? A: No. The opinion expressly said certification or rejection did not reflect the AG's view of the proposal's merits.

Q: Why could the AG not rewrite and certify the ballot title? A: The proposed amendment itself was ambiguous, so the AG said he could not fairly summarize its effects without clarification from the sponsor.

Q: What were the main drafting problems?
A: The opinion identified uncertainty about the measure's legal effect, its relationship to federal constitutional limits, its interaction with Amendment 68, and its treatment of contraceptives and in-vitro fertilization.

Background and statutory framework

The proposal would replace Amendment 68's statement of public policy with a directive that Arkansas protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth. The proposed ballot title described the measure as banning abortion except for life-saving medical treatment, not affecting contraceptive use, and not affecting in-vitro fertilization that did not cause the death of an unborn child.

Under A.C.A. § 7-9-107, the Attorney General could certify the submitted wording, substitute suitable wording when possible, or reject a petition whose text could not be fairly summarized. The opinion cited Bradley v. Hall for the need to explain the change from existing law and discussed Roe v. Wade when addressing the proposal's claimed challenge to federal law.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• A.C.A. § 7-9-107 (Repl. 2011)
• A.C.A. § 7-9-107(b)
• A.C.A. § 7-9-107(c)

Cases:

• Roe v. Wade
• Bradley v. Hall

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

STATE OF ARKANSAS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dustin McDANIEL

Opinion No. 2013-065

July 16, 2013

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas

Post Office Box 101
Blytheville, Arkansas 72316

Dear Mr. Dunn:

This is in response to your request for certification, pursuant to A.C.A. § 7-9-107 (Repl. 2011), of the popular name and ballot title for a proposed constitutional amendment. You have previously submitted similar measures, which this office rejected due to ambiguities in the texts of your proposed amendments. See Ops. Att’y Gen. Nos. 2012-045, 2012-002 and 2011-163. You have made changes in the text of your proposal since your last submission and have now submitted the following proposed popular name and ballot title for my certification:

Popular Name

PROTECTING THE LIFE OF EVERY UNBORN CHILD

Ballot Title

An amendment to the Arkansas Constitution: This amendment will revise Amendment 68, Abortion, Section 2, Public Policy. The effect of this revision will be to change the existing public policy of Arkansas that “protect[s] the life of every unborn child from conception until birth” into law. This amendment will challenge federal law and court rulings. This amendment will ban abortion except when necessary as life-saving medical treatment. This amendment will not affect in-vitro fertilization that does not cause

323 CENTER STREET, SUITE 200 * LITTLE Rock, ARKANSAS 72201 TELEPHONE (501) 682-2007 * Fax (501) 682-8084 INTERNET WEBSITE * http://www.ag.state.ar.us/

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No, 2013-065
Page 2

the death of an unborn child. This amendment will not affect the use of contraceptives. This amendment will not require an appropriation of public funds.

The Attorney General is required, pursuant to A.C.A. § 7-9-107, to certify the popular name and ballot title of all proposed initiative and referendum acts or amendments before the petitions are circulated for signature, The law provides that the Attorney General may substitute and certify a more suitable and correct popular name and ballot title, if he can do so, or if the proposed popular name and ballot title are sufficiently misleading, may reject the entire petition. Neither certification nor rejection of a popular name and ballot title reflects my view of the merits of the proposal. This Office has been given no authority to consider the merits of any measure.

In this regard, A.C.A. § 7-9-107 neither requires nor authorizes this office to make legal determinations concerning the merits of the act or amendment, or concerning the likelihood that it will accomplish its stated objective. In addition, consistent with Arkansas Supreme Court precedent, unless the measure is “clearly contrary to law,” this office will not require that a measure’s proponents acknowledge in the ballot title any possible constitutional infirmities. As part of my review, however, I may address constitutional concerns for consideration by the measure’s proponents.

Consequently, this review has been limited primarily to a determination, pursuant to the guidelines that have been set forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court, discussed below, of whether the popular name and ballot title you have submitted accurately and impartially summarize the provisions of your proposed amendment.

The purpose of my review and certification is to ensure that the popular name and ballot title honestly, intelligibly, and fairly set forth the purpose of the proposed amendment or act.

' See Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 445, 29 S.W.3d 669, 675 (2000); Donovan v. Priest, 326 Ark. 353, 359, 931 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1996); Plugge v. MeCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 841 S.W.2d 139 (1992),

• See Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 466, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984),

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No, 2013-065
Page 3

The popular name is primarily a useful legislative device.’ It need not contain detailed information or include exceptions that might be required of a ballot title, but it must not be misleading or give partisan coloring to the merit of the proposal.’ The popular name is to be considered together with the ballot title in determining the ballot title’s sufficiency.”

The ballot title must include an impartial summary of the proposed amendment or act that will give the voter a fair understanding of the issues presented.° According to the court, if information omitted from the ballot title is an “essential fact which would give the voter serious ground for reflection, it must be disclosed.” At the same time, however, a ballot tithe must be brief and concise (see A.C.A. § 7-9- 107(b)); otherwise voters could run afoul of A.C.A. § 7-5-522’s five minute limit in voting booths when other voters are waiting in line. The ballot title is not required to be perfect, nor is it reasonable to expect the title to cover or anticipate every possible legal argument the proposed measure might evoke.” The title, however, must be free from any misleading tendency, whether by amplification, omission, or fallacy; it must not be tinged with partisan coloring.'° A ballot title must convey an intelligible idea of the scope and significance of a proposed change in the law.'! The ballot title must be intelligible, honest, and impartial.’

3 Pafford v. Hall, 217 Atk. 734, 739, 233 S.W.2d 72, 75 (1950).

4 E.g., Chaney v. Bryant, 259 Ark, 294, 297, 532 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1976). ; Moore v. Hall, 229 Ark, 411, 316 S.W.2d 207 (1958).

> May v. Daniels, 359 Ark. 100, 105, 194 S.W.3d 771, 776 (2004).

° Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 226, 604 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1980).
’ Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 285, 884 S,W.2d 938, 942 (1994).

• Id. at 288, 884 S.W.2d at 944,

” Id, 293, 884 S.W.2d at 946-47,

'9 Id, at 284, 884 S.W.2d at 942.

'' Christian Civic Action Committee v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 245, 884 S.W.2d 605, 607 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 4

Having analyzed your proposed amendment, as well as your proposed popular name and ballot title under the above precepts, it is my conclusion that I must reject your proposed popular name and ballot title due to ambiguities in the text of your proposed measure. Various additions or changes to your ballot title are, in my view, necessary in order to more fully and correctly summarize your proposal. I cannot, however, at this time, fairly or completely summarize the effect of your proposed measure to the electorate in a popular name or ballot title without the resolution of the ambiguities. I am therefore unable to substitute and certify a more suitable and correct popular name and ballot title pursuant to A.C.A. § 7-9- 107(b).

I refer to the following ambiguities:
In its current form, Amendment 68 provides as follows:
§ 1. Public funding.

No public funds will be used to pay for any abortion, except to save the mother’s life.

§ 2. Public policy.

The policy of Arkansas it to protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitution.

§ 3. Effect of amendment.

This amendment will not affect contraceptives or require an appropriation of public funds.

Your proposed measure, if adopted, would amend section 2 to read as follows:

'2 Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 489, 798 S.W.2d 71, 74 (1990).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 5

Protecting Life.

The State of Arkansas shall protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth.

This amendment is ambiguous in the following respects:

1, Your amendment of the current provision is ambiguous in that it is unclear what your measure accomplishes in striking two provisions from the current text of Section 2. The Amendment in its current form expressly declares it to be “[t]he policy of Arkansas . . . to protect the life of every unborn child” only to the extent “permitted by the Federal Constitution.” Your proposed amendment of Section 2 entails the following: (1) it strikes the express reference to “policy” and instead simply directs the state to “protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth”; and (2) it strikes the phrase “permitted by the Federal Constitution.” I will address in turn the ambiguities attending these two changes.

Deletion of the term “policy”

In Little Rock Family Planning Services vy. Dalton, a federal district court interpreted Section 2 in its current form as merely stating the policy basis underlying the restriction on public funding of abortion set forth in Section 1.'° Significantly, the court in Dalton based this conclusion not upon the mere appearance of the term “policy” in Section 2, but rather upon the fact that the substantive directive to “protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth” had no “force” qualifying as “independent” of the funding restriction set forth in Section 1.'4 Under the court’s analysis, what rendered this

'3 Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Dalton, 860 F.Supp. 609, 626 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 497 (8" Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S, 1074 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 516 U.S. 474 (1996).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 6

substantive declaration a mere statement of “policy” was not its express designation as such, but rather the fact that it was not “self-executing” -- i.e., that the declaration had practical meaning only as expressing the rationale for a clearly delineated restriction.

With respect to restriction on abortion possibly extending beyond the range of public funding, the Arkansas Supreme Court has further ruled that because Section 2 “merely expresses the public policy of the state” without “provid[ing] any means by which the policy is to be effectuated,” it cannot be read as “a self-executing provision that prohibits the State from engaging in any activity that further or advances abortions.” "°

Even though your amended version of Section 2 does not use the term “policy,” it likewise does not “provide any means by which the policy is to be effectuated.” This fact suggests that, despite the contrary summation in your proposed ballot title, your amendment may provide no clearer proscription against abortion than does the current version of Section 2.'’ Stated differently, as amended by your proposal, Section 2 may remain nothing more than a declaration of policy whose application is either indeterminable — and, as such, necessarily ambiguous — or else restricted to the public-funding limitation set forth in Section 1.

4 1d. at 626-27.
iP) ld.

'® Knowlton v. Ward, 318 Ark. 867, 875, 889 S.W.2d 721 (1994). See Op. Att?y Gen. 2011-020 (noting that neither Section 2 nor Section 3 of Amendment 68 is self-executing).

'7 See Unborn Child Amendment Committee v. Ward, 328 Ark, 454, 463, 943 S.W.2d 591 (1997) (rejecting a facial Section 2 challenge to the state’s indirect involvement in providing non-publicly funded abortion services because the section is not self-executing).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 7

The court in Dalton questioned that Section 2 could have any “effect independent of Section 1.”'® I appreciate that you may have avoided using the term “policy” in your proposal in an effort to invest Section 2 with such independent effect. Your measure, however, fails to achieve such clarity. Without guidance as to the effect of this change on current law, this aspect of your measure cannot be satisfactorily summarized for the voters in a ballot title.

Deletion of the reference to federal law.

Despite the contrary suggestion in your proposed ballot title, which declares that your measure would “ban abortion except when necessary as life-saving medical treatment,” your deletion of any reference to federal law merely leaves unaddressed the effect of federal constitutional restrictions upon the state’s authority to restrict abortions. Without guidance in the measure itself regarding what bearing, if any, federal law might have upon your proposal, I am unable in a ballot title to inform the voter of your measure’s effects on current law," Being provided with clear information on this issue would be of utmost significance to a voter.

'® 860 F.Supp. at 627,

'° The Arkansas Supreme Court has described as follows the importance of communicating to the voter the changes a measure will effect on existing law:

It is evident that before determining the sufficiency of the present ballot title we must first ascertain what changes in the law would be brought about by the adoption of the proposed amendment. For the elector, in voting upon a constitutional amendment, is simply making a choice between retention of the existing law and the substitution of something new. It is the function of the ballot title to provide information concerning the choice that he is called upon to make. Hence the adequacy of the title is directly related to the degree to which it enlightens the voter with reference to the changes that he is given the opportunity of approving.

Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 927, 251 S.W.2d 470 (1952).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No, 2013-065
Page 8

Although your ballot title characterizes the measure as challenging federal law by imposing a qualified ban on abortion, the measure itself contains no such challenge. Rather, it is totally silent regarding the application of federal law. As a consequence, the measure contains no guidance regarding whether the term “protect” is meant to extend beyond the point permitted under the federal constitution. Without resolution of this ambiguity, | am unable to summarize your proposal in a ballot title.

Moreover, even if your measure were clear in expressing an intention to ban abortion, such a measure would be incapable of enforcement. As I have informed you in responding to previous submissions,’ any measure designed to ban abortions from conception until birth is unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade! —a fact that must be communicated to the voter in the clearest of terms, given its crucial significance in weighing any such proposal. You have provided no guidance regarding whether or how you intend your measure to “challenge” federal law, leaving me unable to summarize the effects of your proposal upon existing law, including all current laws relating to abortion.

2. Totally apart from the issue of how federal law might restrict the
   state’s authority, your measure is unclear regarding how the state might be obliged permissibly to “protect” the life of the unborn. It is unclear, for instance, whether this provision would impose upon the state an obligation to mandate such “protective” measures as prenatal screening and drug monitoring. Although you may construe the phrase “protect the life of every unborn child” as nothing more than a euphemism for banning abortion,

*° See, e.g., Ops. Att’y Gen. 2012-045 and 2011-163,

71410 U.S. 113 (1973). As you will recall, I have previously explained for you in detail in Ops. Att’y Gen. 2012-045 and 2011-163 the constitutional difficulties attending any attempt to ban abortion outright.

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 9

the phrase is open-ended to an extent that allows of broader readings. The scope of this term might well be a matter of serious concern to a voter. Without clarification on this score, however, I am unable to summarize your proposal in a ballot title.

3. Section 2 as amended in your proposal is further ambiguous in
   that it is unclear how it can be reconciled with the exception set forth in Section 1 of Amendment 68. Your proposal categorically requires the state to “protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth” (emphasis added). Read in isolation, this directive would appear to include protecting the life of a child even if the life of the mother were endangered by the pregnancy. This directive cannot be reconciled with the provision in Section 1 permitting the public funding of abortion “to save the mother’s life.”

4. To the extent that directing the state to “protect the life” of a
   fetus would involve banning abortion except to save the mother’s life, your proposal moreover conflicts with Section 1’s apparent acknowledgment that, at least in certain instances, privately funded abortions are permissible under other circumstances. Section 1 on its face bars only the public funding of abortions except to save the life of the mother,” thus leaving unaffected the option of obtaining abortions at private expense. Your proposed Section 2 is, as noted, ambiguous, but it may be intended to foreclose privately-funded abortions. Without resolution of this internal conflict in your proposed amendment, | am unable to summarize this aspect of your proposal in a ballot title.

2 In Dalton, 516 U.S. 474 (1996), the Supreme Court declared this provision preempted by the federal Hyde Amendment to the extent that it might be invoked to preclude the funding of abortions funded under Medicaid in cases of rape or incest. See AKA v. Jefferson Hospital Association, 344 Ark. 627, 651, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001) (Imber, J., dissenting) (discussing this ruling).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 10

5. Your proposal is further ambiguous in that it creates a potential
   tension with the provisions of Section 3, which declares that Amendment 68 “will not affect contraceptives.”

A measure such as the “morning-after” pill at least potentially involves the destruction of a fertilized embryo.”? Your proposal, at least as summarized in your ballot title, equates fertilization with constitutionally protected “conception,” raising the question of whether using a potential abortifacient of this sort would be proscribed. I appreciate that Section 3 exempts all “contraceptives” from the application of Amendment 68, thus possibly mooting the question of whether the “contraceptive” use of a “morning-after” pill might otherwise be banned. Simply characterizing this question as moot, however, begs the question of whether the category “contraceptives” should be read under your measure as including an abortifacient agent.”

Your proposal does not address whether the term
“contraceptives” in Section 3 must be restricted only to those measures that would foreclose fertilization or whether the term should be more broadly construed. Your silence on this question leaves me unable to summarize in a ballot title legal consequences that might give the voter a serious ground for reflection.

6. Your proposal further leaves unaddressed, either directly or
   indirectly, what would be the effect of your amendment upon the practice of in-vitro fertilization. Nevertheless, you declare in your ballot title that your measure “will not affect in-vitro

3 See Op. Att’y Gen. 88-380 (noting that use of this measure can result in either the suppression of ovulation or the prevention of implantation of an already fertilized egg).

*4 In the above referenced opinion, my predecessor cautiously opined that the potential abortifacient effect of a “morning-after” pill “may have significance in connection with the policy statement embodied in Section 2 of Amendment 3.” /d.

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065

Page 11

fertilization that does not cause the death of an unborn child.” Your measure itself neither directly supports this proposition nor provides guidance as to what might be the practical effects if the qualification set forth in your ballot-title summary were to apply. If one accepts, for instance, that conception is fertilization — an assumption you appear to make in your ballot title but do not express in your measure — any in-vitro fertilization that involves the destruction of fertilized eggs would be foreclosed under your proposal. The practical effect might be to bar the procedure entirely — a result your ballot title not only fails to acknowledge but appears to deny. I am unable to account for this denial and consequently cannot substitute language in a ballot title so as to summarize this important aspect of your measure.

Your measure is further ambiguous in that it does not resolve the question of what precisely the terms “conception” and “unborn child” denote. Answering this question is crucial to determining the scope of your measure.

As my predecessor acknowledged in the opinion referenced in item 6, supra, the term “conception” is itself fraught with ambiguity. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court addressed as follows the complexity of the claim that life begins at conception:

Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed ... by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a “process” over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the “morning-after” pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs.”°

> A1O USS. at 116.

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065

Page 12

The Arkansas Supreme Court has echoed this concern as follows:

An unborn child cannot exist before life begins, but those trained in the disciplines of law, medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to arrive at a consensus of when life begins.”°

Under the current version of Section 2, which acknowledges the applicability of federal law, an intense definitional debate of the sort just described appears to be unnecessary. Indeed, the Court in Roe v. Wade, in the course of articulating the federal law regarding abortion, merely acknowledged this definitional problem without feeling any need to resolve it. This is so because the preemptive federal law pronounced in Roe v. Wade would permit all of the procedures discussed above — including, with certain qualifications, abortion — without needing to rely on any precise determination of when “conception” occurs and an “unborn child” comes into being.

This is not the case, however, if a measure effectively rejects federal law, as you purport your proposal does. Determining the practical effects, if any, of such a rejection would turn on precisely defining the term “conception,” whose occurrence would presumably trigger potential legal consequences with respect to all procedures of the sort discussed above,

Although you imply in your ballot title that the “conception” referenced in your proposal is the equivalent of “fertilization,” you at no point declare as much in the measure itself. Without resolution of this ambiguity, I cannot summarize the legal effects of your measure in a ballot title. As previously noted, a voter might well consider these effects of paramount concern in determining whether to approve your measure.

°° Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 467, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984).

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065
Page 13

Moreover, your failure to clarify what you mean by the term “conception” renders ambiguous the term “unborn child,”’’ since one cannot determine simply by use of the term when a “child” comes into being. Clarification on this score is likewise required before I can adequately summarize you measure and its effects.”®

I cannot begin to certify a ballot title for your proposed amendment in the face of the ambiguities noted above. You must remedy these confusing and ambiguous points before I can perform my statutory duty.

My office, in the certification of ballot titles and popular names, does not concern itself with the merits, philosophy, or ideology of proposed measures. -I have no constitutional role in the shaping or drafting of such measures. My statutory mandate is embodied only in A.C.A. § 7-9-107 and my duty is to the electorate. I am not your counsel in this matter and cannot advise you as to the substance of your proposal.

At the same time, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court, through its decisions, has placed a practical duty on the Attorney General, in exercising his statutory

27 In Riviere, in the course of rejecting a popular name containing the term

unborn child,” the Arkansas Supreme Court pointed out this ambiguity as follows:

The ballot name “unborn child,” standing alone, would tend to mislead those voters who follow an alternative school of thought and do not think of fetuses of certain gestational ages as unborn children. Those voters could well make a distinction between a one- second old conceptus and a fetus of cight months gestation....

Td. at 468.

Assuming you elect to revise and to resubmit your proposal, in light of the court’s rejection in Riviere of a popular name containing the term “unborn child,” you might want to consider removing the term from your own proposed popular name.

*8 | appreciate that the term “conception” appears in the current version of Section 2 as well as in your proposed amendment. As noted above, however, the ambiguity of this term is far less of an issue under current law, which acknowledges the applicability of federal law that renders determining the precise moment of “conception” largely irrelevant.

Preston Dunn, Jr., President
Personhood Arkansas
Opinion No. 2013-065

Page 14

duty, to include language in a ballot title about the effects of a proposed measure on current law. See, e.g., Finn v. McCuen, supra. Furthermore, the Court has recently confirmed that a proposed amendment cannot be approved if “[t]he text of the proposed amendment itself contribute[s] to the confusion and disconnect between the language in the popular name and the ballot title and the language in the proposed measure.” Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376 (2000). The Court concluded: ‘“[I]nternal inconsistencies would inevitably lead to confusion in drafting a popular name and ballot title and to confusion in the ballot title itself.” Jd. Where the effects of a proposed measure on current law are unclear or ambiguous, it is impossible for me to perform my statutory duty to the satisfaction of the Arkansas Supreme Court without clarification of the ambiguities.

My statutory duty, under these circumstances, is to reject your proposed ballot title, stating my reasons therefor, and to instruct you to “redesign” the proposed measure and ballot title. See A.C.A. § 7-9-107(c). You may, after clarification of the matters discussed above, resubmit your proposed amendment, along with a proposed popular name and ballot title, at your convenience. I anticipate, as noted above, that some changes or additions to your submitted popular name and ballot title may be necessary. I will be pleased to perform my statutory duties in this regard in a timely manner after resubmission.

Sincerely =. / a)
EW,

USTIN MCDAMIEL -
Attorney General

DM/cyh

Enclosure

(Popular Name)
Protecting the Life of Every Unborn Child

(Ballot Title)
AN AMENDMENT TO THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION:
THIS AMENDMENT WILL REVISE AMENDMENT 68, ABORTION,
SECTION 2, PUBLIC POLICY. THE EFFECT OF THIS REVISION WILL BE TO CHANGE THE EXISTING PUBLIC POLICY OF ARKANSAS THAT “PROTECT|S] THE LIFE OF EVERY UNBORN CHILD FROM CONCEPTION UNTIL BIRTH” INTO LAW. THIS AMENDMENT WILL CHALLENGE FEDERAL LAW AND COURT RULINGS. THIS AMENDMENT WILL BAN ABORTION EXCEPT WHEN NECESSARY AS LIFE-SAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT. THIS AMENDMENT WILL NOT AFFECT IN-VITRO FERTILIZATION THAT DOES NOT CAUSE THE DEATH OF AN UNBORN CHILD. THIS AMENDMENT WILL NOT AFFECT THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES. THIS AMENDMENT WILL NOT REQUIRE AN APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Arkansas, Amendment 68, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas is amended to read:

2. Protecting Life.
   The State of Arkansas shall protect the life of every unborn child from

conception until birth.